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Zusammenfassung
Moderne Fahrzeuge sind zunehmend intelligent und miteinander vernetzt. Dies Er-
möglicht neue Qualitäten von Kooperation, indem Kooperation von der Aufmerk-
samkeit menschlicher Nutzer entkoppelt wird. Im Rahmen von Smart-Traffic, zum
Beispiel, können smarte Fahrzeuge autonom kooperieren um den Verkehrsfluss zu
optimieren, um Dienste zu nutzen und zu erbringen und um Sensorwerte auszutau-
schen. Zusätzlich zu Verbesserungen der individuellen Lebensqualität, haben solche
kooperative Dienste das Potential, zur Lösung signifikanter gesellschaftlicher Heraus-
forderungen beizutragen. Dazu zählen, zum Beispiel, die Verminderung schädlicher
Umwelteinflüsse und die Meisterung stetig wachsender Mobilitätsanforderungen.
Das wachsende Volumen an Daten, die Nutzer smarter Dienste von sich preisge-
ben, ermöglicht jedoch auch weitgehende Eingriffe in die Privatsphäre von Nutzern.
Wenn Aspekte des Privatsphärenschutzes nicht frühzeitig im Systementwurf be-
rücksichtigt werden, kann die unrechtmäßige Erfassung privater Daten nicht effek-
tiv verhindert werden.
Im Kontext von Smart-Traffic ist insbesondere der Schutz von mit Zeitstempeln ver-
sehenen Lokationsdaten relevant. Also von Daten, aus denen entnommen werden
kann, wo ein bestimmter Nutzer sich zu einer bestimmten Zeit aufgehalten hat. Lo-
kationsdaten werden für die Realisierung einer Vielzahl von Smart-Traffic-Diensten
benötigt, von kooperativer Verkehrsüberwachung und Verkehrsflussoptimierung
bis hin zu der Auslieferung von Nachrichten basierend auf geografischen Kriteri-
en. Zur selben Zeit können Lokationsdaten, im Kontext der Privatheit, höchst sensi-
bel sein. Aus Ihnen kann auf Gewohnheiten, Interessen, soziale Kontakte und sogar
den Gesundheitszustand und das politische Engagement von Nutzern geschlossen
werden. Daher sollte die Privatheit von Lokationsdaten gewährleistet werden.
Der Nutzen von Smart-Traffic-Diensten ist oft direkt von dem Volumen und der Qua-
lität der kommunizierten Daten abhängig. Dabei kann es unzureichend sein, Nut-
zern lediglich die anonyme oder pseudonyme Partizipation zu ermöglichen. Wie
wiederholt in der Literatur gezeigt werden konnte, können, bei ausreichend ho-
her Samplingrate und -präzision, anonyme Lokationsdaten effektiv deanonymisiert
werden, indem auf Korrelation und leicht zugängliches Kontextwissen zurückge-
griffen wird. Außerdem werden explizit identifizierbare Daten oft benötigt, um den
Missbrauch von Diensten zu detektieren und zu bestrafen.
Viele bestehende Arbeiten und in der Praxis eingesetzte Systeme verlassen sich auf
die Existenz von dedizierten vertrauenswürdigen Entitäten, z.B. in der Form von ver-
trauenswürdigen Dienstanbietern. Diese bieten nicht nur ein attraktives Angriffs-
ziel, sondern befinden sich oft auch in der Position für großflächige Einschnitte in
iv
die Privatsphäre von Nutzern. Durch die Sammlung großer Datenmengen werden
z.B. Korrelationsangriffe ermöglicht. In dieser Arbeit wird daher untersucht, wie,
durch Dezentralisierung, die Abhängigkeit von einzelnen Entitäten aufgehoben wer-
den kann. Zusätzlich zur Eliminierung zentralisierter Datensenken, ermöglicht De-
zentralisierung auch die Realisierung von Datenlokalität: es kann erreicht werden,
dass präzise Lokationsdaten nur mit Entitäten geteilt werden, die sich nachweislich
in der Nähe befinden.
In der vorliegenden Dissertation wird auf drei funktionelle Bausteine eingegangen,
die sowohl relevant für aufkommende Smart-Traffic-Dienste sind, als auch signifi-
kante Herausforderungen bei der Balancierung von Privatsphärenschutz und Nut-
zen bieten. Diese sind: kooperative Planung, geografische Adressierung und die
dezentrale Bereitstellung von Pseudonymen. Als wichtigen Unterschied zu vielen
verwandten Arbeiten und praktisch etablierten Systemen, werden in dieser Arbeit
Widersacher angenommen, die beliebige zentral kontrollierte Systemkomponenten
infiltrieren können, um privatsphärenrelevante Daten zu sammeln. Dies soll die Ge-
fahr widerspiegeln, die von Hacker-Angriffen, staatlichen Eingriffen und unehrli-
chen Dienstanbietern hervorgeht. Es wird allerdings angenommen, dass die Mehr-
zahl der Nutzer nie aktiv mit böswilliger Absicht zusammenarbeitet (z.B. um die
Privatsphäre einzelner Nutzer zu kompromittieren). Die konkreten Beiträge in der
vorliegenden Arbeit sind folgende:
• Privatsphärengerechte kooperative Routenplanung [41]. Im Rahmen von ko-
operativer Routenplanung veröffentlichen Nutzer ihre geplanten Routen, um,
gemeinschaftlich, Staus zu vermeiden und den Verkehrsfluss zu verbessern.
Die zentrale Herausforderung, die in diesem Kontext in Angriff genommen
wird, ist, Widersacher daran zu hindern, vergangene und zukünftige Nutzer-
Lokationen erfassen zu können. Gleichzeitig soll das System in der Lage sein,
sich gegen Missbrauch zu schützen, insbesondere gegen Nutzer, die falsche
Pläne veröffentlichen. Als Lösung wird die Konstruktion Promise Coins (PCs)
vorgestellt. PCs sind kryptographische Tokens angelehnt an David Chaums
Entwürfe für elektronisches Bargeld. Eine begrenzte Anzahl von PCs wird an
jeden Nutzer ausgestellt. Dabei müssen PCs ausgegeben werden, um Pläne zu
veröffentlichen. Neue PCs werden ausgestellt, sobald Pläne wie versprochen
erfüllt wurden. Dadurch verbleiben ehrliche Nutzer mit einem stabilen Vorrat
an PCs, während lügende Nutzer schnell das Recht verlieren, an dem System
teilzunehmen. Wie durch Analyse bestätigt, sind Pläne anonym und nicht ein-
fach rekonstruierbar. Durch Leistungsmessungen der verwendeten Bausteine
wird weiterhin die Praxistauglichkeit des vorgestellten Systems gezeigt.
• Privatheitswahrender Langstrecken-Geocast [39, 40, 42, 43, 56]. Das System
OverDrive wird vorgestellt - ein Overlay-basierter Geocast-Dienst für Smart-
Traffic-Anwendungen. OverDrive ermöglicht die Adressierung von Fahrzeu-
gen basierend auf geografischen Charakteristika. So können z.B. Nachrichten
an alle Nutzer in einem bestimmten Gebiet ausgeliefert werden. Anders als
vin zentralisierten Ansätzen, werden die Lokationen von Nutzern nicht mit
einzelnen Dienstanbietern geteilt, sondern mit einer Gruppe anderer Nutzer.
Zusätzlich zur Eliminierung zentralisierter Datensenken, wird dabei auch Da-
tenlokalität realisiert - nur Nutzer, die sich nachweislich in der Nähe befin-
den, empfangen präzise Lokationsdaten. Durch einen dedizierten Mechanis-
mus zur Aufdeckung von gefälschten Lokationen, wird Datenlokalität auch
dann sichergestellt, wenn Widersacher aktiv ihre eigenen Positionen fälschen.
Zusätzlich zu einer Analyse der erreichten Privatheit, werden Simulations-
studien des vorgeschlagenen Systems durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse demons-
trieren, dass sowohl die großflächige, als auch die gezielte Überwachung von
OverDrive-Nutzern nicht effektiv möglich ist, ohne physisch präsent zu sein.
Bezüglich der erreichbaren Performanz, erweist sich OverDrive als praktika-
ble Alternative zu traditionelleren, zentralisierten Ansätzen.
• Sybil-resistente Pseudonymisierung und Pseudonymwechsel ohne vertrau-
enswürdige Dritte [44]. Das Ausstellen von Pseudonymen ist ein etablier-
ter Ansatz, um die Privatheit von Nutzern zu gewährleisten, während Zu-
gangskontrolle ermöglicht wird und Sybil-Angriffe verhindert werden. Um
die Identifikation von Pseudonyminhabern durch durchgängige Beobachtung
und Korrelation zu verhindern, müssen nicht-verkettbare Pseudonymwechsel
ermöglicht werden. Existierende Ansätze zur Realisierung von Sybil-resistenter
Pseudonymisierung und Pseudonymwechsel sind dabei entweder inhärent
von vertrauenswürdigen Instanzen abhängig, oder führen zu einem signifi-
kanten Rechenaufwand für beteiligte Nutzer und deren Geräte. In dieser Dis-
sertation wird ein neuer Ansatz für Sybil-resistente Pseudonymisierung und
Pseudonymwechsel entwickelt, welcher von der Existenz individueller Ver-
trauensanker unabhängig ist, ohne Nutzer unrealistisch stark zu belasten. Der
vorgeschlagene Ansatz basiert auf der Verwendung von Blockchains, wie sie
auch in dezentralen Währungen verwendet werden. Es wird ein genereller
Ansatz vorgestellt, sowie der konkrete Entwurf BitNym, der auf dem unmodi-
fizierten Bitcoin-Netzwerk aufbaut. Evaluationsergebnisse demonstrieren die
praktische Realisierbarkeit des Ansatzes und zeigen, dass Anonymitätssets,
die der gesamten Nutzerpopulation entsprechen, möglich sind.
Es wurde, bezüglich dem in ihnen erreichten Schutz der Privatsphäre, eine Analyse
und Evaluation aller vorgestellten Bausteine durchgeführt. Dabei wird ein zweistu-
figer Ansatz verwendet. Zunächst werden die Bedrohungen Detektion und Enthül-
lung betrachtet. Hierbei werden die Art und die Qualität der Daten, die ein Wider-
sacher sammeln kann, untersucht. Dies schließt die Identifizierung von möglichen
Angriffen, mit deren Hilfe der Angreifer sein Wissen vermehren kann, mit ein. Ba-
sierend auf den Daten, die laut diesem Schritt zur Verfügung stehen, wird schließ-
lich untersucht, inwieweit die Verkettbarkeit und Identifizierung von Datenobjekten
möglich ist. Das Endziel des Widersachers ist dabei stets das Erhalten von identifi-
zierbaren, mit Zeitstempeln versehenen Lokationsdaten.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, a rapid development of new information and communication tech-
nologies can be witnessed. In addition to promising significant quality of life im-
provements, these advancements have great potential for meeting long-standing
societal challenges, like reducing environmental impacts and meeting ever increas-
ing mobility demands. Ubiquitous communication technology and the increasing
intelligence of things - physical objects - enable fundamentally new qualities of co-
operation, as cooperation becomes decoupled from users’ attention. In the domain
of smart traffic, for example, users in smart vehicles can easily cooperate to optimize
traffic flow, request and provide services and exchange sensor data.
With these new abilities, however, come new dangers: with the increasing amount
of privacy-relevant data shared by users, new dimensions of privacy intrusions be-
come possible. Without considering privacy issues early in the design of complex
systems, resulting systems can become inherently susceptible to leaks of privacy-
relevant data and exploits by determined attackers. Recurring media reports, e.g.,
about the activities of governmental intelligence agencies, reflect this as well as in-
vestigations into popular smart traffic systems like Google Maps and Waze [64].
Users are left with no choice but to accept their loss of privacy if they want to use
novel services and retain their competitiveness and overall societal integration. Yet
the right to privacy is widely acknowledged to be fundamental [62] and forms a
central pillar of functioning democratic societies.
The realization of complex systems is significantly more difficult when privacy pro-
tection becomes a central design requirement. In many areas, there is still a lack of
understanding about how complex functionality can be realized in a reliable and
abuse-resistant manner without harming users’ privacy in the face of strong adver-
saries. The focus of this thesis is on three functional building blocks that are espe-
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cially challenging in this respect: cooperative planning, geographic addressing and
the decentralized provision of pseudonymous identifiers.
1.1 Problem statement
Adversary model
In the scope of this thesis, adversary models are used for analyzing and evaluating
the privacy characteristics of different systems and approaches. As an important
distinction to many related works, this thesis assumes strong adversaries that can
collude with entities controlling central system components, e.g., service operators
and certificate authorities, for compromising user privacy. This assumption reflects
the threat arising from security breaches, governmental subpoenas and dishonest
service operators.
Unless noted otherwise, adversaries are assumed to be external to the majority of
users, i.e., not colluding with them or controlling them. Adversaries can, however,
be internal to a bounded number of users, e.g., via bribes or the compromising of
user devices.
Cellular network operators are assumed to honor location privacy and never col-
lude with adversaries to release the location data of users. Location privacy in cel-
lular networks is a problem orthogonal to the challenges tackled in this thesis. The
fact that cellular network providers can learn the locations of all of their customers
is a drawback in the practical realization of cellular networks and not an inherent
property. Given cellular network technologies that protect user locations from cel-
lular network operators, the requirement of honest cellular network operators can
be dropped for all designs discussed in this thesis.
Privacy in smart trac
Privacy-preservation is the protection of privacy-relevant data, which encompasses
all non-public data that is attributable to a person [26]. One of the most relevant
classes of privacy-relevant data generated in the context of smart traffic is that of
location data - information from which the location of a user at a given point in time
can be inferred. Location data, e.g., in the form of timestamped location samples,
is required for the provision of a wide variety of smart traffic services, from traffic
monitoring and optimization to the delivery of messages based on geographic crite-
ria. At the same time, timestamped location data is highly sensitive from a privacy
standpoint. It can reveal habits, interests and social contacts as well as health status
(by observing the frequency of hospital visits) and political engagement (by observ-
ing the presence at political events). Consequently, a central focus point of this thesis
is the preservation of location privacy in cooperative smart traffic services, i.e., pre-
venting potential adversaries from collecting identifiable location data. This is a
significant challenge; cooperative smart traffic services often require location data
to be shared continuously. As repeatedly shown in the literature, given a sufficient
number of location samples, the reconstruction of trips and eventual identification
of collected samples can become possible.
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From a technical standpoint, the protection of privacy-relevant data is best realized
by following the principle of data minimization. Data minimization can be defined
as ensuring that no subject gets to know any data, privacy-relevant or not, unless
it is absolutely necessary in a given system context [94]. Data minimization is chal-
lenging to realize without compromising the utility of complex services. For some
services like abuse-resistant cooperative planning or the location-based addressabil-
ity of mobile nodes, no compelling solutions are known that enable a satisfactory
balance between privacy protection and utility.
In many existing works, key system tasks are put under the centralized control of
single trusted entities. In addition to often enabling large-scale correlation attacks
and privacy breaches, this approach results in centrally controlled components that
are attractive targets for attacks and, therefore, costly to secure. Through decen-
tralization, the need for centralized control over system-critical components can be
eliminated, as well as the existence of system-wide data sinks. Additionally, the re-
alization of data locality becomes possible, i.e., ensuring that precise location data is
disclosed only to entities that are also provably nearby. Also, the problem of estab-
lishing trust anchors in systems with diverse (and potentially globally distributed)
stakeholders can be avoided.
Scope of this thesis
In the scope of this thesis, two specific functional building blocks for upcoming
smart traffic systems are explored. Both are difficult to reconcile with the require-
ment of location privacy under the assumption of strong adversaries. Namely, fol-
lowing problems are considered:
• Realizing cooperative route planning, where vehicles inform each other about
planned routes to optimize traffic flow and avoid future congestions. A cen-
tral challenge here is to ensure abuse resistance, i.e., that malicious participants
cannot effectively manipulate traffic flow through false reports. On the other
hand, the plans of users must remain private and non-identifiable, as they re-
veal planned future locations.
• Enabling long-distance geocast, i.e., the addressability of vehicles based on geo-
graphic criteria. Geocast enables location-based notifications and information
queries to be forwarded to vehicles on the road, thus forming a base for a
wide variety of smart traffic services. Without costly dedicated infrastructure,
the locations of participating vehicles must be monitored in order to provide
the service correctly. Without additional measures, this can enable large-scale
privacy breaches.
In addition to these smart traffic-specific building blocks, a third, more universally
relevant challenge is also tackled:
• Realizing pseudonymization and pseudonym change in a completely decentral-
ized manner, i.e., without relying on any form of trusted third party (TTP) dur-
ing setup and operation. Unlinkable pseudonyms that support changeover
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are required in a vast number of systems, both in smart traffic and beyond.
Eliminating TTPs in this context poses a significant challenge, especially when
considering sybil attacks, i.e., the simultaneous use of multiple fake identities.
If privacy-preservation is not a design goal, straightforward solutions exist for all of
these challenges. This is also true if a weak adversary is assumed, e.g., by assuming
the existence of an honest, completely incorruptible and universally trusted service
provider.
Assumptions
This work is based on a number of assumptions which are realistic and easily met
in today’s world and the near future.
Since this thesis explores cooperative services, users are an entity of central impor-
tance. The term user is used interchangeably to describe both the driver of a smart
vehicle and any on-board device on that vehicle. It is assumed that vehicles and
devices operate on behalf of the driver and share its location during travel. This
assumption makes the distinction between subjects, their (possibly autonomous)
vehicles and their vehicles’ on-board equipment irrelevant.
It is assumed that vehicles, and thus, users, are equipped with cellular network-
ing interfaces (e.g., for 3G and 4G networks) and that cellular network coverage is
ubiquitous. Additionally, the availability of short-range communication interfaces,
as discussed in the context of vehicular networking [66], is assumed as well as the
existence of GPS sensors. These requirements can, in essence, be met by using a
commonly available smartphone, which makes the proposed solutions readily de-
ployable in practice. As users of smart traffic services are typically associated with
moving vehicles, this thesis assumes the existence of an abundant energy budget for
users and does not consider the energy consumption of the presented solutions.
It is assumed that the majority of users are honest and cooperate willingly. More
specifically, it is assumed that, while possibly selfish or curious in isolation, the ma-
jority of users will never actively collude with malicious intent.
1.2 Research questions and contributions
This thesis tackles two major questions:
1. How complex systems can be designed so that strong adversaries cannot learn
any privacy-relevant data. More specifically, the focus is on preventing the
collection of timestamped location data that is identifiable while preserving the
systems’ functionality and making sure that privacy measures do not enable
significant abuse.
2. How decentralization can be applied to complex services, eliminating the re-
quirement for single trusted entities. A special focus in on the implications of
decentralization on trust and its interplay with privacy.
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This thesis identifies several important open challenges in the context of smart traf-
fic. The key contribution consists of developing and evaluating original solutions
to these challenges. The presented solutions are readily deployable using existing
infrastructure and common consumer equipment like smartphones. The specific
contributions are the following:
• Privacy-preserving cooperative route planning. In cooperative route plan-
ning approaches, vehicles share their planned routes to cooperatively avoid
congestions and optimize traffic flow. The main challenge tackled in this con-
text is the preservation of user privacy (i.e., preventing adversaries from de-
termining the past and future locations of individual users) while ensuring
that the system is resistant to abuse, i.e., to malicious users that distribute false
plans. Addressing this challenge, this thesis introduces the construction of
promise coins (PCs) modeled after Chaum’s electronic cash design [16]. A limited
supply of PCs is issued to each user, with the spending of PCs being required
for publishing plans. PCs are reimbursed to users when plans are realized as
claimed, thus maintaining a stable PC supply at honest users. Malicious users,
on the other hand, lose their right to participate in the system by being unable
to replenish their PC supply.
• Location privacy in long-distance geocast. OverDrive, an overlay-based geo-
cast service for smart traffic applications, is presented. OverDrive enables the
addressing of vehicles based on geographic characteristics, e.g., the delivery
of messages to all users within a given area. Unlike in centralized approaches,
user locations are not shared with a single service provider but with a dy-
namic set of other users. In addition to, in this way, eliminating centralized
data sinks, data minimization is realized through data locality - only users that
are provably close receive precise location data.
• Sybil-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym change. The issuing of
pseudonyms is an established approach for protecting the privacy of users
while limiting access and preventing sybil attacks. To prevent pseudonym
deanonymization through continuous observation and correlation, frequent
and unlinkable pseudonym changes must be enabled. Existing approaches
for realizing sybil-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym change are ei-
ther inherently dependent on trusted third parties (TTPs) or involve signif-
icant computation overhead at end-user devices. This thesis investigates a
novel, TTP-independent approach towards sybil-resistant pseudonymization
and pseudonym change. The proposal is based on the use of cryptocurrency
block chains as general-purpose, append-only bulletin boards. A general ap-
proach is presented as well as BitNym, a specific design based on the unmodi-
fied Bitcoin network [84].
In addition to performance evaluations, privacy analyses and evaluations of the
proposed building blocks are conducted. Based on the adversary model outlined in
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Section 1.1, the type and quality of data an adversary is able to collect using different
attacks is analyzed. A simulation approach is used to capture the complex effects
arising in realistic scenarios (e.g., the geographic distribution of users in vehicular
traffic scenarios) as well as to quantify the trade-offs between privacy protection and
performance.
Based on the data available to an adversary (according to analysis and simulation),
it is analyzed to what extend identification is possible. In this context, it is discussed
to what extend data items associated with the same user can be linked together, as
this enables profiling attacks and greatly increases an adversary’s knowledge gain
after identifying individual data items (e.g., using additional context knowledge).
1.3 Structure of this thesis
The foundations of this thesis are introduced in Chapter 2. Amongst other things,
the chapter discusses existing techniques for the preservation of location privacy
as well as different approaches towards decentralization. The assumptions and ad-
versary models underlying the remainder of the thesis are elaborated in Chapter 3.
Additionally, a systematic approach for analyzing the privacy characteristics of the
proposed systems is described.
Three bodies of original work are then presented. Chapter 4 describes an investiga-
tion into privacy-preserving cooperative route planning as well as the novel promise
coin construction. Chapter 5 presents the privacy-preserving long-distance geocast
system OverDrive. Chapter 6 addresses the challenge of realizing pseudonymization
and pseudonym change without TTPs and introduces the BitNym system.
The thesis then concludes, in Chapter 7, with a summary of results and a discussion
of future perspectives for research and application.
The thesis features three appendices. Appendix A presents a measurement-based
investigation into the connectivity- and privacy-related properties of deployed cel-
lular networks. Appendix B describes the functionality and implementation of an
interactive visualization of the OverDrive system. Appendix C lists simulation pa-
rameters used for generating the evaluation results presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
2. Privacy and trust in cooperative
smart trac services
This chapter introduces foundations that are relevant for the presented thesis. Upon
introducing smart traffic and the concept of cooperative services in Section 2.1,
privacy-related challenges applying in this context are discussed in the subsequent
Section 2.2. Common privacy threats and protection goals are introduced and spe-
cific threats related to the sharing of timestamped location data are considered. In
Section 2.3, existing approaches for protecting timestamped location data are out-
lined and compared.
As the avoidance of centralized architectures, e.g., for eliminating the requirement
of trusting singular entities, is an important theme throughout this thesis, different
approaches to decentralization and their impact on trust modelling are discussed in
Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 discusses existing proposals for limiting the impact of malicious users
while preserving the privacy of honest ones. Notably, this includes approaches for
bounding the number of identities that users are able to simultaneously maintain
within a given system.
Lastly, the chapter also touches upon several related challenges. The connectiv-
ity and privacy characteristics of contemporary cellular networks are discussed as
well as the practical possibilities for establishing private and secure communication
channels over the Internet. Both of these challenges are discussed in Section 2.6.
2.1 Smart trac and cooperation
Today’s street traffic is still largely inefficient. Overburdened roads lead to con-
gestions and unnecessary pollution. Accidents are common and the possibilities
for social interactions with other drivers are limited. Smart traffic, the application
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of modern information and communication technology to the vehicular traffic sce-
nario, has tremendous potential for improving such issues. Through the increasing
interconnection of smart vehicles, for example, the capabilities of traffic participants
to cooperate can be significantly enhanced. This section, following an outline of the
capabilities of modern and near-future vehicles, discusses several examples of how
improvements can be realized. Typical smart traffic applications are introduced as
well as the concept of cooperative services and its application to the smart traffic
context.
2.1.1 Smart cars
Modern cars are rapidly increasing in complexity, becoming equipped with a grow-
ing number of sensors and communication capabilities. On the sensor side, this
includes GPS positioning sensors (for navigation), weather (e.g., temperature and
rain) sensors, road condition sensors and multiple cameras (e.g., for parking assis-
tance). Cellular communication interfaces for 3G, 4G and soon 5G networks are
increasingly deployed for enabling richer traffic information and infotainment ser-
vices as well as enabling maintenance-related tasks (e.g., remote diagnoses). Short-
range radio interfaces for enabling ad hoc vehicular networking are being standard-
ized and will likely be included in new vehicles in the near future [35, 66]. For
receiving wide-area broadcasts, classic FM radio and the (60 bit/s) traffic message
channel running over it can be leveraged as well.
As an important addition to these sensory and communication capabilities, mod-
ern cars are also equipped with an increasing amount of intelligence. From auto-
matic navigation and engine management to safety-related features like automatic
breaking, cars are increasingly software-controlled. The ongoing research into au-
tonomous driving is especially interesting in this context; given a car that can nav-
igate traffic and reach its destination by itself, the need for an actual human driver
diminishes. The lack of a human driver does not, however, alleviate potential pri-
vacy concerns, as subjects are still present in the form of passengers and, potentially,
car owners.
While some of the listed capabilities are not yet widely deployed on today’s streets,
many of them can be emulated using common smartphones. Stock smartphone fea-
tures that can be leveraged include cellular network interfaces, GPS sensors, wire-
less LAN and Bluetooth interfaces (for short-range communication [12]) and accel-
eration sensors. Modern smartphones also feature substantial computing resources.
One of the main limitations of smartphone-class devices - their constrained energy
budget - is not relevant in the vehicular traffic setting. Here, abundant energy re-
sources are typically available (e.g., when considering devices located in moving
cars).
2.1.2 Typical smart trac applications
In the following, the potential behind smart traffic is motivated based on several
example classes of smart traffic applications.
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2.1.2.1 Safety
Increasing the safety of travel is a constant driving force behind vehicular innova-
tion. Safety applications, e.g., the sending of cooperative awareness messages for as-
sisting in the detection of hazards, are also one of the main motivators behind the
development of short-range vehicular networking standards and protocols [66]. Lo-
cal ad hoc communication is ideal for safety-related applications, as safety-critical
information is usually time-critical (necessitating low communication latencies) and
only of local interest. Wide-area warnings are, however, possible as well and can be
used for adapting route choices (e.g., for avoiding icy roads).
2.1.2.2 Trac optimization
In addition to improving the mobility of subjects and goods, traffic optimization is
an important contributor to reducing the negative environmental impact of devel-
oped societies. Historically, optimizing the traffic flow has been a challenge tackled
mainly by traffic authorities and city planners. With the rise of the smart traffic
paradigm, however, the role of individual users increases. By reporting the locally
observed traffic, users act as traffic sensors and assist in traffic monitoring. Addition-
ally, through automatic vehicular navigation and the possibility for two-way commu-
nication with vehicles, traffic can be influenced in a more fine-granular manner.
Vehicular navigation, specifically, is one of the most widely used smart traffic appli-
cations today. Considering major deployed systems, two different evolution stages
can be identified. Using static route planning, navigation devices determine their
own current location (e.g., via GPS) and determine the shortest path to the destina-
tion based on static map material. Dynamic route planning is performed similarly to
static navigation, but traffic updates, e.g., about congestions and construction sites,
are also taken into account during route calculation. Dynamic route planning is, for
the most part, the current status quo in automatic navigation and used in a wide
range of navigation devices and smartphone applications.
Different possibilities exist for obtaining the current traffic state for dynamic route
planning. Established approaches like police reports or infrastructure-based traffic
monitoring (e.g., via inductive sensors in the road) are suboptimal in terms of cost,
delay and precision. Leveraging input from vehicles on the road is significantly
more promising. Such cooperative methods are discussed in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.2.3 Parking space discovery
While traffic optimization can improve the flow of traffic, shortening parking space
search times through improved parking space discovery has the potential for reducing
the overall traffic volume. Cruising for parking spaces was found to generate signif-
icant amounts of traffic [103]. In practice, payment-based reservation systems and
locally deployed sensors are often used for determining free parking spaces. This
information can then be shared with individual vehicles. However, payment-based
parking solutions are not applicable everywhere and the deployment and mainte-
nance of sensors can require significant investments.
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2.1.2.4 Social networking
Despite large amounts of vehicular traffic, users on the road can rarely connect with
each other while travelling. The popularity of vehicular social networking applications
like Waze1 as well as the communication habits of professional drivers (e.g., truck
drivers) both hint at a general desire for interacting with fellow travelers. Modern
communication technologies can help, e.g., by providing discovery mechanisms for
communication partners with a similar location or route. In addition to facilitating
social interactions within a geographically relevant scope, vehicular social network-
ing also enables the exchange of practical traffic-related information that is cumber-
some to convey in an automatic manner.
2.1.3 Cooperative services
As a general concept, cooperative services are services in which individual subjects
(respectively devices acting on their behalf) work together for realizing the main
provided functionality. In contrast to collaboration, the goals achieved through co-
operation are common to all participants. Thus, cooperating users act selfishly, as
they benefit from the end-result of collaboration. Cooperation can range from phys-
ical actions to the sharing of information. Many smart traffic applications discussed
so far can be realized or augmented by leveraging user cooperation. In fact, most
smart traffic services are inherently cooperative, as information and actions from
other participants are required to achieve benefits.
In the following, common forms of user cooperation are discussed as well as their
application to the smart traffic context. The discussed forms of cooperation are:
• information exchange
• planning
• one-to-one cooperation
• data distribution
2.1.3.1 Information exchange
Through information exchange, individuals can augment each other’s view of the
world. In this way, more informed decisions are enabled for all involved parties.
An application example of this pattern is traffic monitoring, respectively dynamic
route planning. Here, vehicles can act as traffic sensors by transmitting their loca-
tion, speed and driving direction. By collecting such floating car data from a large
number of participants on the road, the current traffic state can be estimated. This
is the approach used in, amongst others, the popular smartphone-based navigation
service Google Maps2.
Another example for cooperative services based on information exchange are crowd-
sensing systems [46]. Similarly to traffic monitoring, sensory input is collected from
1https://waze.com/
2https://maps.google.com/
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participants. Crowdsensing can be used for anything from environmental studies
(e.g., by collecting information about air quality) and the creation of fine-granular
weather maps up to improving the safety of individuals in cities, by cooperatively
identifying dangerous areas [21]. In this context, it should be noted that vehicular
safety approaches based on short-range ad hoc networking are also centered around
the idea of information exchange [66].
2.1.3.2 Planning
Cooperation is also possible in the form of cooperative planning, i.e., the coordina-
tion of individual actions. In a smart traffic context, this can most prominently take
the form of cooperative route planning. Here, in addition to static map material and
information about the current traffic state, the destinations and planned routes of
other traffic participants are taken into account during route planning. In this way,
the future traffic situation can be anticipated [23, 34].
Cooperative planning can also be applied for allocating available parking spaces
and charging stations for electric cars.
2.1.3.3 One-to-one cooperation
As an alternative to more global approaches, one-to-one cooperation is possible as
well. Individual participants can query each other for information and engage in
social interactions.
In contrast to the information exchange concept discussed earlier, one-to-one coop-
eration enables the request-based, on-demand sharing of information. Additionally,
the provision of services requiring more human attention is possible. This can in-
clude services that involve physical actions, e.g., a change in route as in [48].
2.1.3.4 Data distribution
Up to this point, mechanisms for distributing data to a set of recipients were im-
plicitly assumed. In practice, such communication channels are often realized using
centralized services or dedicated infrastructure. However, data distribution can also
be realized in a cooperative manner by participating individuals.
An example for this approach is classic peer-to-peer networking (cf. Section 2.4.3).
Also, many works exist that leverage data distribution via vehicular ad hoc net-
works, e.g., [83, 118]. As an effect of cooperative data distribution, neither revenue
generation nor explicit investments are required for maintaining the availability of
services. Instead, participating users contribute a fraction of their own communica-
tion, computation and storage resources.
2.2 Location privacy
As an important aspect of cooperation, users need to generate and share data that is
potentially privacy-relevant. The term privacy-relevant encompasses all non-public
data that is attributable to a natural person [26]. In the context of smart traffic, this
most distinctively involves timestamped location data, as it is commonly required for
realizing services related to moving vehicles and traffic. Considering cooperative
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Threat Protection goal(s)
linkability unlinkability
identifiability anonymity, pseudonymity
non-repudiation plausible deniability
detectability undetectability, unobservability
information disclosure confidentiality
content unawareness content awareness, transparency
policy and consent non-compliance policy and consent compliance
Table 2.1 LINDDUN threats and corresponding protection goals.
traffic monitoring, for example, the transmission of timestamped location data is
mandatory for reporting the locally observed traffic state.
In the following, based on a more general discussion of the concept of privacy, an
overview is given of the challenges involved in protecting location data while main-
taining service utility.
2.2.1 Threats and protection goals in general
Despite of its importance for maintaining individual and societal freedom and its
recognition as a fundamental human right [62], the concept of “privacy” is highly
vague and difficult to grasp with a precise technical definition. Different approaches
to concretizing its extent have been proposed, many of which are rooted in legal
definitions (see, for example, [104] and the excellent overview in [26]). In [94], Pfitz-
mann and Hansen propose an extensive terminology for discussing privacy-related
topics in a technical context. Their work proposes precise definitions for concepts
like anonymity, unlinkability and pseudonymity and is widely used in the privacy
research literature.
Comprehensive analysis frameworks for identifying privacy threats have also been
proposed, most notably the LINDDUN methodology [28, 119]. LINDDUN defines
seven distinct privacy threats (and their corresponding protection goals) that can
be used for reasoning about the privacy properties of a system. These are predom-
inantly rooted in the definitions proposed by Pfitzmann and Hansen as well as in
legal requirements applying to service operators. In the following, due to its system-
atic structure and large scope (it includes several threats not mentioned in [94], for
example), the LINDDUN set of privacy threats is used as a base for concretizing the
concept of privacy. The threats defined by LINDDUN are: linkability, identifiability,
non-repudiation, detectability, information disclosure, content unawareness and policy
and consent non-compliance. These threats are also listed in Table 2.1, together with
their respective protection goals. Additionally, the four threats most relevant in the
context of this thesis are highlighted.
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For describing the LINDDUN threats, two additional concepts need to be intro-
duced first. An item of interest is a generic placeholder for an information item. Typ-
ical examples can include shared sensing samples, observed actions or user identi-
ties. While items of interest can be privacy-relevant to various degrees (e.g., a pass-
port photo versus a private party photo), a fine-granular distinction in this respect
is avoided in this thesis. An adversary is a fictive entity used for analysis that follows
a set of malicious goals. In the scope of this section, for example, these goals are to
realize the threats associated with each of the discussed protection goals. The capa-
bilities of adversaries are determined by a-priori assumptions and form the basis for
security and privacy analyses and evaluations. For the remainder of this chapter, if
no more specific description is given, any entity external to a subject is considered
its potential adversary3.
In the following, the threats addressed in the LINDDUN framework are discussed
together with their respective protection goals. As a base, the definitions from [28]
and [119] are used4.
2.2.1.1 Linkability
The linkability of two or more items of interest allows an adversary to sufficiently dis-
tinguish whether they are related or not. For example, two legal documents signed
by the same subject are clearly linkable between each other and to their signer. In
addition to such explicit linkability via a subject identifier, links between items of
interest can also be inferred via context-specific traits like timing or similarity. If,
for example, a ball is found next to a broken window, a link between the ball and
the act of breaking the window is reasonable. The risk from such linking attacks, i.e.,
attempts to infer links between not explicitly associated items, increases with the
amount (or richness) of information comprising the individual items. In the scope of
this chapter, the case of linking items of timestamped location data is discussed in
greater detail.
The protection goal associated with linkability is unlinkability, i.e., ensuring that no
linking between a given set of items is possible for a given adversary.
In the scope of this thesis, multiple approaches are discussed, proposed and evalu-
ated for achieving unlinkability in different system contexts.
2.2.1.2 Identiability
The identifiability of an item of interest enables an adversary to create a link between
the item of interest and a subject identity. Thus, identifiability can be seen as a spe-
cial form of linkability. Considering again the example of signed legal documents,
a signature enables an unambiguous link between the document and a subject. In
effect, correctly signed documents are clearly identifiable.
3However, the majority of subjects is usually assumed to not collude with malicious intent. Trust
modelling is further discussed in Section 2.4.
4Note that LINDDUN is frequently updated. Current materials about the methodology can be
found at: https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/linddun
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Identifiability is arguably the most important threat discussed here. Without identi-
fiability, the privacy-relevance of data can be disputed as no attribution to a subject
is possible (for the considered adversary model). Consequently, the identifiability
of sensitive information can lead to significant real-world harm for the concerned
users, ranging from unwanted personalized advertisements to financial harm (e.g.,
an increase in insurance fees due to identifiable information about driving behavior
or health status) and actual physical harm (e.g., due to the repression of subjects
based on political, sexual or religious orientation).
Identifiability is tightly related to the protection goal of anonymity. A subject is said
to be anonymous if an adversary cannot distinguish it within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set [94]. Likewise, an item of interest can be said to be anonymous or
anonymized if it cannot be linked to a subject within a set of subjects. The size of
the anonymity set is a common metric for evaluating the strength of the achieved
anonymity, i.e., the anonymity level. The term k-anonymity is also often used for de-
scribing the same metric, with k denoting the size of the anonymity set.
A related notion which is frequently used in the scope of this thesis is that of pseu-
donymity. An item of interest associated with a subject is pseudonymous or pseudo-
nymized if the adversary can link it only to a pseudonym, an identifier other than the
subject’s actual identity. In many systems, the use of some sort of identifiers is un-
avoidable, e.g., when the interaction with a subject involves several rounds of com-
munication. A central practical difference between pseudonymity and anonymity is
the fact that pseudonymity implies the linkability of all items of interest associated
with the same pseudonym. Consequently, if each pseudonym in a given system is
associated to only one item of interest each, the term anonymity can be used as well.
It should be noted that, since it enables linkability, pseudonymity can be difficult to
maintain. A plethora of works exist that deanonymize datasets based on linkability
within them [50, 68, 85, 86, 109, 123]. A straightforward approach is using auxil-
iary context knowledge that helps with the identification of a single item of interest.
For example, a pseudonymous user might accidentally use his real identity in one
interaction. If only one single item of interest can be identified, all items that are
linkable to it become deanonymized as well. For limiting the risk from identifica-
tion, it is, thus, desirable to minimize linkability, e.g., through the frequent change
of pseudonyms.
Achieving anonymity and effective pseudonymity in different smart traffic systems
is a major area tackled in this thesis and one of its main motivations.
2.2.1.3 Non-repudiation
The non-repudiation threat applies when an adversary has irrefutable evidence con-
cerning the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or action. Non-repudiation
can be viewed as an extreme case of linkability in which an adversary can create a
link with absolute certainty and prove its existence to an independent third party,
the so called judge. For example, in a legal context, the signature on a document
makes the actions of reading and accepting it non-repudiable for the signer. An
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adversary in possession of the signed document can use it as proof in front of an
actual judge, triggering potential legal consequences for the subject. The opposite
to non-repudiation, and the respective protection goal, is plausible deniability.
Plausible deniability is especially relevant in scenarios where the punishments re-
sulting from the judge’s decision are potentially not justified within a larger context.
For example, the judge might operate within the legal framework of an oppressive
government that punishes the expression of critical opinions (a classic motivation
for off-the-record communication). Voting (e.g., in parliamentary elections) is an-
other relevant scenario. Here, plausible deniability is mandatory for ensuring the
freedom of choice of voters and preventing vote buying.
In the scope of this thesis, no scenarios are considered in which, based on the consid-
ered adversary models, the modelling of an external judge entity is relevant. Thus,
non-repudiation and plausible deniability is not considered in detail. However, the
limiting of abuse, e.g., by punishing malicious users, is an important theme in this
thesis. Approaches are investigated that enable such regulation without requiring
the explicit (non-repudiable) accountability of subjects.
2.2.1.4 Detectability
The detectability of an item of interest refers to the adversary’s ability to sufficiently
distinguish whether it exists or not. Consequently, undetectability, the inability to
make such a distinction, is the main associated protection goal. Consider, as an
example, the passing of paper messages in a classroom setting. Ideally, the teacher
(the adversary in this case) is unable to detect that such messages exist and are being
exchanged.
The concept of unobservability can also be used in the context of detectability. It
describes a stronger form of undetectability: an unobservable item of interest is
undetectable by all entities but the ones directly associated with it, and the subjects
associated with it are, additionally, anonymous to each other. Recalling the last
example, consider the leaving of an anonymous paper message at a hidden location.
Only the author of the message and the person finding it know of the message’s
existence and content. Neither of them knows the identity of the other.
Even if no details about an item of interest are known to an adversary, its existence
can still represent a privacy-relevant piece of data. Communication metadata is a rel-
evant example in this context: the fact that a subject is communicating with another
might already disclose information about its identity and the relationship between
the two. As an additional argument for undetectability and unobservability, the
two concepts also imply that the content of items of interest (e.g., the content of
messages) is protected as well.
Detectability plays an important role in the scope of this thesis. It is mainly pre-
vented through ensuring that only limited amounts of data are shared with potential
adversaries, e.g., through considering decentralized approaches for system design.
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2.2.1.5 Information disclosure
The information disclosure threat describes the exposing of the content of an item of
interest to an entity unauthorized to see it, i.e., an adversary. It corresponds to the
protection goal of confidentiality which is also relevant for security. Examples for in-
formation disclosure are the reading of intercepted communications. Consequently,
encryption is commonly used for preventing such information leaks.
Compared to undetectability and unobservability, confidentiality protects only the
content of the item of interest. The adversary is still aware of the item of interest’s
existence and can potentially link it to subjects or other items of interest.
In the scope of this thesis, two cases are considered in the context of confidentiality.
First, the case in which information must be transmitted over a potentially insecure
medium. In this case, encryption can usually be used for protecting the content
against adversaries that are external to all participants in the communication. The
second case is that items of interest need to be shared with potential adversaries
for realizing services. This is a common case in the context of cooperative services,
as communication (e.g., involving privacy-relevant data) is usually required for en-
abling cooperation.
2.2.1.6 Content unawareness
Content unawareness is a broad concept focusing on the interaction of humans with
complex information and communication systems. Wuyts and Joosen define it as
“not understanding the consequences of sharing personal information in the past,
present of future” [119]. Without content awareness, subjects do not understand the
implications of sharing privacy-relevant data or how it is generated and collected.
An important specific threat associated with this lack of understanding is that too
much privacy-relevant data is leaked to potential adversaries. Even if this informa-
tion is of no use in the present, there is no reliable way for it to be “forgotten” in
the future, so that harms can materialize at a later date. Common approaches for
preventing content unawareness include guaranteeing high degrees of transparency
about the collection and processing of data. The human side of things, i.e., edu-
cation, informed consent and suitable user interface design, are arguably the most
important aspects in this context.
The challenge of protecting against content unawareness is relevant mainly at the
point where human users interact with technology, e.g., during the decision whether
a given system should be used at all or not. Consequently, it exceeds the scope of
this thesis and is not considered further.
2.2.1.7 Policy and consent non-compliance
Policy and consent non-compliance means that one of the entities processing poten-
tially privacy-sensitive data does not act in the manner advertised in its privacy pol-
icy, the consent signed by users or the active data protection legislation. In essence,
it can be viewed as the threat that the employed trust model is wrong in some as-
pect, i.e., that some trusted entity turns into an adversary. Steps can be taken within
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organizations and legislative areas to minimize this risk, e.g., in the form of frequent
audits by independent controllers.
However, such processes are out of the scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus is
on determining the impact of individual entities becoming malicious, as well as on
designing systems in such a way that individual malicious entities are limited in the
amount of harm they can inflict. Policy and consent non-compliance is, thus, not
considered as a threat but instead used (to varying degrees) as an underlying as-
sumption during the analysis and evaluation of systems in respect to the remaining
privacy threats.
2.2.2 Location samples and localization
In the scope of this thesis, a location sample is a unit of timestamped location data,
i.e., a tuple of a location and time value.
Locations can be represented in several different ways. The most commonly used
in the context of smart traffic is via geographic coordinates, e.g., pairs of latitude
and longitude (“49.01256, 8.40792”). This is also the representation that is implicitly
assumed in the remainder of this thesis. Alternative forms of representation include
context-specific statements (“at the SCC building”, “20 meters north from here”)
and hierarchical models (“Germany/Karlsruhe/KIT/Building 20.20.”).
Localization is the process of determining a given entity’s location. It can be per-
formed in an implicit manner by external entities that are aware of their own loca-
tion and are able to observe the entity that is to be localized. For example, cellular
network operators know the location of base stations under their control and can
observe the radio communication of users within their network. If a base station
is within the communication range of a user, the operator can determine the user’s
location on a cell-level granularity. By evaluating the signal strength of the user’s
signal at neighboring base stations, an even more precise localization is possible.
In order for an entity to learn its own location, a different, explicit localization ap-
proach is more commonly used. Here, the entity actively collects information that it
can use for inferring its own location. The global positioning system (GPS) is the most
prominent and widely used example from this category. Here, entities calculate
their location based on beacons from multiple satellites in the Earth’s orbit. Note
that this is a passive form of localization, in the sense that entities can determine
their position without leaking any information (and most importantly their current
location) to third parties. It places entities in control over the granularity and sam-
pling rate of location samples containing their own location. In contrast, if implicit
localization is used or possible, only the sampling rate can be influenced in some
cases. For example, silent periods can be introduced during which radio interfaces
are switched off.
In practice, GPS-based localization can be augmented by introducing additional
localization information. Notable from a privacy standpoint are cloud-based ap-
proaches. Here, raw GPS sensor readings are transmitted to centrally operated
servers, often in addition to other information like the set of visible cellular net-
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work base stations and wireless LAN hotspots. The service operator then estimates
the entities’ locations and sends them back to them. In effect, localization speedups
and an increased accuracy can be achieved. Such techniques are used by default, for
example, on Android smartphones [64]. From a privacy standpoint, however, the
usage of this approach is not recommended, as the localization provider learns the
locations of users with significant precision.
2.2.3 Privacy-relevance of identiable location samples
Identifiable location samples (i.e., location samples that can be linked to used iden-
tities) are highly privacy-relevant and can enable wide-ranging harms to users if
leaked to an adversary. Consider the location samples generated by a regular citi-
zen on any given day. Typically, they include the location of their home and loca-
tions where they spend their free time. Through inference, significant amounts of
additional information can be extracted from such data. Information about visited
shops or recreational areas can help create detailed user profiles for targeted adver-
tisement (that might not always help subjects make good decisions). Hospital visits
may hint towards sensitive health conditions and may, thus, be interesting to know
for insurance companies. Co-location with other users can allow the reconstruction
of social ties. Co-location with political demonstrations can reveal opinions and
assist oppressive governments with the prosecution of dissidents.
Based only on these few examples for concrete potential harms, it can be concluded
that identifiable location samples are highly sensitive from a privacy standpoint.
Systems relying on the sharing of location samples must be designed in such a way
that potential adversaries cannot collect identifiable location samples.
2.2.4 Identication attacks
A non-obvious, yet relevant, approach for attaining identifiable location samples
is by using inference techniques and additional context knowledge on otherwise
unidentifiable data. Several such identification attacks have been proposed, focusing
mostly on the case that data on taken trips is available, i.e., sets of linked location
samples.
The reconstruction of trips is trivial if pseudonyms are used that are changed only
rarely: all location samples shared using a given pseudonym have obviously been
shared by the same user. However, given a high enough sampling rate (i.e., short
intervals between shared samples) and a high accuracy of the shared locations, effec-
tive linking attacks on location samples are possible even if pseudonyms are changed
regularly [117].
Several approaches have been proposed for inferring identities based on trips, i.e.,
groups of linkable location samples. In [68], for example, Krumm proposes to iden-
tify home locations first (using clustering methods and time-of-day heuristics), from
which identities can be inferred using easily accessible context knowledge. Within
the considered evaluation scenario, the correct home locations could be determined
with a mean error of around 60 meters. Concerning the inference of identities from
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home locations, Golle and Partridge [50] found that identification is possible with a
significant probability if the work location of a subject can also be inferred from the
present trip. For example, they found that knowledge about an unknown subject’s
home and work locations are enough to (on average) uniquely identify it within
the U.S. working population. The level of anonymity was found to increase with
the decreasing precision of available home and work locations. However, a granu-
larity on the level of counties is required for achieving significant anonymity sets.
In conclusion, the authors suggest that home and work personas need to be kept
unlinkable.
In addition to home and work locations, another form of context knowledge that
can aid identification are physical observations, e.g., in the form of timestamped
photos or videos. By correlating such observations with pseudonymously reported
locations, the corresponding pseudonyms (and all past and future location updates
shared using them) can be linked to the respective users. In [109], for example,
timestamped photos were used for linking pseudonymized taxi locations with the
identities of celebrity passengers. Since the location samples reported by a given
taxi were linkable to each other, the destinations of the passenger’s trips could be
inferred.
The identification of individual location samples can also be possible by analyzing
communication metadata. For example, employed IP addresses might be used for
inferring identities. Challenges and solutions related to the protection of communi-
cation metadata are discussed in Section 2.6.
2.3 Data minimization
A straightforward approach for preserving privacy is by not interacting with other
entities at all. Upcoming smart traffic systems, however, depend on interactions
and promise significant benefits for both individuals and society, so that their real-
ization is desirable. This outlines a central tension field: balancing the protection
of privacy-relevant data with the utility of the resulting systems. The principle of
data minimization is an established approach for addressing this tension [94]. Data
minimization can be defined as ensuring that no subject gets to know any data,
privacy-relevant or not, unless it is absolutely necessary in a given system context.
In this section, following a motivation of relevant protection goals, related work on
data minimization in smart traffic is presented and discussed. Note that the listed
works are only a small relevant subset of the much larger field of location privacy
and privacy in location-based systems. A more thorough overview of the field, that
is not focused on the smart traffic scenario, is given, for example, by Wernke et al.
in [115]. The related questions of reducing trust requirements through decentraliza-
tion and preventing abuse are discussed in the separate Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
2.3.1 Protection goals
For motivating the choice of related works presented in the following, the general
protection goals from Section 2.2.1 are now discussed in the context of location pri-
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vacy, i.e., with location samples as the main item of interest. This discussion forms
the base for the analysis and evaluation approach used in the main part of this the-
sis.
For all scenarios and approaches discussed in the scope of this thesis, the main con-
sidered privacy-related threat is the leaking of identifiable location samples to po-
tential adversaries.
If location samples are undetectable by an adversary (e.g., by not generating or shar-
ing them in the first place) or if their confidentiality is maintained (e.g., the adver-
sary only learns them in an encrypted form), no further steps can be taken towards
obtaining identifiable location samples. Ensuring the undetectability and confidential-
ity5 of location samples is, thus, the first line of defense considered here. However,
this is difficult to achieve in the smart traffic context, as location samples must often
be shared for realizing services.
If location samples become disclosed to a potential adversary, he can now try to
identify them using additional information. In the simplest case, location samples
can have been shared using an identifiable pseudonym or an identifiable commu-
nication address. However, the adversary can also use context knowledge and sta-
tistical methods for performing the identification. As a second line of protection,
this direct identifiability of location samples must be prevented, i.e., the anonymity
or pseudonymity of location samples must be established and preserved.
If the adversary can learn several location samples that he cannot identify directly,
his next possibility is to attempt to discover links between them. The availability of
reconstructed trips of linked location samples enables an additional range of possi-
ble identification attacks. Additionally, should one location sample be identifiable
directly, any samples linkable to it become identifiable as well. Thus, the unlinkabil-
ity of location samples must be ensured.
If deployed protection measures fail and identifiable location samples become avail-
able to the adversary, a last line of defense can consist in reducing the privacy-
relevance of the shared samples. For example, samples concerning especially sen-
sitive information (e.g., hospital visits) can be omitted or their precision reduced.
In the scope of this thesis, such schemes are not considered and all location sam-
ples are treated equally for analysis purposes, i.e., independently of their perceived
sensitivity. However, approaches for reducing the precision of location samples are
discussed in the context of protecting against identification and linkability.
Note that the non-repudiation, unawareness and non-compliance threats are also
not considered further here (cf. Section 2.2.1 and Table 2.1). They do not map well
to the considered scenarios and their consideration exceeds the scope of the thesis.
Note also that adversaries considered in the following are mainly internal, in the
sense that they collude with entities directly participating in the realization of the
considered service. The protection against external adversaries can usually be re-
5Note that the two protection goals are deliberately joined into one here. The threat that location
samples are detectable by an adversary but not disclosed to him does not map well to the smart
traffic scenario.
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alized in a straightforward manner by leveraging communication encryption and
cryptographic authentication. It is, thus, not considered in detail.
2.3.2 Undetectability and condentiality
The undetectability and confidentiality of location samples is achieved if a potential
adversary cannot learn about their existence and content. Two basics approaches
for achieving this exist:
1. Reducing the volume of shared location samples.
2. Reducing the possibilities for adversaries to intercept shared location samples.
Concerning the first approach, the basic reasoning is that if less data is shared, more
data remains undetectable and confidential. Clearly, simply reducing the data vol-
ume will deteriorate the utility of most services. Trade-offs in this respect are highly
application- and scenario-specific. In [59], for example, Hoh et al. describe an ap-
proach for the privacy preserving collection of location samples for traffic monitor-
ing purposes. Location updates are communicated only every couple of hundred
meters, when passing a previously placed virtual trip line. While a significant im-
provement to the continuous collection of user locations (as practiced in many com-
mercial systems [64]), the available information is still sufficient for assessing the
current traffic state with high precision.
Reducing the opportunities during which potential adversaries can intercept shared
location samples, on the other hand, is mainly a question of system architecture.
If the assumed adversary model considers that operators of centralized systems
can become malicious, more decentralized architectures must be considered. By
removing centralized data sinks, linking and identification attacks become more
challenging; adversaries might be unable to collect relevant samples even if they
have been shared by users. Different approaches to decentralization are discussed
in Section 2.4.
2.3.3 Anonymity and pseudonymity
Here, approaches for preventing the identifiability of individual location samples
are considered, namely anonymity, pseudonymization and obfuscation. Preventing
linkability between multiple location samples, which can also enable identification,
is discussed in the next section.
2.3.3.1 Anonymity
Anonymity is given if no identifiers of any sort are associated with shared location
samples or, if there are such identifiers, no two location samples are associated with
the same identifier. An important aspect in this context is the protection of commu-
nication addresses. The protection of communication addresses is less challenging
when communication is local and radio-based, as the available broadcast domain al-
lows participants to choose and change their own communication addresses at will.
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In the same context, communication can be skipped altogether by deploying ded-
icated infrastructure, e.g., inductive sensors for measuring traffic flow. However,
in many scenarios, neither the sole reliance on short-range communication nor the
costly deployment of dedicated infrastructure is feasible. Different approaches for
enabling non-local anonymous communication are, thus, discussed in Section 2.6.2
of this chapter.
While anonymity is highly desirable from a privacy standpoint, the usage of pseu-
donymous identifiers is often unavoidable. For example, it is not clear how ac-
cess control (e.g., for preventing sybil attacks) can be realized without any form of
identifiers. Also, if the addressability of participants is required, e.g., for receiving
information queries, some form of communication address (which can already be
considered a pseudonym) is needed. Lastly, it should be noted again that pseudo-
nymity can be improved into anonymity by ensuring that each pseudonym is used
only once.
2.3.3.2 Pseudonymization
Pseudonymization, i.e., the protection of identities through the use of pseudonyms, is
a widely used concept in smart traffic and vehicular networking [61, 92, 93]. Pseu-
donyms used in these contexts are typically composed of communication addresses
and cryptographic credentials needed for authenticating and securing communi-
cation channels. In order for pseudonyms to be unlinkable to subjects, all iden-
tifiers comprising them (i.e., communication addresses and cryptographic creden-
tials) must be unidentifiable as well. Likewise, in order for a pseudonym change to
be effective, all identifiers comprising the pseudonym must be changed simultane-
ously.
Pseudonymization schemes are especially helpful for assisting in the management
of abuse. For example, access control mechanisms can be implemented that bound
the number of pseudonyms per registered user, thus preventing sybil attacks. Ap-
proaches like this, that limit the extent of abuse while maintaining pseudonymity,
are discussed in Section 2.5.
2.3.3.3 Obfuscation
The goal of obfuscation is to reduce the precision of shared location samples so as to
make an identification using additional context knowledge more difficult6. The ef-
fectiveness of obfuscation against identification attacks has been shown, e.g., in [68]
and [50]. However, obfuscation also decreases the utility of location samples [123].
A variety of approaches for realizing location obfuscation have been proposed in
the literature [115]. Example techniques include adding artificial noise to reported
location measurements and sharing multiple fake dummy locations in addition to
the correct ones. Some approaches take additional care to guarantee k-anonymity, by
6Obfuscation can also be used for reducing the sensitivity of location samples, by making it more
difficult to determine a subject’s exact location (“hospital or supermarket?”). This property of obfus-
cation is, for the most part, ignored in the scope of this thesis; all identifiable location samples are
considered equally worthy of protection (cf. Section 2.3.1).
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ensuring that at least k users report the same obfuscated location at a given time. The
coordination of participants within this anonymity set is often realized by relying
on one or more trusted anonymization providers. Alternatively, the use of local ad
hoc networks between participants has been proposed for eliminating the need for
such trusted entities [20]. However, since the effective range of ad hoc networks is
limited [53], the expected size of obfuscation regions with this approach is small,
reducing the benefit of obfuscation.
A more general challenge in the context of location obfuscation is that of map match-
ing [115]. Here, context knowledge about the road map defining the movement of
participants is assumed. In this way, unlikely locations can be discarded when re-
garding obfuscated location data. The attack is further aggravated if the speed and
movement direction of participants can be inferred as well, which is often hard to
avoid given continuous location updates. Other approaches for attacking location
obfuscation include forming intersections between multiple shared locations and
using additional knowledge about location probability distributions [115].
2.3.4 Unlinkability
Identification attacks are often based on the availability of reconstructed trips, i.e.,
groups of linkable location samples (cf. Section 2.2.4). For avoiding this attack vec-
tor, the unlinkability of location samples must be improved. Challenges in this con-
text, that are characteristic to the smart traffic scenario, include that a continuous
sampling is often necessary (e.g., for traffic monitoring) and that pseudonyms are
often used that cannot be changed for every shared sample (e.g., due to performance
constraints).
Concerning the challenge of continuous sampling, it was found that a decrease
in sampling rate has significant negative effects on tracking efficiency. According
to [117], for anonymous location samples, linking is effectively prevented by using
sharing intervals of as little as 16 s. This corresponds to the results by Hoh et al.
in [59], where location samples are shared in spatial intervals between 100 m and
500 m. As an orthogonal contributing factor, the use of noisier (i.e., more strongly
obfuscated) location data was also found to reduce linking performance in [117].
How far the sampling precision and rate can be decreased in practice without sig-
nificant cuts in system utility is highly scenario-specific and must be evaluated for
each specific case.
If complete anonymity is infeasible, i.e., pseudonyms must be reused for multiple lo-
cation samples, additional care must be taken concerning the timing of pseudonym
changes. More specifically, pseudonym changes must be synchronized with other
nearby pseudonym holders so that no unambiguous linking (based on correlating
location samples before and after the change) between old and new pseudonyms is
possible. In other words, the goal is that a mixing of pseudonyms takes place. Mix-
ing can happen in an on-demand, peer-to-peer manner, by leveraging short-range
radio communication [71]. Alternatively, the changing of pseudonyms at predefined
spots, so called mix zones [7], has been proposed. Typically, mix zones are areas in
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which no communication takes place. After traversing a mix zone, participants start
using new pseudonyms. By choosing areas with high degrees of traffic and a low
relative speed between participants as mix zones, a high degree of confusion is pos-
sible without any additional communication between peers. Example proposals for
the placement of mix zones include street crossings [91] and parking lots [74]. Note
that independently of the concrete realization, the effects of mixing are amplified by
chaining multiple mixing steps, e.g., by passing several mix zones.
2.4 Trust and decentralization
In this section, possibilities for more fine-grained trust modelling are discussed
based on different approaches to system architecture and decentralization.
This thesis uses “decentralization” in the sense of distributing functionality across
multiple components controlled by non-colluding entities. Therefore, and in con-
trast to some related works, systems in which key system components are physi-
cally distributed (e.g., over multiple machines and data centers) but controlled by a
single entity (the service operator) are considered centralized here.
Furthermore, this thesis treats the concepts “trust model” and “adversary model”
as mutually inverse. While the adversary model describes which entities can be
under adversarial control and what these entities can do, the trust model states as-
sumptions about which entities are trusted to not collude with adversaries, either in
general or concerning some set of actions within their capabilities.
In the following, the trust assumptions behind cooperative services are first recapit-
ulated. Following that, different approaches to system architecture are introduced
and discussed, namely:
• centralized systems
• peer-to-peer systems
• ad hoc networks
• block chain networks
• mix networks
During all discussions, the main focus is on the implications of the considered ap-
proaches for trust modelling.
2.4.1 Cooperative services
Description
Cooperative services are based on the idea that participating users are actively in-
volved in realizing the provided functionality (cf. Section 2.1.3). For example, users
can share sensory data for enabling the monitoring of traffic or coordinate plans for
optimizing traffic flow. Cooperating in such a way is usually in the interest of all
participating users as they benefit from the service provided in the end, e.g., in the
form of reaching their destinations quicker.
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Trust assumptions
The main assumption behind cooperative services is that, while individual users can
be selfish and even malicious, the majority of users will not actively collude against
the common interest.
The impact of different percentages of adversary-controlled users within the user
population is specific to the individual considered service. For illustration, a simple
sensing service can be considered where all participating users contribute one sen-
sory value (e.g., about the average speed on a given road segment) and the median
of all values is taken as the final sensing result. If all regular (i.e., non-adversarial)
users R always contribute the same correct value c and all adversary-controlled
users A always contribute the wrong value w, the end result will be c for |R| > |A|,
c+w
2 for |R| = |A| and w for |R| < |A|. Thus, in this simple example, as long as
the adversary controls less than half of the user population, he cannot influence the
service functionality in any meaningful way.
Note that when considering anonymity and pseudonymity in the context of coop-
erative services, it must additionally be assumed that the majority of users will not
actively collude against specific individual users as well. If users cooperate with an
adversary for identifying a specific victim within a system, they cannot be counted
towards the anonymity sets for that victim.
Practical challenges
A major challenge in the context of cooperative services is the protection against
sybil attacks. If sybil attacks are possible, the percentage of adversary-controlled
users can become arbitrarily high. While not immediately causing a higher identifi-
ability of users7, this can be detrimental to service functionality.
2.4.2 Centralized systems
Description
In the scope of this thesis, systems are considered centralized if one or more cru-
cial8 system components are under the control of one or few entities (e.g., the same
organization). This is a more trust-centric approach to defining centralization and
does not have to correspond to physical centralization. For example, a classic clien-
t/server system, a cloud-based service distributed over multiple data centers and a
nation-wide infrastructure of interconnected base stations managed by one operator
are all considered centralized systems here. Many popular smart traffic systems are
centralized according to this definition, for example Google Maps [64].
An example centralized system is depicted in Figure 2.1. In the example, all data
that is relevant for achieving the system’s functionality is collected and stored at a
central server.
7During an undetected sybil attack, anonymity sets might be perceived as larger than they are in
reality. However, anonymity sets will not shrink as the direct cause of a sybil attack - sybil attacks do
not directly influence the number of participating regular users.
8In the sense that core system functions depend on their availability and correct operation.
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client 
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Figure 2.1 A centralized system based on a client/server architecture.
Trust assumptions
Entities controlling crucial components in a centralized system, i.e., service opera-
tors, must be trusted for being able to make statements about overall system utility
and privacy aspects. This is a clear disadvantage, considering the potential vulnera-
bility of individual service operators to coordinated attacks, bribes, legal subpoenas
and abuse within their own organizational structures. In some cases, centralized
systems can be designed in such a way that some privacy protection goals are met
even under the assumption of a malicious service operator. However, the availabil-
ity and functionality of a service are inherently dependent on the service operator’s
integrity. Also, the undetectability and confidentiality of data that is critical for pro-
viding a service’s functionality (e.g., location samples when considering a traffic
monitoring system) is usually unachievable in centralized systems without the in-
troduction of additional communication channels.
Practical challenges
Practical disadvantages of centralized systems include the difficulty of financing the
continuous maintenance of central system components [97]. As a result of this diffi-
culty, centralized systems are often deployed by for-profit companies that might not
have a sufficient interest in designing their services in a privacy-conscious manner.
2.4.3 Peer-to-peer systems
Description
Peer-to-peer systems are, in essence, the application of the cooperative services
paradigm to system architecture. All functionality provided in a peer-to-peer sys-
tem is realized directly by individual participating entities, i.e., peers. Peer-to-peer
systems enable decentralization; peers can be autonomous and no centralized con-
trol is necessary.
Distributed hash tables (DHTs) like the widely used Kademlia [78] are a classic example
for peer-to-peer systems. As their name suggests, DHTs realize key-value storages
where the values are stored on different peers. DHT protocols define mechanisms
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for maintaining an overlay network structure layered on top of an existing commu-
nication substrate like the Internet. In this context, peers are usually also referred
to as overlay nodes. Rules are defined for, amongst other things, forming and main-
taining neighbor relationships with other peers. The resulting overlay topology is
typically optimized for allowing the efficient routing based on keys and node iden-
tifiers. Overlay networks have also been proposed in the context of smart traffic.
In [101], for example, a decentralized traffic monitoring system - PeerTIS - is real-
ized with the help of a scenario-tailored DHT.
peer 
relevant 
data 
Figure 2.2 A peer-to-peer system realizing a DHT.
An example peer-to-peer system realizing a DHT is depicted in Figure 2.2. Data
stored in the DHT is replicated across multiple peers.
Trust assumptions
Similarly to cooperative services, the trust assumption underlying DHT-like peer-
to-peer systems is that the majority of peers does not collude with malicious intent.
Concrete harms are, again, specific to the individual systems. A simple example
system will be considered for illustration. Consider a DHT in which a key lookup
involves the querying of k distinct peers. With pR denoting the probability that
a given random peer does not collude with the adversary (i.e., pR is the ratio of
regular peers), the probability pt that an adversary will be able to tamper with the
lookup is pt = 1 − pRk. With this probability, the adversary can either block the
lookup or change its result.
Practical challenges
As in cooperative services in general, DHTs and similar peer-to-peer systems are
heavily vulnerable to sybil attacks9. While sybil attacks are a general challenge in
9Approaches for preventing sybil attacks and lessening their potential impact are discussed in
Section 2.5.1.
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the context of peer-to-peer systems, some approaches discussed in the following
sections, most notably the block chain paradigm, effectively manage this threat as a
part of their design.
Most existing peer-to-peer systems are not primarily concerned with the meeting of
privacy protection goals. The PeerTIS system [101] mentioned earlier, for example,
enables arbitrary peers to collect precise location samples.
2.4.4 Ad hoc networks
Ad hoc networks are, in essence, peer-to-peer systems based on short-range radio
communication between peers. Vehicular ad hoc networks are the application of this
approach to the scenario of vehicular traffic. Vehicular ad hoc networks have been
widely discussed in the research community. A comprehensive overview of the field
is given, for example, in [35] and [66].
Vehicular ad hoc networks are not at the focus of this thesis. Reasons include their
limited geographic scope. The maximum transmission range of common vehicular
radio technologies is limited. This is even more the case in densely populated areas
with a large number of physical obstructions, e.g., due to buildings. Additionally,
it was found that even using multi-hop routing, the scalability of mobile ad hoc
networks remains limited [53].
2.4.5 Block chain networks
Description
Block chain networks are a form of peer-to-peer systems in which a single data struc-
ture is maintained and synchronized across all peers - the so called block chain. First
proposed in the context of Bitcoin [84, 110], the block chain paradigm is especially
interesting in the context of eliminating the need for singular trust anchors while
maintaining robustness against sybil attacks.
A cooperatively maintained block chain realizes a distributed append-only bulletin
board with unified global state, as well as a timestamping service. Its high resilience
to sybil attacks stems from the fact that the level of influence of individual peers is
directly tied to the possession of limited resources like, e.g., computing power. In a
Bitcoin-type network, for example, an adversary must control more computing re-
sources than the remainder of the network in order to cause significant disturbances.
In addition to the original application of realizing a decentralized payment system,
the block chain paradigm has been adapted for realizing naming systems10, adding
incentives to sensing services [89], timestamping cryptographic commitments [24],
securing username registration [45], bootstrapping trust without a TTP [54] and re-
alizing decentralized anonymous credentials [47], to name just a few examples.
An example block chain network is depicted in Figure 2.3. In addition to feature-
complete peers, also referred to as full nodes, the figure features a simple payments
verification (SPV) client that doesn’t store the complete block chain. In popular block
10https://namecoin.info
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chain networks like Bitcoin, full nodes face significant communication and storage
requirements11. Addressing this challenge, SPV clients have been proposed as early
as in the original Bitcoin paper [84]. SPV clients need to store only metadata and can
query full nodes for additional data on demand.
full node 
SPV client 
blockchain 
Figure 2.3 A block chain network.
An in-depth description of Bitcoin and similar block chain-based systems exceeds
the scope of this chapter. In Chapter 6, a system is proposed that builds upon the
block chain paradigm and can be implemented on top of the Bitcoin network. Rele-
vant technical details related to Bitcoin are introduced there.
Trust assumptions
In contrast to DHT-like peer-to-peer systems, the main trust assumption underlying
block chain networks is not that the majority of peers do not collude maliciously,
but that all entities colluding with malicious intent do not own more than 50% of
the relevant resources in the network. So, for the population of regular peers R, the
population of adversary-controlled peers A, and with res(x) denoting the relevant
resources held by the peer x, a block chain network is considered secure as long as:
∑
r∈R
res(r) ≥ ∑
a∈A
res(a)
As long as this assumption holds, adversaries can neither alter the current state of
the block chain nor prevent the inclusion of new entries. They can, however, delay
the inclusion of new entries by a factor proportional to the amount of resources held
by them (up to a factor of 2). Independently of the amount of resources an adver-
sary controls, he can never add entries to the block chain that are considered invalid
according to the used block chain protocol. For example, in Bitcoin, the stealing of
11At the time of writing, the Bitcoin block chain (which must be stored by all full nodes and down-
loaded upon joining the network for the first time) had a size of just slightly under 50 GB.
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currency units from a specific Bitcoin address is impossible without knowledge of
a matching private key. However, an adversary controlling more than half of the
resources in the network might be able to alter past inclusions in the block chain.
In the context of Bitcoin, this can be used for performing double-spending attacks, i.e.,
reverting payments that were previously marked as finalized. Such history rewrit-
ing attacks are, however, highly time-intensive for entries past a certain age, as well
as difficult to hide. An easier attack for adversaries controlling the majority of re-
sources in the network is preventing the inclusion of certain new entries in the block
chain, effectively censoring affected users.
Concerning the security of SPV clients, transaction data received from full nodes is
cryptographically verified so that only few deception possibilities remain. Malicious
full nodes can withhold data from connected SPV clients or attempt to present an al-
ternative chain of entries. Due to the inherent logic behind the block chain paradigm
and the SPV approach, the latter attack vector quickly becomes prohibitively expen-
sive. Additionally, both threats can be managed by connecting to multiple full nodes
and comparing the data received from them.
All information stored on the block chain is public. Consequently, value transfers in
block chain-based payment systems are realized through a publicly viewable ledger.
While value transfers are pseudonymous, transactions are linkable to each other by
design and the flow of currency units between pseudonymous addresses is openly
visible. A variety of approaches have been proposed for improving the privacy
properties of block chain networks in this respect and enabling transaction unlink-
ability. For example, the usage of accountable external mixing providers [9] and
new transaction types involving zero-knowledge proofs [6, 79] have been proposed.
Several solutions based on the cooperation of users (e.g., for forming joint mix trans-
actions) have been proposed as well [8, 77, 100, 124].
Practical challenges
Popular block chain networks like Bitcoin are inherently energy-inefficient. Proofs
of controlled computing power, realized through the solving of cryptographic puz-
zles, are continuously required for adding new block chain entries. On a global
scale, this leads to adverse environmental impacts [5]. More energy-efficient alter-
natives are being developed. A notable example is the proof-of-stake approach used
in the PPCoin cryptocurrency [67]. Here, the level of influence of individual peers is
tied to the portion of the currency supply they control. Without an active exchange
of currency units, this is largely based on the time they have already spent partici-
pating in the system.
2.4.6 Mix networks
Description
Mix networks are networks of non-colluding entities that are most commonly used
in the context of anonymous communication. The main idea is that messages are
sent through a chain of randomly chosen nodes from the mix network, so called
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mixes. Mixes act as proxies and forward messages to subsequent mixes or the ac-
tual destination. By using multiple layers of encryption, decryption mix nets can be
realized in which every mix is aware only of its predecessor and successor in the
chain and only the communication endpoints are aware of message contents. In this
way, as long as at least one of the mixes does not collude with the remaining ones,
the anonymity of the communication is effectively preserved against all participat-
ing entities but the message source. If sufficient amounts of traffic are present, i.e.,
if multiple users are sending messages through the mix network at the same time,
a deanonymization of communication processes also becomes difficult for external
adversaries that can observe all or parts of the traffic in the network. In the context
of this thesis, the most relevant instantiation of the mix network paradigm is the
anonymous communication system Tor [31]. Tor offers low-latency two-way anony-
mous communication through a network of independently operated mixing servers,
so called relays. The characteristics and service-related properties of the Tor network
are further discussed in Section 2.6.2.
mix 
user 
Figure 2.4 Communication through a mix network.
Figure 2.4 depicts an example mix network with two users. One of the users is
communicating with the other via three randomly chosen mixes.
Trust assumptions
Since mixes are usually chosen randomly by the user when communicating through
a mix network, it can never be guaranteed with certainty that an effective anonymiza-
tion will be realized. However, setting aside any possible linkability based on ex-
ternal traffic observations and timing, an effective anonymization is possible as
long as at least one of the randomly chosen mixes does not collude with the re-
maining ones. Thus, if pA denotes the probability that a randomly chosen mix is
controlled by the adversary and k is the used mix chain length (the default used
by Tor is k = 3), the probability that the anonymization was successful becomes
1− pAk. Since this probability is heavily influenced by the number of mixes an ad-
versary can control (assuming an uniformly random selection process, pA is the ra-
tio of adversary-controlled mixes in the network), effective protection mechanisms
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against sybil attacks are needed for maintaining the anonymization utility of the
mix network. Also, note that attacking the functionality of the service, e.g., by not
forwarding a message to next mix, is still possible even if only one mix in the chain
is controlled by the adversary. However, such attacks are easily spotted and the
responsible mixes can be excluded from future chains.
Practical challenges
A different approach for deanonymizing communications through a mix network is
by observing the flow of traffic between mixes. Especially in low-latency networks,
this approach can be highly effective [82]. The attack can be made more difficult for
an adversary by increasing communication latencies as well as the number of simul-
taneously active users, the anonymity set. Naturally, however, active users must be
non-colluding with the adversary in order to be counted towards anonymity sets.
2.5 Limiting abuse
The impact of abuse, i.e., attacks on the correct functioning of services, can be sig-
nificant in the context of smart traffic. For example, traffic monitoring can be influ-
enced by reporting false data, ultimately leading to an alteration of vehicular traf-
fic [64]. This section introduces and discusses different approaches for managing
abuse. Two different aspects are considered:
1. Preventing sybil attacks, as they amplify the significance of many types of at-
tacks.
2. Reacting to abuse, e.g., by implementing punishment mechanisms for malicious
behavior.
2.5.1 Preventing sybil attacks
In a sybil attack [33], a single adversary creates a large number of pseudonymous
identities (sybils) and uses them simultaneously. In this way, he gains the potential
to heavily disturb cooperative services. Sybil populations can not only reduce the
utility of a system, e.g., by deliberately contributing disproportionate amounts of
falsified data, but also weaken privacy protection mechanisms, e.g., by crowding
out regular users from anonymity sets. The possibility for sybil attacks undermines
the main trust assumption behind cooperative services and many approaches to
decentralized system design - that the majority of participating identities are non-
colluding.
A variety of defense mechanisms against sybil attacks have been proposed in the
literature, mostly in the context of peer-to-peer networking [111]. Some require the
existence of a trusted third party (TTP), a single entity trusted by all participants,
while others can be realized in a decentralized manner. In the following, existing
approaches are discussed based on this classification, starting with approaches rely-
ing on a TTP.
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2.5.1.1 Approaches based on the existence of a TTP
Using a TTP like a certificate authority or pseudonym issuer is a straightforward
solution to the sybil challenge. In essence, the TTP issues pseudonyms to users
and keeps track of the number of identities issued per user. TTP-based solutions
are widely used. Even systems aimed at high degrees of decentralization (e.g., the
decentralized online social network Safebook [25] and the peer-to-peer signaling pro-
tocol RELOAD [63]) include TTPs in their design for bounding the number of iden-
tities per user.
In order to ensure that only the TTP can issue valid identities, pseudonyms must
contain some sort of cryptographic proof like a cryptographic signature from the
TTP. However, regular cryptographic primitives like asymmetric signatures enable
the TTP to learn the pseudonyms issued to individual users and identify all pseudo-
nymized actions and communication. A common solution for avoiding this identi-
fiability by the pseudonym issuer is the usage of blind signature schemes [16]. When
requesting a blind signature on some data, a user first applies a blinding operation on
the data. The signing authority calculates a signature on the blinded data without
knowledge of the original data. The signature on the blinded data can be unblinded
by the user, yielding a valid signature on the original data. After this process, the
signing authority is unable to link the act of signing (and, hence, the identity of
the user) with the resulting signature used for authentication. Blind signatures (in-
cluding a possible implementation) are further discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis,
where they are used for enabling privacy-preserving and abuse-resistant coopera-
tive planning.
A simple practical realization of pseudonym issuing using blind signatures is de-
scribed in [60]. As an alternative to the usage of blind signatures, pseudonymization
schemes have also been proposed based on the use of zero-knowledge proofs [14].
In [47], Garman et al. propose an approach for realizing decentralized anonymous
credentials using zero-knowledge proofs and block chain networks. While it likely
supports anonymizing credentials determined without a TTP, the approach inher-
ently requires a TTP for initially setting up system parameters.
In systems where users are active for extended periods of time, the changing of
pseudonyms needs to be supported as well for reducing the linkability between ac-
tions and shared samples. The issuing of pseudonym pools to participants (as pro-
posed, e.g., in [36]) as well as the use of self-certifying sybil-free e-token dispensers
[13] have been proposed in this context for allowing pseudonym changes without
introducing a possibility for creating sybil identities.
The central drawback of all mechanisms discussed in this section is that, while TTPs
must not necessarily be trusted for guaranteeing the non-identifiability of pseudo-
nyms, they still retain the ability to mount sybil attacks. This situation is problem-
atic when considering strong adversaries that can compromise individual system
components and cryptographic keys (e.g., by colluding with a service operator).
Furthermore, the TTP becomes inherently required for the correct functioning of the
system, making it a single point of failure and attractive attack target. Securing TTPs
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against both compromise and attacks on their availability is costly (as is reflected,
e.g., by the fees charged by certificate authorities in practice). Additionally, appoint-
ing TTPs is non-trivial in systems of global scope, as all participants need to agree
on a common trust anchor.
2.5.1.2 Decentralized approaches
Decentralized approaches for preventing sybil attacks are often based on the as-
sumption that adversaries cannot control an arbitrarily larger amount of a specific
scarce resource than regular participants [33]. Consequently, a large number of
works describe mechanisms that enable participants to prove their possession of a
given resource. Commonly used resources include:
• Communication addresses. In [30], for example, new participants are required to
register their IP address in a DHT which can later be queried for identifying
sybils.
• Computing power. So called proof-of-work schemes are usually based on the
solving of cryptographic puzzles that require a certain amount of computing
time [4, 10].
• Human attention. CAPTCHAs [113] are commonly used for ensuring that a
human subject was involved in an operation. These are human-solvable chal-
lenges for which no reliable automated solution is known.
For effectively limiting sybil attacks, resource proofs must be requested regularly
from each participant. This requirement leads to a central drawback of proof-of-
resource schemes - the involved challenges are either too difficult, thus deterring
honest users (e.g., when considering mobile devices with limited resources or the
user experience from solving countless CAPTCHAs), or too easy, thus offering in-
sufficient protection against determined adversaries (e.g., IP address blocks and
computing power can be rented from cloud providers, crowdsourcing marketplaces
can be used for solving CAPTCHAs on a large scale) [69].
A related approach, proof-of-burn, is based on the idea that a non-replenishable re-
source needs to be provably destroyed, e.g., when a new identity is established. In
contrast to proof-of-work, a proof-of-burn can be completed instantly and adver-
saries are unable to leverage economy of scale effects: every proof “costs” the same
for everybody. The approach was proposed in the context of Bitcoin [84] for estab-
lishing trustworthy internet pseudonyms by provably destroying a certain amount
of Bitcoin [54].
Protection mechanisms based on the social graph between participating users have
been proposed for peer-to-peer networks [27, 121, 122]. Such schemes are based on
the assumption that sybil node populations do not exhibit the same interconnection
patterns found in regular social graphs [112]. It can be argued that, compared to
controlling communication addresses, computing resources or human attention, the
forming and maintenance of social links with human users is significantly more
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difficult for an adversary and does not scale as well. In many social graph-based
approaches, the social relationships between users must be made public. From a
privacy standpoint, this can be highly problematic [86]. Peer-to-peer systems like
X-Vine [81] and Whanau [70] follow a different approach and integrate social graph-
based sybil protection directly into their overlay network structure.
In some systems, a small group of entities is responsible for detecting and prevent-
ing sybil attacks. In the Tor network, for example, 5-10 independent directory author-
ities constantly monitor the network and, based on voting, blacklist nodes suspected
of malicious behavior or of being part of a sybil population. This approach replaces
a singular TTP with a set of third parties, the majority of which need to be trusted
to not collude with malicious intent.
Effective and easy to deploy approaches exist for preventing sybil attacks in systems
based on short-range communication. In addition to the difficulty of multiplexing
a radio interface across multiple identities, different proposals exist for identifying
whether two claimed identities reachable over short-range radio share the same po-
sition (making them likely members of a sybil population). To name a few examples,
techniques from this class have been proposed using radio-based position verifica-
tion [49] and statistic signal strength distribution analysis [120].
2.5.2 Reacting to abuse
In the scope of this section, it is assumed that some possibility for abuse exists and
that an adversary is willing to exploit it. General possibilities for the detection of
abuse are considered first, followed by approaches for privacy-conscious blacklisting
and reputation management.
2.5.2.1 Detection
In order for users that abuse the system to be identified and, for example, punished,
their malicious behavior must first be detected. Meeting this precondition is, again,
a scenario-specific challenge. Here, a few noteworthy examples relevant to smart
traffic are discussed.
A general approach for identifying malicious users is by comparing their actions
with those of regular users. A simple example for this approach can be constructed
for cooperative sensing systems where multiple users contribute sensor values con-
cerning the same object (e.g., for determining the road quality at some location).
Such a system can be abused by contributing false sensor values. However, if the
cooperative services assumption holds and the majority of contributing users do not
collude with the adversary, false values are detectable through their distance to the
median. The sources of such contributions can be marked - with high probability,
they are either malicious or their sensing equipment is malfunctioning.
When disturbing smart traffic systems, malicious entities must often also falsify
their own location. Through such location spoofing, an adversary can, e.g., contribute
false traffic reports about some area (to influence traffic monitoring results) without
needing to be physically present [64]. Solutions for the protection against location
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spoofing exist that require additional infrastructure support [15] or spot checks by
local trusted entities [96]. In Chapter 5, an alternative approach is investigated that
is based on a reduction of the location verification challenge to the challenge of ver-
ifying an entity’s proximity.
2.5.2.2 Blacklisting and reputation management
If anonymity or pseudonymity is given, it becomes highly challenging to punish
users upon detected misbehavior. For example, malicious users can simply switch
to a new pseudonymous identity. In this context, several anonymous blacklisting
systems have been proposed that allow service operators to serve anonymous users
while retaining the possibility to blacklist them [57]. As a downside, these ap-
proaches are primarily focused on centralized setups in which users authenticate
to one or more service providers. Additionally, the existence of a TTP is usually
assumed.
Reputation systems have been proposed for allowing a more fine-granular distinc-
tion between cooperative and malicious nodes, e.g., in the context of peer-to-peer
systems [65]. Several works have also attempted to reconcile reputation systems
with the requirement of participant anonymity, resulting in the proposal of sev-
eral anonymous reputation systems. Androulaki et al., for example, propose an
approach centered around the idea of repcoins [1] (based on blind signatures and
David Chaum’s original electronic cash idea [16]). The IncogniSense framework [22]
enables reputation transfers between pseudonymous identities that preserve the un-
linkability between pseudonyms. The approach is also based on the usage of blind
signatures. Both IncogniSense and the repcoins approach, however, rely on the ex-
istence of a TTP for securing reputation scores.
2.6 Related challenges
In the following, two challenges are discussed that are related to the main topics
of this thesis. The connectivity and privacy characteristics of contemporary cellular
networks are discussed first. Following that, practical solutions for securing both
the content and the metadata of non-local communication are considered.
2.6.1 Connectivity and privacy in cellular networks
For scenarios in which long-distance connectivity is required for highly mobile en-
tities (such as moving vehicles), no practical alternatives to the use of cellular net-
works are known. However, the reliance on cellular network connectivity intro-
duces a number of new challenges and open questions.
For one, in currently deployed cellular network architectures, service operators can
both identify and locate all active clients. Consequently, they need to be trusted for
maintaining their user’s location privacy in all services relying on cellular network
connectivity. This is an assumption shared by virtually all works from the smart
traffic domain that rely on cellular network services. While greatly exceeding the
scope of this thesis, designing cellular networks in a privacy-conscious and trustless
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manner does not represent a technical impossibility. Data minimization techniques
like pseudonymization can be applied within cellular networks just as within other
systems. Concrete proposals in such a direction have already started to emerge in
the research literature. With ZipPhone [107], for example, users connect to the net-
work anonymously by sharing a pool of virtual SIM cards with other participants.
In addition to these general privacy concerns, a number of more deployment-specific
characteristics are also interesting in the context of this thesis, namely:
1. Whether cellular networks are ubiquitously available for smart traffic users.
2. Whether the establishment of peer-to-peer connections to other cellular net-
work users is possible.
3. Whether IP address changes can be initiated by users (for ensuring the unlink-
ability of pseudonym changes).
4. Whether IP addresses used in cellular networks are identifiable by external
adversaries.
It can be argued that 1 is easily true for cities and major roads in the developed
world. For determining the validity of 2, 3 and 4, the connectivity properties of
all cellular networks available in Germany were evaluated. The setup and detailed
results of this evaluation are discussed in Appendix A. In the following, a summary
of the results is presented:
2. The establishment of peer-to-peer connections is not always possible. Restric-
tive middleboxes and filtering policies were deployed in three of the four con-
sidered networks. For clients of two of the four considered networks, peer-to-
peer connections were completely infeasible.
3. IP address changes can be enforced by users.
4. New IP addresses still belong to the subnets of the same cellular network op-
erator. This increases the linkability between pseudonym changes and might
eventually lead to an identification of users.
2.6.2 Private and secure communication
This section considers the establishment of communication channels that are suit-
able for the use in cooperative services and decentralized systems. For maintain-
ing privacy protection and robustness in cooperative services, several privacy and
security-related protection goals should be fulfilled. From a privacy standpoint,
the anonymity, undetectability and confidentiality of communication is especially rel-
evant (see Section 2.2.1 for a detailed explanation of these protection goals). For
limiting various possibilities for system compromise and abuse, the security goals
of integrity and authenticity should additionally be realizable. Integrity is given if
the content of the communication cannot be altered by adversaries without being
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noticed. Authenticity is given if impersonation attacks are prevented and the (pos-
sibly pseudonymous) identity of the communication partners can be verified. Note
that this does not necessarily imply that the communication endpoints are identifi-
able in the sense that links to subjects can be inferred (which would conflict with the
anonymity goal). If pseudonyms are used, for example, authenticity is also given if
the communication partner is provably the rightful holder of the claimed pseudo-
nym.
In the following, possible approaches for realizing these protection goals in both
local and non-local (e.g., IP-based) communication are discussed, with an additional
focus on the anonymization service Tor.
2.6.2.1 Local communication
For adversaries that are not locally present, all of these protection goals are straight-
forwardly met by communication using short-range radio. If radio is used and ad-
versaries are within receiving range, the undetectability of communication cannot
be ensured. The anonymity of communication is only possible as long as the ad-
versary cannot localize the transmitting stations and link them to subjects via, e.g.,
physical observations. The remaining protection goals can be met using state of the
art security mechanisms from the vehicular networking domain [61]. These com-
monly rely on asymmetric cryptography for bootstrapping an authenticated chan-
nel, using cryptographic certificates included in pseudonyms.
2.6.2.2 Non-local communication
Concerning the security of non-local communication (e.g., over the Internet), var-
ious secure communication protocols that offer confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity have been proposed in the research literature and technical standards.
The transport layer security (TLS) protocol [29] is arguably one of the best studied
and most widely used of these proposals. Again, the authenticity of communica-
tion partners can be verified using asymmetric cryptography and the presentation
of cryptographic certificates. Upon bootstrapping a communication channel, sym-
metric cryptography is used, for performance reasons, for ensuring confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity.
For protecting the metadata of IP-based communication (achieving anonymity and
ideally also undetectability), several approaches exist that are of practical relevance.
Proxy servers and virtual private networks are popular amongst end users. How-
ever, they rely on the assumption that the chosen operators are honest and do not
collude with potential adversaries. By chaining multiple services, the trust require-
ments can be reduced. In essence, mix networks (cf. Section 2.4.6) realize just this - a
chaining of multiple potentially malicious anonymization providers so that the like-
lihood that all entities in a chain are colluding is reduced. The Tor network [31] is an
especially notable instantiation of the mix network approach that is discussed sep-
arately in the following. Other systems based on mix networks, e.g., HORNET [18],
are not deepened upon due to their lower availability and user base (and hence
achievable anonymity sets) at the time of writing.
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2.6.2.3 Tor an Peer-Tor-Peer
Tor [31] is an infrastructure-based mix network, i.e., anonymization is provided by a
network of dedicated relays (often high-bandwidth servers) that are reachable from
the public Internet (i.e., are not firewalled or behind NAT). Originally focused on en-
abling anonymous web surfing, Tor is also low-latency, in contrast to high-latency
mix networks where messages are delayed to achieve a higher resilience to timing-
based correlation attacks. At the time of writing (May 2016), the Tor network was
comprised of more than 7000 relays distributed over 1273 different autonomous sys-
tems and 82 countries12. The likelihood that all relays in a chain are malicious and
colluding is, therefore, lower than in any other practically deployed mix network.
The Tor network is currently estimated to serve more than 1 700 000 concurrent users
per day13. This number is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, higher than for any
other anonymous communication service deployed today. Note that the number of
users of an anonymization service directly limits the achievable anonymity level of
its users (i.e., the size of achievable anonymity sets).
In addition to sender anonymity, Tor also supports the registration of hidden services
providing receiver anonymity. Using hidden services, users can become reachable
via the Tor network without disclosing their true IP address. Cryptographically gen-
erated “.onion”-addresses are used for addressing Tor hidden services. For register-
ing hidden services and accepting connections, only outbound connections must
be made by clients. Thus, using hidden services, peers are able to connect to each
other independently of any restrictive firewalls or NAT middleboxes, as long as out-
bound connections to Tor relays are possible. As was discussed in Section 2.6.1, this
is highly relevant in currently deployed cellular networks where the establishment
of direct communication links between users is often impossible.
In the scope of this thesis, an abstraction library for Tor and Tor hidden services was
developed. Named Peer-Tor-Peer (PTP)14, the library is based on the Java language
and aims at enabling the rapid development of Android applications that require
the establishment of peer-to-peer connections. In addition to enabling peer-to-peer
connectivity even in the presence of restrictive middleboxes, PTP (through the use
of Tor and Tor hidden services) also realizes the pseudonymity, undetectability, con-
fidentiality, integrity and authenticity of resulting communication channels. In the
context of this thesis, PTP can be used for building practically usable implemen-
tations of OverDrive (cf. Chapter 5) and the mixing protocol used in BitNym (cf.
Chapter 6). While not explicitly evaluated in scenarios with high mobility, PTP is
expected to provide continuous connectivity as long as cellular network connectiv-
ity remains present and forced IP address changes are rare15.
12https://compass.torproject.org
13https://metrics.torproject.org/
14https://github.com/kit-tm/PTP
15IP address changes necessitate the reregistration of hidden service identifiers, leading to delays
during which the reachability of PTP peers is impaired.
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3. Assumptions, adversary model
and evaluation approach
A number of assumptions underlying the works presented in this thesis are stated in
Section 3.1 of this chapter. A general adversary model is defined in Section 3.2. The
model defines the combination of influence, goals and knowledge against which all
solutions proposed in this thesis strive to protect users. A structured analysis and
evaluation approach used in the remainder of this thesis is introduced in Section 3.3.
3.1 Assumptions
This thesis is based on a number of general assumptions that are introduced in the
following. Whenever works presented in subsequent chapters make use of addi-
tional, more specific assumptions, these are presented in those respective chapters.
3.1.1 Users
In the scope of this thesis, extensive use of the term user is made. For simplicity, it
is used in a very broad manner so as to include both the driver of a smart vehicle
and any intelligence within the vehicle (e.g., in the form of on-board devices like
navigation systems) acting in the interest of that subject1. For the sake of simplicity,
one subject is assumed per vehicle that controls the vehicle and its movement2.
In the following, several assumptions are made concerning the capabilities of users.
While formulated with current and near-future smart cars in mind, the required
1The fact that subjects can fulfill multiple roles in the context of smart traffic, e.g., can also be
passive passengers, is abstracted away.
2Considering the near-future possibility of widely available autonomic vehicles, not necessarily
by actually driving.
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assumptions can also be met by commonly available smartphones (if only vehi-
cles with more conservative capabilities are available). Following assumptions are
made:
• Cellular networking interfaces are available and cellular network coverage is
ubiquitous. Sufficient bandwidth capacities are present to service large num-
bers of users independently of their geographic distribution.
• Short-range communication interfaces, e.g., dedicated inter-vehicle communi-
cation interfaces [66] or simply Bluetooth [12], are available3.
• Users are always able to determine their own location, e.g., using GPS. Addi-
tionally:
– No privacy threats are associated with localization. For example, no en-
hanced localization services involving the disclosure of location informa-
tion to a cloud service (as investigated in [64]) are used.
– The localization precision is sufficient for all use-cases considered in this
thesis.
• Users have an unlimited energy budget4.
• The majority of users are honest and cooperate willingly. While possibly self-
ish or curious in isolation, the majority of users will never actively collude
with malicious intent5.
3.1.2 Privacy in cellular networks
Cellular network operators are assumed to honor the location privacy of their users
and never collude with adversaries to release collected location data. With currently
deployed cellular network architectures, this assumption is required in any system
relying on cellular network connectivity. This includes systems proposed in related
works (e.g., [59]) as well as commercially deployed systems like Google Maps.
Location privacy in cellular networks is a problem orthogonal to the challenges tack-
led in this thesis. However, it does not represent a technical impossibility and re-
search in that direction is available [107]. Given cellular network technologies (or
similar long-range wireless communication approaches) that effectively prevent op-
erators from obtaining identifiable location samples, the assumption of honest cel-
lular network operators is no longer necessary.
3This assumption is required only for the abuse-resistant cooperative route planning system pro-
posed in Chapter 4.
4Users of smart traffic services are typically associated with moving vehicles, e.g., cars. For this
reason, this thesis assumes the existence of an abundant energy budget and does not specifically
consider the energy consumption of the presented solutions.
5This assumption is central to the cooperative services concept (cf. Section 2.4.1). It also implies
that the majority of users will not actively collude to identify specific individual users or their actions.
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3.1.3 Existing building blocks
A number of existing cryptographic building blocks and privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies are used in this thesis. On the cryptography side, this includes symmetric
encryption (e.g., via AES), digital signatures and asymmetric encryption (e.g., via
RSA and elliptic curve cryptography), secure communication protocols like TLS [29]
and blind signature schemes like RSA blind signatures [17]. The security of all of
these building blocks is assumed. Note that specific implementations of crypto-
graphic primitives are freely exchangeable in practice as long the provided func-
tionality is preserved. On the user side, it is assumed that users, unless controlled
by an adversary, are able to generate secure cryptographic keys and maintain their
secrecy if necessary.
In addition to existing cryptographic primitives, several systems deployed in prac-
tice are assumed to be secure within their individual trust model. In addition to the
Bitcoin network, which is of interest mainly in Chapter 6, this includes the anony-
mous communication services Tor and PTP (cf. Section 2.6.2). Specifically, it is as-
sumed that Tor effectively anonymizes communication for any adversary consid-
ered in this thesis. Likewise, it is assumed that PTP successfully leverages function-
ality provided by Tor for enabling authenticated and both content- and metadata-
protected connections between pseudonymous peers. These assumptions imply
that no timing attacks based on global scale communication eavesdropping will be
considered and that the majority of Tor relays are assumed to be non-colluding.
Connections to the Tor network, and, consequently, interactions using PTP, are as-
sumed to be possible for all entities with Internet access (e.g., via cellular networks).
3.2 General adversary model
An adversary model is defined in the following for enabling the analysis and eval-
uation of privacy characteristics. The main goal of the adversary is the collection of
identifiable location samples from users (i.e., of timestamped locations than can be
linked to subject identities). In general, the presented model applies to all systems
discussed in this thesis. Scenario-specific concretizations are made where necessary.
The adversary’s area of influence, goals and assumed inference capabilities are de-
fined first. Following that, concretizations of the adversary model for the different
scenarios investigated in this thesis are listed.
3.2.1 Capabilities
It is assumed that the adversary can infiltrate individual system entities (e.g., users,
service operators) for achieving his goals. Entities controlled by the adversary are
not required to adhere to any predefined rules or specifications, e.g., can ignore
protocol steps and distribute false information.
As an important distinction to many related works, if single entities (e.g., service
operators) control indispensable system components (as is the case in centralized
systems), these entities are explicitly assumed to collude with the adversary6. This
6Cellular network operators are an exception here (cf. Section 3.1.2).
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assumption reflects the threat arising from security breaches, governmental subpoe-
nas and dishonest service operators.
Concerning the infiltration of the user population, it is assumed that the majority
of users does not collude with the adversary. Weakening this assumption would
question the entire cooperative services concept. A bounded number of users can,
however, be infiltrated by the adversary, e.g., via bribes or security compromise. The
exact percentage of the user population that is under adversary control is varied as
an evaluation parameter.
Compared to the Dolev-Yao model [32], the adversary assumed in this thesis is not
globally omnipresent7. While he can intercept individual messages, he is not able
to deanonymize anonymous low-latency communication (e.g., communication over
Tor) using timing-based attacks. Note that anonymous communication technologies
like Tor and PTP (cf. Section 2.6.2) as well as secure communication protocols like
TLS [29] are used throughout this thesis. Under the assumption that these building
blocks are not vulnerable to the adversary and provide their services correctly, the
possibility for malicious interception, injection or altering of messages does not pose
a significant threat and is therefore ignored.
The assumed adversary is not able to deploy additional infrastructure that is not
already required by the considered system. For example, an adversary deploying
dedicated vehicle tracking equipment (e.g., license plate scanners) with the explicit
goal of tracking users is not covered by the adversary model described here.
3.2.2 Adversary goals
The primary goal of the adversary is the collection of identifiable location samples
from users. Depending on the adversary’s priorities, two flavors of the goal are
possible. In the simplest case, the adversary tries to collect as much samples as
possible from as many users as possible. Alternatively, he targets one specific user
and attempts to track his movement. If nothing else is specified, the former behavior
is assumed.
The adversary also pursues the realization of other privacy threats that can lead up
to the obtaining of identifiable location samples. In the scope of this thesis, this most
notably includes the identification, or breaking, of pseudonyms.
Apart from these adversarial goals, following constraint is also assumed for the ad-
versary: if he colludes with entities of central importance to a system, e.g., with a
service operator that performs key tasks, it becomes an additional goal for the ad-
versary to maintain the utility of the system. This goal models the fact that he might
want to escape detection and maintain the secrecy of his surveillance, ensuring that
users won’t stop using the compromised service. In the case that the adversary’s
identity is identical to that of the service operator, maintaining the system might
also simply be more important for him than compromising the privacy of users. As
a direct result of the described constraint, the adversary model developed here is
7It should be noted that adversaries in the Dolev-Yao model are not able to infiltrate participating
entities, which is a major characteristic of the adversary outlined here.
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unsuited for evaluating the abuse resistance of a system. Separate, scenario-tailored
adversary models for this goal are introduced where necessary.
3.2.3 Context knowledge and identication attacks
Several identification attacks on location samples have been proposed in the lit-
erature, based on correlation, timing and additional context knowledge (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.4). The evaluation of well-known attacks is not a focus of this thesis. It is
assumed that attacks from the literature are possible for the adversary if he has ac-
cess to a comparable set of data. If additional context knowledge is required for a
considered attack (e.g., the home and work locations of users as in [49]), the adver-
sary is assumed to have access to it.
3.2.4 Concretizations for di erent systems
Concretizations to the presented adversary model are made for each of the specific
scenarios tackled in this thesis. The more important of these adaptations are listed
in the following.
Concerning the promise coin approach to privacy-preserving cooperative route plan-
ning, a centralized system architecture is given. Consequently, according to the
defined adversary model, the service operator with all of its infrastructure is as-
sumed to be under the full control of the adversary. The adversary has an interest
in maintaining the utility of the system, i.e., ensuring an improved traffic flow, but
also wants to collect as many identifiable location samples from as many users as
possible (effectively tracking their movement in this way). An additional, separate
adversary is modelled in this context that does not collude with the service operator
and strives towards disturbing the system and abusing it for influencing traffic.
OverDrive realizes a decentralized, peer-to-peer architecture. The adversary is as-
sumed to control a portion of the overlay network. Nodes controlled by the adver-
sary do not have to correspond to actual users. However, the use of a sybil-resistant
pseudonymization scheme (as developed in Chapter 6) is assumed, so that the num-
ber of nodes under the adversary’s control is bounded. During the evaluation, it is
assumed that the adversary can control up to 1% of the node population. If sybil
attacks are not possible and a large user population is assumed, infiltrating 1% of
the node population represents a significant challenge. Nodes can’t choose their
physical location arbitrarily, but nodes controlled by the adversary can lie about
their own location. Goals of the adversary in this scenario are the collection of loca-
tion samples from all participating nodes, i.e., establishing a view similar to that of
an operator in a comparable centralized system, as well as the targeted tracking of
individual users.
BitNym is based on the usage of block chain networks as distributed append-only
bulletin boards. The adversary is assumed to be unable to attack the underlying
block chain network, so that its security properties are preserved. In the case that
the Bitcoin network is used, for example, it is assumed that no entity can control
more than 50% of the computing resources in the network (cf. Section 2.4.5). How-
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ever, the adversary can deanonymize regular value transfers via Bitcoin, i.e., iden-
tify the pseudonymous addresses used in them. The focus of the adversary in the
context of BitNym is on breaking pseudonyms, as it enables the identification of
pseudonymously shared location samples.
3.3 Evaluation approach
In the following, it is described how, based on the previously discussed assumptions
and adversary model, the privacy characteristics of the proposed systems are evalu-
ated. The proposed approach is inspired by LINDDUN [28] and similar approaches
to privacy threat modeling [26]. Like in related approaches, privacy threats and cor-
responding protection goals are first identified, followed by a structured search for
possible attacks. The feasibility of individual attacks is then discussed and, where
applicable, evaluated using simulations.
In contrast to more practice-oriented approaches (like LINDDUN), the approach
used here follows a narrower scope in terms of the considered system model and
protection goals. Implementation-specific details are abstracted away to a large ex-
tent. Only the four most relevant privacy threats for this thesis - identifiability, link-
ability, detectability and information disclosure - are considered (cf. Section 2.3.1).
This reduction of scope enables a more exhaustive consideration of possible attack
vectors. Also, threats are not seen in isolation, but as contributors to the main ad-
versary goal of obtaining identifiable location samples. In this way, a better compa-
rability of evaluation results can be achieved.
Note that more security-related attack goals, like abusing a given system or creating
sybil identities, are not covered by the approach outlined here. The approaches used
for evaluating these aspects are more specific and are discussed when considering
the concrete contexts.
The employed approach consists of several steps that are grouped based on the pri-
vacy threats most prominently addressed through them. The two groups of steps
are detection and disclosure and linking and identification.
3.3.1 Detection and disclosure
Here, the amount, content and quality of the data that the adversary is able to gather
is determined. Following steps can be identified:
1. Identifying knowledge from passive observation. Based on the considered system
and the entities controlled by the adversary, the data collectable by him under
normal operation is identified. This includes all messages exchanged with
compromised entities, their content and metadata, including source identifiers
(if available) and timing data.
2. Identifying possible actions. Here, all actions are enumerated that the adversary
is able to perform within the system model and that exceed the actions per-
formed during regular operation. In other words, actions are identified that
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might be used for constructing active attacks. This includes malicious behav-
ior like lying or not following protocol specifications. Actions that are not part
of the adversary model (e.g., physical surveillance) are not considered.
3. Evaluating possibilities for increasing knowledge. For each combination of identi-
fied actions, it is investigated to what extent it can be used as an active attack
for increasing the adversary’s knowledge. Additional constraints, like the aim
to preserve a service’s utility if colluding with the service operator, are taken
into account.
Considering the complex scenarios addressed in this thesis - involving, e.g., vehic-
ular traffic and overlay networks - a purely analytical approach is often insufficient
for evaluating detection and disclosure threats. Thus, on several occasions, sim-
ulations are complementarily used to determine the characteristics and extent of
collected data as well as the effects of attacks.
3.3.2 Linking and identication
Here, the extent is determined to which the adversary can extract identifiable loca-
tion samples from the data available to him (according to the preceding evaluation
steps). Following steps are relevant in this context:
1. Direct identification. It is investigated to what extent location samples known
to the adversary can be identified directly, i.e., by using explicit links to other
data items.
2. Linkability. For each combination of data types known to the adversary, it is
determined whether links between individual data items of these types can be
established. Linking might be possible based on spatio-temporal similarities
between location samples.
3. Identification attacks based on linked data. The feasibility of identification attacks
based on clusters of linkable data items (trips, in the case of linkable location
samples) is investigated. Correlation- and context-based inference attacks can
be considered in this context.
Linking and identification attacks from the literature can often be reused if the data
available to the adversary can be matched to the setup in the original publications.
In the scope of this thesis, such mappings are performed whenever possible to avoid
the replication of existing results. If no mapping is possible, the possibilities for link-
ing and identification attacks based on the available data are discussed analytically.
48 3. Assumptions, adversary model and evaluation approach
4. Privacy-preserving cooperative
route planning
This chapter deals with one of the most popular and relevant smart traffic applica-
tions today - improving overall traffic flow. The focus is on cooperative route planning,
a concept for optimizing vehicular routing on a global scale by gathering data about
planned routes. As in other smart traffic applications, the benefits of such a system
come at the cost of an increased privacy risk for participating users. Planned routes
include both the current and the planned future locations of drivers and passengers
- all highly privacy-relevant pieces of information. With only an indirect benefit
from publishing their intended route, users might choose against participating in
cooperative route planning if they face the danger of privacy loss. Lower adoption
rates, in turn, decrease the utility of cooperative route planning systems.
It is, therefore, desirable to allow users to participate in cooperative route planning
anonymously. However, without additional precautions, granting users anonymity
can enable wide-scale abuse and thus greatly deteriorate service utility. How to
resolve this tension is not obvious and poses a significant challenge in the context of
cooperative route planning.
Addressing this challenge, a system is proposed here that realizes cooperative route
planning in a privacy-preserving manner while offering protection against users
that repeatedly publish false plans. According to the author’s knowledge, the work
presented here is the first that addresses this combination of requirements.
Cooperative route planning and the challenges addressed in this chapter are de-
scribed in greater detail in Section 4.1. Additionally, the adversary model for this
chapter is concretized. Following a discussion of related work (in Section 4.2), a sys-
tem is proposed that enables users to publish travel plans in an anonymous fashion.
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More specifically, users can publish promises - intents to pass at specific waypoints
at approximate times. While the unlinkability of promises to individual users is
ensured, lying users are quickly excluded from participation.
A high-level overview of the general scheme and the underlying system architec-
ture is given in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, the design is concretized and a detailed
description of the involved entities, objects and mechanisms is provided. A pri-
vacy analysis of the proposal is performed in Section 4.5, following the approach
from Chapter 3. The privacy analysis is followed by an analysis of the system’s se-
curity against different forms of abuse (attacks on the functionality of the system),
presented in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, possible performance bottlenecks of the so-
lution are evaluated to prove its practicability. The chapter concludes in Section 4.8
with a summary of results.
This chapter is largely based on [41].
4.1 Cooperative route planning
The distribution of vehicular traffic today is still largely inefficient. Overburdened
roads lead to congestion, traffic accidents and increased pollution due to stop and
go. Adaptive route planning based on traffic monitoring is a widely accepted mea-
sure for improving present inefficiencies. Vehicles receiving traffic updates can
adapt their routes accordingly, thus reaching their destinations quicker and improv-
ing the overall traffic flow. Most currently deployed systems restrict themselves to
estimations about the current traffic situation. Predictions about the future, if at all,
are made only based on the current state and historic data. The growing intercon-
nection of vehicles and infrastructure, however, enables more advanced forms of
cooperation in vehicular route planning. Information about planned routes can be
shared by vehicles on the road (respectively their navigation devices), leading to
more precise traffic predictions. Precise predictions, in turn, enable the selection of
faster routes and result in an improved traffic flow [23, 34]. In the scope of this the-
sis, the approach of sharing planned routes and integrating the plans of others into
route planning decisions is referred to as cooperative route planning.
4.1.1 Example use case and potential benets
The cooperative route planning concept can be motivated using a typical use-case.
Consider an ideal route planning system and the following scenario: Before a user
starts his trip, he enters his destination into his navigation device1. His navigation
device receives updates about the current traffic situation as well as precise predic-
tions about future developments. In this way, it can propose a route, a start time and
times and locations for possible coffee breaks, so that the user wastes as little time
and fuel as possible. As a side-effect, by ensuring a fast and uncongested journey for
1Automated route planning is even more interesting when considering self-driving cars which,
unlike human drivers, cannot function without it. Also, they always adhere to the route proposed
by their route planning component.
4.1. Cooperative route planning 51
the user, his navigation device also contributes towards improving the global traffic
flow for all traffic participants.
The effectiveness of the navigation device’s planning largely depends on the quality
of the data it receives. For the current traffic state, good estimates can be obtained by
gathering data from road side infrastructure or speed measurements from vehicular
fleets. For calculating the future traffic state, on the other hand, input from all other
vehicles on the road is desirable for deriving an accurate forecast. If all vehicles on
the road publish their intended route and consider the published routes of others,
significant improvements in overall traffic flow can be achieved [23, 34].
In its pure form, cooperative route planning has a strong altruistic element - by
publishing his plans, a user contributes to the common good. Additional incentives
can easily be introduced into such a system as well. For example, participating users
can receive benefits, like road toll discounts or the right to use a reserved lane, if they
publish their plans beforehand.
Returning to the previous example, a navigation device implementing cooperative
route planning can announce that the user will be passing a certain, frequently con-
gested road segment at some approximate time in the future. On a trip to Switzer-
land, for example, it can announce that they will be passing the Gotthard tunnel
between 13:15 and 13:30 on the same day. When they indeed arrive at 13:23, the
user is able to use a reserved lane and pass the tunnel immediately.
4.1.2 Privacy and security challenges
Independently of any benefits, insufficient trust in the privacy provided by a coop-
erative route planning system can hamper the deployment of such a system. Users
may weigh their own privacy higher than the common good (in the form of better
global traffic flow) or the incentives a service operator may offer. Additionally, as
was already discussed in Chapter 2, the centralized collection of large amounts of
privacy-relevant data might also be undesirable on a societal level. As in most smart
traffic scenarios, a central challenge is the protection of location data. Both current
and intended future locations should be shared in such a way that they are not easily
identifiable. Additionally, to prevent profiling and identification based on context
knowledge, the reconstruction of user trips should be hampered as well.
Somewhat in opposition to these requirements to user privacy, several security as-
pects must also be considered to guarantee the effectiveness of cooperative route
planning. It must be ensured that the plans reported by users reflect their actual
intentions and that the number of plans a user can publish is bounded. Without
precautions, malicious users can influence traffic flow by distributing large num-
bers of fake plans (a form of sybil attack). In addition to controlling the registration
to cooperative route planning systems, mechanisms are needed for monitoring that
plans have actually been fulfilled. The latter is also a precondition to the implemen-
tation of incentives (e.g., the right to use a reserved lane if participating honestly).
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4.2 Related work
Cooperative, anticipatory route planning has been widely discussed in the context
of intelligent transportation systems [23, 34]. Existing works focus on improving
route planning decisions based on collected planning data from users. Proposed
systems are evaluated using traffic simulations. Evaluation results demonstrate that
significant improvements in average travel times are possible, especially in scenar-
ios with a high traffic density. While these contributions are valuable for advancing
the cooperative route planning concept, no works are known that consider the issue
of protecting user privacy or minimizing the systems’ vulnerability to abuse.
In addition to academic works on the subject, the practical deployment of cooper-
ative route planning approaches is gaining traction as well. Examples include the
smartphone app NUNAV2. As in the discussed academic proposals, the destina-
tions of all users are collected in a centralized fashion. Route planning algorithms
are continuously applied on the data by the service operator and resulting route rec-
ommendations are communicated back to users. Since the actual route planning is
performed by the service operator, he needs to be aware of the current location and
the destinations of all users.
As was already discussed in Section 2.3, there is a plethora of works on location pri-
vacy and privacy for collaborative sensing that focus on achieving different privacy
protection goals while performing operations on a user’s current location. While
there are many works dealing with privacy in systems reporting a user’s current
state, very few works are known that deal with intention privacy.
In [19], Chim et al. propose a scheme for making power usage reservations in a
smart grid context using blindly signed anonymous credentials. While their sce-
nario and approach are similar to the ones in this chapter, their scheme has im-
portant drawbacks. For example, it only guarantees that users will consume the
reserved amount of energy per day and not whether they will consume it at the
specific time frames they claim. Additionally, the electricity provider in [19] is as-
sumed to know the total daily power consumption of a user. In a traffic scenario,
this would correspond to the traffic authority or a private company knowing the
distance traveled by each participating vehicle, which is undesirable from a privacy
standpoint and difficult to realize. The idea of preventing abuse using single-spend,
renewable tokens has also appeared in the context of privacy-preserving subscrip-
tion services [106]. However, the question of realizing anonymous promises and
reservations has not been raised in these works.
Privacy-preserving reputation systems have been proposed for preventing abuse in
systems with pseudonymous participants (see also Section 2.5.2). Androulaki et al.,
for example, propose an approach centered around the idea of repcoins [1], which,
similar to the approach introduced in this chapter, are based on David Chaum’s orig-
inal electronic cash idea [16]. However, their scheme does not consider the promise
scenario, i.e., is lacking a mechanism for publishing promises in such a way that rep-
2http://www.graphmasters.net/
4.3. High-level overview of solution 53
utation can be gained on promise fulfillment without enabling an adversary to link
the promise back to its author. The IncogniSense framework [22] enables reputation
transfers between pseudonymous identities that preserve the unlinkability between
pseudonyms. Layering a cooperative planning system on top of IncogniSense, the
same pseudonym could be used for publishing and fulfilling individual promises,
with the pseudonym’s reputation score incrementing upon fulfillment. In order to
avoid linkability between promises however, a different pseudonym will have to
be used per promise. This requirement is difficult to reconcile with IncogniSense’s
periodic pseudonym switching mechanism, resulting in a more complex and com-
putationally demanding solution than the approach proposed here.
Another related research area is privacy-preserving incentive systems. In [72], Li et
al. propose two schemes for privacy-preserving incentives in mobile sensing sce-
narios. One of their schemes is based on a trusted third party, the other uses a chain
of blindly signed tokens for ensuring the payment of users and protecting against
cheating (in this context, committing data for the same sensing task multiple times).
While related to the problems tackled here, the problem of publishing promises and
verifying promise fulfillment in a privacy-preserving manner is not considered.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the presented work is the first to tackle the
problem of publishing planned routes in a vehicular route planning context while
protecting the past and future locations of users and effectively limiting abuse.
4.3 High-level overview of solution
An abstract overview of the proposed solution is given here. The promise coin (PC)
construction is introduced as well as its application to the problem of realizing
abuse-resistant cooperative route planning without compromising the location pri-
vacy of users.
4.3.1 Promise coins
A central challenge when considering stronger privacy protection in cooperative
route planning systems is to ensure that malicious users cannot disturb the function-
ality of the system. A single malicious user might, for example, repeatedly publish
made-up routes, making individual road segments appear overburdened and thus
greatly altering the flow of traffic. Given a simple, registration-free system with full
user anonymity (i.e., users are anonymous during all interactions with the system),
it is impossible to exclude such users even if their misbehavior can be identified.
Therefore, the promises of other participants can’t be fully trusted, which leads to
a degraded system utility. On the other hand, anonymity and the unlinkability of
user actions are highly desirable from a privacy standpoint.
To answer this tension, a scheme is proposed based on the novel concept of promise
coins (PCs) - cryptographic constructs related to Chaum’s electronic cash [16]. In
electronic cash, financial authorities issue digital bills to users using blind signatures,
i.e., without being able to link these bills to the receiving users later on.
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A pool of PCs is issued, using blind signatures, to each user upon (identifiable)
authentication at a central authority. In the following, this central authority is re-
ferred to as the promise authority (PA). PCs are used to make anonymously pub-
lished promises about a user’s planed route trustworthy. From a high-level view, a
user publishes a promise by paying the PA one PC for it. In exchange, he receives
a promise token from the PA. Once the user proves that he has fulfilled his promise,
or if he revokes the promise in a timely manner, he can redeem the promise token
and receive a new PC from the system. Depending on the deployment scenario, users
might additionally receive benefits when redeeming a promise token, like a dis-
count on the road toll for the current road segment. Promises can also be treated as
reservations. For example, only users with valid promise tokens might be allowed
to pass a given tunnel or bridge.
Honest users will never run out of PCs and will never need to perform the identity-
coupled PC issuing protocol with the PA again. Uncooperative users, on the other
hand, will run out of PCs upon repeated misconduct and can be denied new PCs by
the PA, effectively banning them from the system.
An unspent PC is a guarantee for the PA (and other users) that the anonymous user
owning the PC is trustworthy enough for publishing at least this one promise. In
contrast to regular currencies, the semantic of a PC is therefore not “money” but
trust, and fulfilling promises regenerates trust.
Using blind signatures for the issuing of PCs, it is ensured that they are completely
unlikable to specific users or to other PCs of a user. The properties of blind signa-
tures are described in Section 4.4.6, together with an example implementation based
on the RSA cryptosystem.
4.3.2 Cooperative route planning with promise coins
When calculating routes, users take traffic updates from the promise board (PB) into
account. The PB is the publicly accessible database of all currently relevant promises.
Traffic updates from the PB include traffic forecasts based on the published promises
of other participants. Once a route has been found, the user (respectively its navi-
gation device) identifies parts of its route for which promises can be made. Specif-
ically, it identifies resources (road segments, tunnels, etc.) along its planned route,
for which a resource authority (RA) has been deployed3. For each of these resources,
it then formulates a promise containing a resource identifier and a time frame (e.g.,
a 15-minute interval) during which it expects the resource to be passed. Using an
anonymous communication channel, this promise is transmitted to the PA together
with a valid, previously unspent PC. After validation of both the promise and the
PC, the PA commits the promise to the PB and returns a promise token (PT) to the
user. Once the user reaches the resource region, he can show the promise token to
the RA. If he arrived at the region within the promised time frame, the RA will cash
in the promise token and issue a new PC to the user.
3Promises can also be made for resources for which no RA has been deployed. However, abuse
cannot be effectively prevented for such promises, rendering them less trustworthy.
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Figure 4.1 Cooperative route planning with promise coins - overview.
Figure 4.1 depicts an overview of these steps. The diagram depicts the distribution
of traffic forecasts (step 1), the publication of a promise (step 2), the commitment of
a promise to the PB and the issuing of a promise token (step 3), the promise token
redemption request at the responsible RA (step 4) and finally the issuing of a new
PC upon the successful redemption of a promise token (step 5). In the last step,
the optional granting of a benefit is shown as well, in the form of issuing a benefit
token. The diagram doesn’t depict the identity-bound protocol for requesting new
PCs from the PA. For honest users (and barring any hardware failures), this step is
performed only once at the beginning of their participation in the system.
As in the remainder of this thesis, while the term user is frequently used when de-
scribing and analyzing approaches, the actual work in a practical implementation
will be performed by navigation devices or self-driving cars. The details of the pro-
posed system can easily be hidden from human drivers and passengers, making the
resulting system appear as a regular route planning application.
4.4 Design
Following the high-level overview given in Section 4.3, a detailed description of the
proposal is now presented. A number of underlying assumptions are recapitulated
first. The participating entities and employed data objects are then introduced. Fol-
lowing that, the mechanisms comprising the system are described. An overview of
the involved cryptographic certificates and data objects can be found in Table 4.1.
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4.4.1 Underlying assumptions
Several assumptions underlie the presented design that are also used for the analysis
of the proposal. These reflect the general assumptions at the core of this thesis, as
discussed in Chapter 3.
Two types of adversaries are considered:
1. An adversary attempting to compromise the privacy of users, modelled in ac-
cordance to the general adversary model discussed in Section 3.2. All entities
controlled by the service operator are assumed to be also controlled by the ad-
versary. The adversary has an interest in maintaining service utility. He per-
forms no actions that would negatively impact traffic flow or the functionality
of the system.
2. An adversary attempting to abuse the system for disrupting or manipulating
traffic flow. His capabilities are restricted to match these of one or more regular
users.
Concerning the required existing building blocks, blind signatures play a central
role in the developed system. It is assumed that they are secure against all consid-
ered adversaries. Additionally, an anonymous and secure (i.e., confidentiality- and
integrity-preserving) communication channel is required. Here, the Tor [31] network
and TLS [29] are used as available building blocks. It is assumed that, in combina-
tion, they are secure against impersonation and eavesdropping attacks by parties
not participating in the communication. Likewise, it is assumed that none of the
considered adversaries can break the metadata protection provided by Tor.
Vehicles (and, consequently, users) are assumed to be equipped with both cellular
(e.g., 3G or 4G) and short-range radio (e.g., IEEE 802.11p) communication interfaces.
All involved entities are assumed to share a globally synchronized clock for cor-
rectly evaluating promise fulfillment and promise revocation requests. The required
clock precision depends on the chosen time frame granularity. For time frames of
several minutes and more, errors in the range of a few seconds are acceptable.
4.4.2 Entities
This section introduces all entities relevant in the context of the proposed system,
namely:
• the promise authority (PA)
• resource authorities (RAs)
• the promise board (PB)
4.4.2.1 Promise authority (PA)
The promise authority (PA) is the trust anchor in the proposed system. It maintains
the publicly known promise authority certificate (PAC). The PAC is used for estab-
lishing trusted communication channels with the PA, signing promise tokens and
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Object Authentication Function
PA certificate (PAC) external, trust anchor secure connections to PA,
trust anchor
coin issuing certificate
(CIC)
signed with PAC blind signing of PCs
promise coin (PC) signed with CIC authenticating promises
promise by spending a PC, later
signed with PAC
publishing future intent
promise token (PT) signed with PAC redeemed for a new PC
upon promise fulfillment
RA certificate (RAC) signed with PAC generating (public part)
and cashing in PTs
user ID external requesting first batch of
PCs
Table 4.1 Overview of used certificates and data objects.
validating actions concerning the state of the PB (e.g., the revocation of promises).
The PA additionally maintains the coin issuing certificate (CIC). The CIC is only used
for blindly signing PCs. A PC is only valid if it includes a signature by a currently
valid CIC4.
The PA can be maintained by a public traffic authority or a private company provid-
ing the cooperative route planning service. In the scope of this chapter, for simplic-
ity, the focus is on a setup featuring one PA. In practice, the deployment of multiple
PAs might be interesting for achieving higher fault tolerance and a decentralization
of control.
4.4.2.2 Resource authorities (RAs)
A resource authority (RA) is an entity responsible for a specific resource, e.g., a road
segment, bridge or tunnel. In order for a user to be able to make promises about
a resource, a RA needs to be deployed for that resource. RAs are equipped with a
resource authority certificate (RAC) signed by the PA. RACs can be used for authen-
tication and their public part is used by the PA for generating promise tokens. All
RAs, their resources and their RACs are publicly known. Information about RAs
can be distributed, for example, by the PB.
The main function of a RA is the verification of the fulfillment of promises. Thus,
a RA needs to be both reachable for users passing its resource and be able to verify
that users are really passing it. For satisfying both of these requirements, RAs are
envisioned to be equipped with short-range radio interfaces as widely discussed
4In a practical deployment, CICs will likely need to be rotated after certain periods to maintain
the scalability of PC double-spending detection (cf. Section 4.4.4.3). A CIC rotation can happen
seamlessly to users, with the PA offering to exchange PCs signed with the old CIC for new ones.
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in the vehicular networking community [66]. Radio-equipped road side units (RSUs)
are a central element of various vehicular networking architectures and are expected
to find major deployment, e.g., for relaying safety messages and time-critical sensor
readings. RAs should be implemented in such a way that they have access to one
or multiple RSUs scattered around the respective resource managed by them. Other
existing infrastructure like toll stations can be leveraged by RAs as well. However,
it is assumed that RAs have no access to dedicated vehicle identification equipment
like license plate scanners. While the anonymous publication of routes is still possi-
ble with RAs equipped in this way, the routes vehicles have already taken become
difficult to anonymize.
Upon verifying that a promise has been fulfilled, RAs cash in the supplied promise
token and hand out a new PC to the user. This step, again, involves only the RA and
the user. In general, none of the actions performed by a RA requires any communi-
cation with the PA, PB or other RAs. Thus, as an important detail, RAs can safely
be realized in an “offline” manner without any form of long-range (i.e., Internet)
connectivity.
Concerning the number and deployment density of RAs, there are two interesting
extreme cases: the dense deployment case, where all major roads are split into multi-
ple short segments and mapped to individual resources, and the sparse deployment
case, where RAs are only set up for common bottlenecks like tunnels, bridges or
busy crossings. While the dense deployment case leads to a higher granularity of
promises and, thus, potentially better traffic predictions, it is also tied to a larger
initial investment for setting up RAs.
4.4.2.3 Promise board
The promise board (PB) is a publicly accessible database for promises. The main func-
tion of the PB is to keep track of published promises and to make this information
public to all interested parties. Information from the PB can be used for making
route planning decisions, by checking how much demand for a resource (e.g., a road
segment) is expected in the future. Promises and promise revocations are pushed to
the PB by the PA after they have been validated.
The PB can be realized as a centralized service, maintained by the service operator.
In principle, it can also be realized in a decentralized manner using a distributed
data structure like a DHT. PeerTIS [101], for example, is a DHT optimized for stor-
ing traffic-related data that could be extended for supporting time-dependent traffic
estimations based on published promises. Since no privacy-related benefits are ex-
pected from a decentralization of the PB, this possibility is ignored in the following.
4.4.3 Objects
This section defines object types that are at the center of the proposed system, namely:
• promises
• promise coins (PCs)
• promise tokens
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4.4.3.1 Promise
In the context of this chapter, a promise is a public statement of intent from an anony-
mous user to make use of a specific resource within a specific time frame. So, with
resourceID denoting some sort of resource identifier and timeframe denoting a time
frame, a promise P has the form:
P := (resourceID, timeframe)
In a cooperative route planning context, a promise can have a semantic like “I will
be passing the Gotthard tunnel going south, between 11:00 and 11:30 today.”. De-
pending on the context and the type of the resource, a promise can also be treated
as a reservation, i.e., only vehicles that made a reservation might be allowed to pass
the Gotthard tunnel at high-traffic times. In a vehicular traffic context, resources
represent short road segments with a length of up to several kilometers. For shar-
ing whole routes, users publish multiple promises. Given a sufficiently high RA
deployment density, a user can publish promises covering its entire planned route.
4.4.3.2 Promise coins
A promise coin (PC) is a cryptographic construct consisting of a random coin ID and
a signature by the PA using the CIC. A PC X can be formally defined as:
PCX := (coinIDX, sigCIC(coinIDX))
PCs do not include a value field as they all have the same semantic: each PC can
be used for publishing exactly one promise. This property offers the benefit that
the blind signature protocol can be completed in one round and the user needs to
generate only one coin candidate. Since all PCs have the same “value”, the PA can
safely sign any blinded coin ID it receives.
4.4.3.3 Promise token
Promise tokens (PTs) are generated upon the publication of a promise. They enable
users to receive new PCs and benefits upon promise fulfillment. Promise tokens are
composed of a promise, an encrypted blinded CIC signature for a new PC and a PAC
signature. The blinded PC signature is encrypted in such a way that both the RA and
PA can decrypt it in the case of promise fulfillment or promise revocation. We denote
this encryption as encRAC,PAC(). In its simplest implementation, encRAC,PAC() can be
realized by concatenating the results of encRAC() and encPAC(). The promise token
PTP,Y for a promise P and a new PC candidate Y can now be formally defined as
(using a temporary value a):
a := (P, encRAC,PAC(sigCIC(blind(coinIDY))))
PTP,Y := (a, sigPAC(a))
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The mechanisms involved in constructing a promise token are introduced in greater
detail in the remainder of this section. An example implementation of the blind()
function is described in Section 4.4.6.
4.4.4 Mechanisms
In the following, the core mechanisms comprising the proposed system are intro-
duced. These are:
• the establishment of communication channels
• the initial generation of promise coins
• the publishing of promises
• the fulfillment of promises and the redemption of promise tokens
• the revocation of promises
• the dissemination of traffic information
4.4.4.1 Establishment of communication channels
In order to avoid linkability of user actions based on communication metadata like
communication addresses, an anonymous communication channel must be estab-
lished for non-local communication (i.e., all communication over the cellular net-
work). Examples for communication that needs to be protected in this way include
the publishing and revoking of promises at the PA and, depending on the imple-
mentation, the querying of the PB for traffic forecast data. The use of Tor is pro-
posed. Tor is an openly accessible anonymization service. It aims at offering low
communication latencies and has the additional benefit that it establishes circuits,
i.e., stateful paths through the underlying mix network that provide bidirectional
communication channels. In the scope of this chapter, this enables responses to be
sent via the same channel as the corresponding request. For further improving un-
linkability, each circuit to the PA is used for only one message exchange linkable to a
PC, and discarded afterwards. Thus, a user establishes a dedicated communication
channel for each promise publication and revocation.
Non-local communication channels must additionally be secure, in the sense that
the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of communication is preserved. Since
all non-user entities are equipped with verifiable cryptographic certificates and no
direct user to user communication is required, the establishment of a secure connec-
tion over a Tor circuit is straightforward using, for example, TLS [29]5. The steps a
user needs to take for forming a non-local anonymous and secure communication
channel are then the following:
5Alternatively, the PA could register a hidden service within the Tor network or use the PTP li-
brary (cf. Section 2.6.2.3). Such an approach realizes end-to-end confidentiality, authenticity and
integrity. However, it also implies additional overhead for both the PA and the Tor network while its
main benefits - network-independent reachability and receiver pseudonymity - are irrelevant in the
considered context.
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1. Establishing a Tor circuit with the destination.
2. Establishing a secure connection over the Tor circuit, e.g., using TLS.
For local communication, i.e., communication with RAs over short-range radio,
linkability based on communication metadata can easily be avoided; users can freely
choose (and change) any communication addresses they might be required to use for
themselves (e.g., MAC addresses). Furthermore, user authentication, which might
threaten anonymity, is not required in the proposed system. Concerning the authen-
ticity of the RA as well as the confidentiality and integrity of short-range communi-
cation, neither are critical for the security of the proposed system. Messages can be
exchanged immediately without a preceding setup phase.
4.4.4.2 Initial coin generation
During initial coin generation, a user receives a batch of PCs upon identification at
the PA. The size of this batch is a system parameter that should be chosen based
on the specific deployment conditions. For users that are honest and can there-
fore maintain a mostly stable supply of PCs, initial coin generation needs to be per-
formed very rarely (e.g., when their coin supply dwindles due to occasional route
planning errors or hardware failures). It must be performed at least once, namely
when the user starts using the system for the first time. The mechanism is composed
of the following steps:
1. For each new PC X that the user wants to request from the PA, he generates a
new random coin ID.
coinIDX := random()
2. The coin ID is blinded and sent to the PA, together with a proof of the user’s
identity. Such a proof can easily be realized by, e.g., equipping navigation
devices with certificates tied to the user’s identity.
PC request := (userID, blind(coinIDX))
3. If the PA finds the user to be eligible for another PC (i.e., if he is in principle
eligible to participate and hasn’t received too many PCs already), it answers
with a CIC signature on the blinded coin ID.
PC reply := sigCIC(blind(coinIDX))
4. Using this signature and information about the applied blinding, the user can
construct a signature for the original unblinded coin ID and thus assemble a
new PC.
PCX := (coinIDX, unblind(sigCIC(blind(coinIDX))))
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Figure 4.2 Initial issuing of one coin.
Parts of this mechanism are also depicted in Figure 4.2. A straightforward, RSA-
based implementation of the blind(), unblind() and sigCIC() functions is described
in Section 4.4.6. Due to the blinding function used by the user, the PA never learns
the original coin ID of the PC it is signing. Thus, it cannot link the resulting PC back
to the user. The PA keeps track of the number of PCs issued to individual users
upon user authentication. In this way, cheating users can be identified and denied
new PCs.
4.4.4.3 Publishing a promise
As one of the main features of the proposed system, users can publish promises
about their future intents. The process of publishing a promise P is composed of
an exchange between the user and the PA. It can be subdivided into the following
steps:
1. The user establishes an anonymous secure communication channel with the
PA.
2. The user generates a new random coin ID. This will be the base for the PC he
will get back upon promise fulfillment.
coinIDY := random()
3. The user sends one of his PCs, his promise P, and the blinded new coin ID to
the PA over the anonymous channel. He also stores the unblinded value of
coinIDY so that he can construct PCY at a later time.
promise request := (P, PCX, blind(coinIDY))
4. The PA checks the validity of the used PC. Specifically, it verifies the validity of
the supplied PC’s signature and checks that no identical PC (i.e., with the same
coin ID and signed with the same CIC) has been spent before. For the latter
check, i.e., the prevention of double-spending, a data structure containing the
coin IDs of previously spent coins must be consulted.
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Figure 4.3 Publishing a promise.
5. If the PA considers both the promise and the PC valid, it signs the promise and
sends it to the PB. It also marks the PC as spent by storing its coin ID in the
data structure consulted in the previous step.
6. The PA furthermore proceeds to generate a promise token for P and the new
PC Y. It signs blind(coinIDY) and encrypts it in such a way that both the RA
responsible for the resource in P and the PA itself can decrypt it. This is easily
done using the public keys from the respective RAC and the PAC by using an
asymmetric encryption scheme. Let a be the intermediate result of these steps.
a := (P, encRAC,PAC(sigCIC(blind(coinIDY))))
Using encRAC,PAC() instead of only encRAC() is necessary for being able to re-
deem the token in the case of a revocation of P or a failure of the RA. The PA
finishes the construction of a promise token for P and Y by signing a:
PTP,Y := (a, sigPAC(a))
7. The resulting promise token is sent back to the user via the same communica-
tion channel initiated by the user.
promise acknowledgement := PTP,Y
The communication exchanges involved in publishing a promise are also depicted
in Figure 4.3. In order to prevent the double-spending of PCs, the PA must store
all spent PCs (more specifically, their IDs). This requirement can lead to scalability
issues as the set of spent PCs can grow indefinitely. Thus, in a practical deployment,
the CIC should be switched periodically. PCs signed with older CICs can be de-
clared invalid so that only the spent PCs signed with the last few CICs need to be
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Figure 4.4 Promise fulfillment and coin reissuing.
stored. The PA can offer an exchange service for PCs whose CIC has become invalid
recently. The rotation of CICs can also be beneficial from a security standpoint [17].
4.4.4.4 Promise fulllment and promise token redemption
RAs are responsible for verifying the fulfillment of promises and cashing in promise
tokens. For a user that has published a promise P and has arrived at the resource
mentioned in P6 within the time frame mentioned in P (in other words, is fulfilling
P), the specific steps are the following:
1. The user transmits, via short-range radio, the promise token PTP,Y to the RA.
This is the promise token he received from the PA upon the publication of P.
fulfillment request := PTP,Y
2. The RA verifies the PAC signature of the promise token. If it is valid, it extracts
P from the promise token and determines if the user has fulfilled it. Most im-
portantly, it verifies whether P concerns its own managed resource, whether
the user is indeed within the limits of this resource and whether the time com-
mitment noted in P has been held.
3. Upon validating that P was indeed fulfilled, the RA decrypts the blinded PC
signature found in PTP,Y and sends it back to the user.
fulfillment acknowledgement := sigCIC(blind(coinIDY))
4. Since the user knows both the original unblinded coin ID and the employed
blinding function, the receipt of the blinded CIC signature is equivalent to
receiving a new PC.
PCY := (coinIDY, unblind(sigCIC(blind(coinIDY))))
Figure 4.4 gives a graphical overview of the involved communication steps. Given
a good placement of the RA’s communication infrastructure (e.g., if it is distributed
6The arrival at a specific resource can be detected by users using GPS or short-range radio beacons
from the RA.
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over several RSUs covering the resource area), the proof that a user is indeed within
the limits of a resource is implicitly given when communicating over short-range ra-
dio. For combating sybil attacks where a single vehicle attempts to redeem multiple
promise tokens simultaneously, techniques based on radio-based position verifica-
tion [49] or statistic signal strength distribution analysis [120] can additionally be
deployed at RAs. In essence, such techniques work by identifying distinct radio
stations based on signal strength, propagation delays or additional data sources like
cameras. They also prevent wormhole attacks in which an adversary places a station-
ary transceiver in the resource area for redeeming promise tokens from a distance.
4.4.4.5 Promise revocation
Promise revocations are necessary if a user changes his route or finds out that he can-
not reach the resource mentioned in his promise in time. The revocation mechanism
is analogous to the promise fulfillment mechanism, with the main exception that it
is performed between user and PA and that not promise fulfillment is checked, but
whether the revocation is early enough to be considered valid. Upon a successful re-
vocation, the PA decrypts the PC signature contained in the supplied promise token
and sends an update to the PB.
In order to avoid the exploitation of the revocation mechanism by malicious users,
e.g., the deliberate publication of false promises and their later revocation, revoca-
tions can additionally be penalized by the PA. Since PCs are atomic, fine-granular
penalties can only be realized probabilistically. Depending on the application sce-
nario, the PA might choose, with a probability p, to not issue a new PC after a
promise revocation. The probability p is then the revocation penalty. On a side
note, since RAs do not necessarily synchronize with the PA or PB, it is also possible
for a user to both revoke a promise and later fulfill it at the respective RA. How-
ever, this leads to no benefit for the user. The impact of such a behavior on traffic
prediction is comparable to the impact of a traffic participant unequipped with co-
operative route planning capabilities. Traffic predictions will remain consistent, as
RAs are only responsible for verifying the fulfillment of promises.
4.4.5 System management and policing
The proposed system offers multiple possibilities for adapting to specific scenarios
and reacting to changes. For one, this includes adapting the number and deploy-
ment density of RAs. Additionally, a service operator can determine the number
of PCs that users receive initially and the number of new PCs they are allowed
to request before being blacklisted. These parameters can be made dependent of,
e.g., the maximum expected route lengths in the scenario (with a safety margin)
and experience-based likelihood estimations for the unintended non-fulfillment of
promises (e.g., due to unforeseeable events or routing miscalculations).
The PA can also enforce different policies by varying the awards a user receives for
fulfilling a promise. For example, revocations can have a chance of not regenerating
a PC, i.e., the PA might supply a fake coin ID signature with a given probability p.
Likewise, fulfilling promises faithfully might have a chance of spawning extra PCs
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for the user. The applicability and impact of different management and policing
approaches is highly scenario-dependent. An in-depth discussion and evaluation of
such issues exceeds the scope of this chapter.
4.4.6 Blind signatures and RSA blind signatures
In the following, an example realization of some of the cryptographic functions used
so far is presented. Specifically, the functions required for the blind signing of PCs
are defined, namely blind(), sigCIC() and unblind(). RSA-based signatures are used,
as well as RSA blind signatures as introduced in [17].
The primitives blind() and unblind() form the cornerstone of the blind signature
concept. Together with the coin signing function sigCIC() (that generates signatures
with the coin issuing certificate (CIC)), they satisfy the following equation (for an
arbitrary message m):
unblind(sigCIC(blind(m))) = sigCIC(m)
In the following, it is assumed that the employed CIC is based on a RSA key with d
and e being the private and public parts of this key and N being its public modulus.
With a random r relatively prime to N, the blinding of m can then be realized as:
blind(m) := mre (mod N)
In order for the unblinding step to work, sigCIC() must be implemented without
any modifications (e.g., padding or hashing) on the message m after it has been
transmitted to the signer (in our case, the PA). Thus, we use the plain RSA signature
scheme for sigCIC():
sigCIC(m) := m
d (mod N)
sigCIC(blind(m)) := (blind(m))
d = mdred (mod N)
For unblind() we apply the inverse of r to the signature, thus receiving a valid sig-
nature on m:
unblind(sigCIC(blind(m))) := m
dredr−1 = md (mod N)
There are known dangers to using RSA blind signatures. If the key used for blind
signing is used for encryption, an attacker can trick the signer to decrypt arbitrary
bits of encrypted data. Thus, a dedicated key is used for signing PCs - the private
part of the CIC. A second danger lies in the commutativity of unpadded RSA signa-
tures as required for the RSA blind signature scheme. It can be exploited to generate
more than one valid message-signature pair during the blind signing process. For
example, a user can easily use multiple blinding factors on the same message. Un-
blinding separately with each blinding factor then yields multiple distinct messages
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with valid signatures. Thus, the use of the hash and sign paradigm is recommended
in implementations using RSA blind signatures: blinding and signing not the PC
itself, but a cryptographic hash of it.
RSA-based blind signatures were chosen here primarily due to their simplicity. More
sophisticated (and complex) blind signature schemes, e.g., such based on bilinear
maps [90], can be considered as well for practical deployments.
4.5 Privacy analysis
In this section, based on the approach described in Chapter 3, potential privacy
threats relevant to the proposed system are considered. A system model is first for-
mulated for establishing a suitable level of abstraction. Following that, the assumed
adversary model is defined. Lastly, a comprehensive privacy analysis of the pro-
posed system is performed. Based on the privacy threats considered through them,
the applied analysis steps are separated into two groups:
1. Detection and disclosure.
2. Linking and identification.
4.5.1 System model
An implementation of the proposed system is assumed that features one dedicated
PA, one PB and multiple RAs associated with different resources. Various deploy-
ment densities of RAs are considered. For simplicity, the PA, PB and RAs are all
assumed to be run by the same organizational entity, e.g., a national traffic author-
ity or a private company.
In addition to these centrally controlled entities, it is assumed that the majority of
traffic participants is using the proposed system and that the majority of users are
honest. While it is not necessary that all vehicles on the road contribute by publish-
ing promises (with knowledge about the usage ratio, interpolations can be made), a
critical mass of users is desirable for attaining the full benefits of cooperative route
planning7.
Further assumptions include that:
• All employed communication channels are anonymous. The existence of com-
munication metadata (e.g., MAC addresses that are used for only one message
exchange) is, therefore, abstracted away.
• CIC rotations are rare8. Therefore, the CIC used for signing a PC has no signif-
icant implications for the linkability between PCs.
7Note that an in-depth exploration of the relationship between user penetration rate, RA density
and system utility exceeds the scope of this chapter.
8As an example, given a user population of 10 million, an average number of daily PC uses per
user of 100, a storage requirement per spent PC of 10 B and a maximum storage capacity for spent
PCs of 1 TB, the PA can go for 100 days without changing the currently active CIC.
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4.5.2 Adversary model
A strong adversary is assumed that controls the PA, the PB and all RAs. This corre-
sponds to a service operator that is either malicious himself or is heavily colluding
with a malicious entity. As a constraint, it is assumed that the adversary cannot
deploy additional infrastructure elements, e.g., in the form of dedicated tracking
equipment like license plate scanners.
The main goal of the adversary is to obtain identifiable location samples from users
- concerning both past and planned future locations.
4.5.3 Detection and disclosure
Starting with the actual analysis, the amount and structure of the data that the ad-
versary is able to gather is determined here. Following things are considered:
1. The knowledge from passive observation that the adversary can acquire during
normal operation.
2. All actions that are possible for the adversary within the system model.
3. The adversary’s possibilities for increasing knowledge based on the actions pos-
sible for him.
Following that, the resulting types of data items available to the adversary are fused
and filtered, arriving at more refined data item types for the subsequent analysis
steps.
By applying these analysis steps, relevant types of data obtainable by the adversary
can be determined. A concrete estimation of the volume and content of the collected
data is impossible using only analysis. These characteristics depend on deployment-
specific system parameters (e.g., the RA deployment density) and properties related
to actual vehicular traffic. Traffic-related properties include traffic volume, the like-
lihood of different trips (respectively origin-destination pairs) and the resulting dis-
tribution of vehicles in the road network. Traffic simulations are an established ap-
proach for capturing such properties and arriving at a more concrete assessment of
systems involving vehicular traffic. However, the implementation of a realistic sim-
ulation study of the proposed system exceeds the scope of this chapter. Instead, an
analytical discussion is presented.
4.5.3.1 Knowledge from passive observation
The adversary controls the PA, the PB and all RAs. Thus, the knowledge available to
him during normal operation corresponds to the data collectable by these entities.
For every data item he can collect, the adversary can also store the time at which
the data item was collected. For received messages, this corresponds to the time at
which the message was received. The following can be collected:
• By the PA:
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– All PC requests (cf. Section 4.4.4.2):
(PC request, time) = (userID, blind(coinID), time)
– All promise requests (cf. Section 4.4.4.3):
(promise request, time) = (promise, PC, blind(coinID), time)
– All revocation requests and the times at which they were sent (revocation
requests contain, in essence, the same information as promise fulfillment
requests; cf. Section 4.4.4.5):
(fulfillment request, time) = (PT, time)
• By the PB: depending on the implementation, users might need to send queries
to the PB for receiving traffic data. Information about a user’s position and
planned route might be deduced from such a query. However, query privacy
is considered to be out of scope here and is not considered further. Multiple
promising solutions to the problem of query privacy in location-based systems
have been discussed in the literature9. A simple solution is to omit the query-
ing step altogether and have the PB proactively broadcast aggregated informa-
tion to users, similar to the traffic message channel widely used in navigation
systems today.
• By RAs:
– All promise fulfillment requests (cf. Section 4.4.4.4):
(fulfillment request, time) = (PT, time)
– Depending on the capabilities of RAs, they might also be able to collect
precise location samples from users within the regions of their respective
resources. This ability might be needed for detecting sybil attacks on the
promise fulfillment step. As an extreme case, it is assumed in the fol-
lowing that short trips (sets of linkable location samples) within resource
regions can be learned. These trips can likely be linked to promise ful-
fillment requests. In the end, data items of the following form can poten-
tially be collected by RAs:
(PT, time, trip within resource region)
Note that the quality of the data collectible by the adversary can vary
greatly depending on the range of RAs, the employed tracking mecha-
nisms and the communication behavior of users within resource regions.
9See, e.g., [115] for a good overview on the topic.
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Depending on implementation (e.g., offline versus online RAs), it is also
not immediately clear whether RAs will be able to store and transmit col-
lected data to the adversary. In practice, RAs might even be controlled
by separate and mutually non-colluding organizational entities (e.g., lo-
cal authorities or traffic infrastructure owners), making it more difficult
for the adversary to obtain all data generated at RAs.
4.5.3.2 Possible actions
In addition to all actions performed during regular operation, and excepting any
actions not covered by the adversary model (e.g., deploying additional surveillance
infrastructure or physically altering the traffic flow), the adversary is left with de-
laying, altering or omitting messages sent by the PA, PB and RAs. These messages
are:
• PC replies sent from the PA during the issuing of new PCs (cf. Section 4.4.4.2)
• traffic updates from the PB
• promise acknowledgements from the PA (cf. Section 4.4.4.3)
• fulfillment acknowledgements from RAs (cf. Section 4.4.4.3)
• revocation acknowledgements from the PA (cf. Section 4.4.4.5)
The delaying, altering or omitting of most of these messages by the PA can easily
be detected by users. The only exception are traffic updates which can be altered
without a straightforward possibility for detection. However, the altering of traf-
fic updates for performing some sort of privacy attack will likely have a negative
impact on overall traffic flow. According to the assumed adversary model, a wors-
ening of traffic flow is undesirable for the adversary. Thus, the altering of traffic
updates for soliciting additional data from users is not considered further.
Concerning the delaying, altering and omitting of the remaining messages and the
delaying and omitting of traffic updates, such actions will, due to their easy de-
tectability, lead to a lowering of the service operator’s credibility. A loss in credibil-
ity will, in turn, likely diminish user numbers and, in this way, decrease the overall
effectiveness of the system. This effect is, again, undesirable for the adversary ac-
cording to the assumed adversary model. Additionally, privacy-conscious users de-
tecting non-standard behavior from a system component might immediately cease
interacting with the system for fear of disclosing too much private information. In
this way, potential active attacks are thwarted easily.
4.5.3.3 Increasing knowledge
As was argued in the previous section, no actions exceeding regular operation are
worthwhile for the adversary within the considered system and adversary models.
Consequently, no possibilities for increasing the adversary’s knowledge through ad-
ditional actions are considered.
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4.5.3.4 Data fusion and reduction
The goal of this section is to arrive at a more concise representation of the data item
types collectible by the adversary and in this way assist the subsequent analysis. The
explicit linkability between different data item types is investigated with the goal of
fusing multiple data item types into new, richer ones. Additionally, fields that are
arguably anonymous, i.e., do not allow any form of linkability or identifiability, are
identified and filtered out from representations.
Let tPC request, tpromise, trevocation, tfulfillment denote the times at which, respectively, PC
requests, promise requests, revocation requests and fulfillment requests have been
received by the adversary. Let tripX denote a trip within an area identified by X.
Then, following types of data items are available to the adversary according to the
preceding analysis:
1. (userID, blind(coinID), tPC request)
2. (promise, PC, blind(coinID), tpromise)
3. (PT, trevocation)
4. (PT, tfulfillment, tripresourceID)
It is now discussed how these data item types can be reduced and merged while
preserving the correctness of analysis.
Given the use of a secure blind signature scheme, no linkage between a blinded
coin ID and a PC is possible. Furthermore, recall that coin IDs are random and not
reused. In effect, the coin IDs used in instances of 1 and 2 will always be different.
It is therefore concluded that no linkage based on blinded coin IDs is possible and
any blind(coinID)-entries can be ignored in the following.
PCs, while used only once each, might offer a limited form of linkability based on
the CIC with which they are signed. In practice, CICs might need to be rotated
periodically, so that it cannot be guaranteed that all PCs in use are sharing the same
CIC. However, according to the assumed system model, CIC changes will happen
only rarely. Additionally, users have the possibility to (anonymously) exchange PCs
signed with an older CIC for new ones. The threat that PCs can be linked based on
the CIC used for signing them is, thus, ignored in the following. PCs are considered
completely unlinkable and, therefore, excluded from future discussion.
Collected promise revocation requests (item 3) can be safely excluded from con-
sideration as well. They do not offer, in qualitative terms, any information gain
compared to collected promise fulfillment requests (item 4).
Concerning promise tokens, they are explicitly linkable to previously published
promises and, thus, enable a linking between items of type 2 and 4. Beyond this
and apart from the content of promises (resource identifiers in combination with a
time frame), promise tokens do not contain any additional information that may be
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of interest to the adversary. The remaining contents of a promise token are signa-
tures which originate from the PA and, thus, the adversary himself.
Based on these considerations, the types of data items available to the adversary
that are relevant for further discussions can be reduced to the following two:
1. (userID, tPC request)
2. (resourceID, timeframe, tpromise, tfulfillment, tripresourceID)
Without additional knowledge and without resorting to correlation-based linking
attacks, no linkage between these two data item types is possible.
4.5.4 Linking and identication
Here, it is discussed to what extend the adversary can extract identifiable location
samples from the data available to him according to the preceding steps. Recall that
a location sample was defined as a tuple of a location and a time, i.e.:
location sample := (location, time)
The analysis is structured around discussing following approaches possible for the
adversary:
1. Direct identification.
2. Linkability.
3. Identification attacks based on linked data.
4.5.4.1 Direct identication
The direct identification of a data item is possible if one of its fields or a combination
of its fields can be linked to a user identity.
Recalling the results from before, data items of the following types are available to
the adversary:
1. (userID, tPC request)
2. (resourceID, timeframe, tpromise, tfulfillment, tripresourceID)
User identities are included only in 1. Data items of this type do not include loca-
tion samples. Furthermore, they are generated during the initial obtaining of PCs,
which, for honest users, will need to be performed only very rarely. One piece of in-
formation that the adversary gains from 1 is that a given user is participating in the
system. By collecting all generated data items of this type, he can learn the identities
of all users of the system. Such knowledge can make the obtaining of context knowl-
edge easier and also helps with the reduction of anonymity sets, as non-registered
traffic participants do not need to be considered.
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Actual location samples are included only in 2, in the form of resources (with vary-
ing granularity) and potentially also more fine-granular trips within resource re-
gions. While a data item of this type is not immediately identifiable, an identifica-
tion might be possible with additional context knowledge. An exact estimation of
this danger is not possible without detailed quantitative and qualitative information
about the data included in 2. Estimates can be obtained using traffic simulations and
a complete implementation of cooperative route planning using PCs.
4.5.4.2 Linkability
As was already discussed, (userID, tPC request)-tuples do not contain location sam-
ples. Furthermore, they are usually generated only very rarely. They are, thus, not
expected to contribute to an increased linkability between data items containing lo-
cation samples and are ignored in the following.
Instead, the focus is on discussing the linkability of data items of the following form:
(resourceID, timeframe, tpromise, tfulfillment, tripresourceID)
If the adversary can link such items together, he can reconstruct long-distance trips
taken by users. As was shown in the literature (cf. Section 2.2.4), such trips can
be highly identifiable if a minimum amount of context knowledge (e.g., about the
homes and workplaces of users) is available. Thus, the forming of such trips is a
serious threat.
It can be argued that the resourceID, timeframe and tfulfilment fields offer an insignif-
icant information gain compared to the trip within the resource potentially recorded
at the respective RA10. Therefore, the following discussion is focused on linkability
based on recorded short trips and the times of promise publications tpromise.
The question of linkability based on short trips can be mapped to the question of
tracking feasibility in existing scenarios from the literature. In [59], for example,
Hoh et al. propose a system in which location samples are shared only when pass-
ing preconfigured virtual trip lines. The resulting scenario is very similar to the one
considered here, where short-range radio communication happens only within re-
sources that might not cover the complete road network without gaps. Based on
the positive results from [59], it is expected that the reconstruction of long-distance
trips using only the available RA-recorded trips will yield poor results for the ad-
versary. It should be noted, however, that in a very dense deployment scenario, i.e.,
if the complete road network is covered by RAs without gaps, the reconstruction
of long-distance trips can become easier. Areas in which no communication with
RAs occurs perform a similar function as mix zones (cf. Section 2.3.4) - they increase
the number of potential hypotheses for the adversary and, therefore, his degree of
linking uncertainty. Without such areas, no mixing is possible.
10It is implicitly assumed that every user chooses from the same selection of non-overlapping time
frames (e.g., evenly spaced intervals from a common start time), so that no linkability based on the
choice of time frame boundaries is possible.
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Additional correlation attacks might be possible by also using the collected tpromise-
values. Groups of promises arriving in close succession can hint at a user currently
calculating his route and can be linked by the adversary. As a simple protection
mechanism, navigation devices can introduce jitter between promise publications
and decouple the order in which promises are published from the order in which
they will be fulfilled.
An open question, however, is the combination of linking based on tpromise with
linking using tripresourceID. It is unclear whether such an approach can significantly
improve the tracking success.
In general, the difficulty and impact of linking collected data items greatly depends
on the practical deployment conditions of the proposed system. Given a sparse
deployment of RAs and a large user population, it is expected that trips will be dif-
ficult to reconstruct. Additionally, a variety of additional privacy improvements are
possible. Depending on the scenario, jitter, revocations or promise omissions may
be used more or less extensively for reducing linkability and the reconstructibility
of trips at the expense of traffic prediction performance. In a practical deployment
(and as a change to the assumptions used here), RAs can also be realized in such a
way that they are controlled by different organizational entities. Such a setup would
result in an increased undetectability of data shared with RAs.
4.5.4.3 Identication attacks based on linked data.
The main value of reconstructed trips for the adversary is that they potentially en-
able more powerful identification attacks than individual samples. Such identifica-
tion attacks are commonly based on context knowledge, e.g., about the home and
work location of users [50].
As an inherent property of cooperative route planning, the origins of trips (often
homes or workplaces) are unlikely to be included in promises, as users are already
there when starting to publish their plans. Additionally, in most application sce-
narios, users are not obliged to publish all of their plans all of the time and might
choose to selectively omit publishing parts of their individual routes that might be
helpful for identification. For example, the very last parts of trips might be omitted.
In scenarios with a sparse RA deployment, it is furthermore very likely that only
high-traffic areas will be covered by RAs. Such areas rarely correspond to final des-
tinations and implicitly offer high anonymity due to the large number of passing
users.
4.5.5 Conclusion
An adversary colluding with the service operator is able to collect all location sam-
ples shared in the system. However, location samples from users are not easily
identifiable. It is, furthermore, expected that long-distance trips taken by users,
which can be used in identification efforts, are not easily reconstructible by the ser-
vice operator. Additional investigations, e.g., using traffic simulations, are required
to confirm this expectation.
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A number of recommendations for practical deployments were stated that can fur-
ther hinder adversaries from obtaining long-distance trips and identifiable location
samples. These include randomizing the times at which promises are published
and selectively omitting some promises (e.g., promises related to trip destinations,
as trip destination are often used in correlation attacks). Distributing the control
over RAs across different organizations can be considered as well, for making it
more difficult for an adversary to obtain all location samples shared in the system.
4.6 Abuse resistance analysis
This section investigates possible attacks on the functionality of the proposed sys-
tem. The system model from Section 4.5.1 is reused. However, a different adversary
model is used, as it was previously assumed that an adversary colluding with the
service operator has no interest in disturbing the service’s utility.
Upon describing the assumed adversary model, different classes of attacks are in-
troduced and their effectiveness discussed. These classes are:
• simple lying
• sybil promises
• RA hijacking
• denial-of-service
4.6.1 Adversary model
The adversary model used here is based on attackers that want to either disturb the
system or exploit it for their own benefit (e.g., use it to redirect traffic). Due to these
goals, it is assumed that the organization maintaining the PB, PA and the RAs has
no interest in colluding with such adversaries. Specifically, it is assumed, for the
presented analysis, that an adversary can control only user entities. A strong at-
tacker might, however, be able to control multiple user entities, e.g., by registering
under multiple fake or stolen identities. An especially strong attacker might addi-
tionally have gained control over one or more RAs, respectively have compromised
their RACs. Compromising the PA, respectively capturing the PAC or a currently
valid CIC, is assumed to be impossible for any adversary considered here. Such a
compromise is significantly more difficult to achieve in practice than compromising
a (potentially physically isolated) RA.
4.6.2 Simple lying
A group of malicious users (respectively a strong attacker controlling multiple user
identities) might want to influence traffic by publishing false promises. For exam-
ple, they might collude to publish multiple identical promises concerning a specific
resource, thus making it appear overburdened and causing other traffic participants
to avoid it. The influence a group of malicious users can exert on the global PB
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state is bounded by the number of PCs available to them. It is expected that even
if they can place a number of false promises before their PC pool is depleted, this
will not influence routing decisions significantly. Users attempting such schemes
will also run out of PCs quickly, being unable to redeem the promise tokens they
received. They might request new PCs, but a non-compromised PA will blacklist
them at some point, thus effectively banning them from the system and denying
them the possibility to cause more mischief.
The threat stemming from large groups of user identities under malicious control
is one of the main reasons for reissuing PCs only upon the verification of promise
fulfilment. Simpler approaches, e.g., with PCs valid for only one day and automati-
cally reissued afterwards, would allow such groups to disturb traffic on a continual
basis.
4.6.3 Sybil promises
In the sybil promises attack, an attacker publishes multiple identical promises, i.e., for
the same resource and time frame. In contrast to regular lying, he is honest about
the promise and just cheating by anonymously publishing it multiple times, thus re-
serving more resources than he needs. The benefit for the attacker is that other traffic
participants will perceive the resources along the attacker’s route as more crowded,
thus potentially avoiding them and granting the attacker a road with less traffic.
The effectiveness of sybil promises in comparison to regular lying depends on the
possibility of realizing a sybil attack on the promise fulfillment mechanism. In other
words, the possibility to trick a RA into mistaking a vehicle in its resource area for
multiple vehicles. If this is feasible for a malicious user, he might be able to fulfill
multiple identical promises simultaneously, effectively avoiding any loss of PCs in
the process. Reliable techniques for identifying and counteracting sybil attacks in
radio-based communication systems exist and have been evaluated for vehicular
networking scenarios. See, for example, [49] for techniques based on radio-based
position verification and [120] for an approach based on statistic signal strength
distribution analysis. With such sybil protection mechanisms in place at RAs, the
simultaneous fulfillment of multiple identical promises becomes infeasible.
Position-verification and similar countermeasures can also be used against worm-
hole attacks, where a user pretends to be at a given resource by using a proxy device
physically placed within the resource region. Specifically, if a radio source doesn’t
exhibit the same mobility signature as other vehicles on the road, it can be blocked
from attempting to fulfill promises.
4.6.4 RA hijacking
If an attacker has gained control over a RA (e.g., by physically compromising it)
and has learned its RAC, the implications are more severe. The attacker can then
publish multiple identical promises for the corresponding resource, thus emulating
multiple cars planning to drive through this exact spot. Since he has access to the
RAC, the attacker can redeem promise tokens immediately, allowing him to publish
an infinite amount of promises for this resource. In the end, he can make it appear to
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the PB and other traffic participants that the resource will be hopelessly overloaded,
thus heavily influencing routing decisions. For this reason, care must be taken to
protect RAs and RACs. For example, tamper-proof hardware can be used. In ad-
dition to that, anomaly detection mechanisms should be deployed to identify and
blacklist malfunctioning RAs and compromised RACs quickly.
4.6.5 Denial-of-service
A malicious group of users might try to attack the availability of the whole system
by mounting a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the PA or PB. Preventing such
attacks is comparable to preventing DoS attacks in many existing information and
communication systems, e.g., popular websites or cloud-based navigation services.
This challenge is, therefore, considered to be out of the scope of this chapter. An
attacker might also mount a DoS attack on a RA, e.g., by damaging it physically
or by jamming its radio interface. As a consequence, users publishing promises
concerning the resource managed by that RA will not be able to get a new PC upon
promise fulfillment. Malfunctioning RAs can be blacklisted by the PA. For promises
published before the RA was blacklisted, the PA can reimburse affected users by
regenerating PCs for the blacklisted RAs without verifying the promises’ fulfillment.
Requests validated with a PC, e.g., promise requests, cause a slightly higher over-
head at the PA. However, DoS attacks using such messages are infeasible given the
limited amount of PCs per user. An alternative is to use promise revocations. Such
DoS attacks can also be defeated easily by requiring a certain time to have passed be-
tween promise publication and promise revocation. Section 4.7 gives an overview
of the performance bottlenecks of the proposed system and gives an idea on the
amount of promises that need to be generated by malicious users in order for a DoS
attack on the PA or the PB to be effective.
4.7 Performance evaluation
This section describes the performance evaluation of key building blocks of the pro-
posed system. Note that a performance evaluation of a complete cooperative route
planning system, assessing also the impact of the approach on actual traffic flow, is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
Only the two major expected performance bottlenecks for the proposed system are
considered here:
1. The computation overhead introduced by the extensive use of cryptographic
primitives.
2. The additional latency introduced by the use of different anonymous secure com-
munication channels for each promise publication and revocation.
The overhead of mechanisms common to other systems (e.g., the distribution of
traffic state via the PB) is not discussed here, as these mechanisms are already well
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studied and either irreplaceable for realizing cooperative route planning or negligi-
ble in terms of their impact on performance. Similarly, the communication overhead
of the proposed system is also not evaluated. The small (easily below 1 kB), infre-
quent messages used in the system are unlikely to cause neither an overburdening
of the short-range radio link to RAs nor significant costs when communicating over
cellular network links with the PA.
Concerning the communication latencies of interactions between users and RAs and
the associated requirements on region length and RA reachability, no explicit eval-
uation was conducted either. Assuming message sizes of below 1 kB, less than 2 kB
must be transferred in total for cashing in a promise token at a RA. With a data rate
of 16 kbit/s (realistically achievable using, for example, the IEEE 802.11p standard
for short-range communication [52]), this implies that the whole operation (request
and response) can be completed in less than a second. In an urban environment
with a maximum speed of 20 m/s (72 km/h), it is therefore enough for RAs to be
able to communicate with users in a 20 m stretch of road. Analogously, on a high-
way setting with speeds up to 50 m/s (180 km/h), 50 m will likely be enough.
4.7.1 Computation overhead
Key steps from the mechanisms described in Section 4.4.4 were implemented that
rely heavily on the use on cryptographic primitives. Specifically, the following op-
erations were implemented:
• generating and blinding a coin ID (user)
• signing a blinded coin ID (PA)
• unblinding a blinded coin ID signature (user)
• validating a coin ID signature (user/PA)
• signing a blinded coin ID and generating a promise token with it (PA)
• validating a promise token signature (user/RA/PA)
• cashing in a promise token, decrypting the coin ID signature contained in it
(RA)
The implementation is based on RSA and RSA blind signatures as described in Sec-
tion 4.4.6. Key sizes of 1024 as well as 2048 bit were evaluated. All user operations
were evaluated on a low-end Android smartphone (ARM-based CPU at 600 MHz)
to model the use of a device with low computational resources. The remaining
operations were evaluated on a notebook computer (Intel i7 CPU at 2.60 GHz per
core, the evaluation was single-threaded). All operations were repeated 100 times
with different cryptographic keys and their average execution time was logged. The
power consumption at the user side was not evaluated. User side operations will
likely be performed inside a moving vehicle, where the energy consumption of a
smartphone-class device can be neglected.
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Operation
Time (ms)
1024-bit RSA 2048-bit RSA
signing blinded coinID (PA) 0.83 5.57
validating promise coin (PA) 0.1 0.14
generating promise token (PA) 2.03 11.31
validating promise token (RA/PA) 0.03 0.18
cashing in promise token (RA/PA) 0.94 5.49
generating blinded coinID (user) 2.15 5.59
unblinding coinID signature (user) 6.22 23.13
validating promise coin (user) 1.27 4.56
validating promise token (user) 1.38 4.58
Table 4.2 Computation times with implementation based on RSA.
The results of the measurements are shown in Table 4.2. It can be seen that for 1024-
bit RSA, all user operations require less than 7 ms and for 2048-bit RSA, less than
24 ms to complete on the chosen hardware. Operations that need to be performed
by RAs require less than 1 ms for 1024-bit RSA and less than 6 ms for 2048-bit RSA.
For the PA, the most expensive operation is the generation of a promise token. The
generation of a promise token involves the computation of two cryptographic signa-
tures - one for the new PC and one for the promise token itself. Hence, and because
in the RSA cryptosystem signing is more expensive than signature verification, the
average computation time here reaches 2.03 ms for 1024-bit RSA and 11.31 ms for
2048-bit RSA. Even for 2048-bit RSA, a PA will still be able to process more than 88
promise requests per second and CPU core. For perspective, given a population of
1 million simultaneously active users, an average deployment density of one RA per
10 km and an average vehicular movement speed of 100 km/h (so that an average
of 10 promises will be made per hour), an average of about 2800 promises are likely
to arrive at the PA per second. Thus, with the presented implementation and key
lengths of 2048 bit, computational resources equivalent to 32 CPU cores (one high-
end server) will need to be deployed by the service operator. This requirement can
be reduced by several orders of magnitude by employing specialized cryptographic
hardware. Also, more efficient blind signature schemes exist (e.g., [90]), whose eval-
uation exceeds the scope of this chapter.
4.7.2 Anonymous secure communication channel latency
The unlinkability of user actions to communication metadata like IP addresses is an
important prerequisite for the privacy assurances offered by the proposed system.
Additionally, communication channels should be secure from end to end, to prevent
attackers from disturbing the functionality of the system. These requirements can
potentially lead to a significant increase in communication latency, both for setting
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Figure 4.5 Secure and anonymous communication channel latency.
up a communication channel and for sending data over it. For deriving an estimate
for the scale of these latencies, the approximate communication latency of user-PA
interactions via the anonymous secure communication channel described in Sec-
tion 4.4.4.1 was evaluated. An evaluation scenario was constructed to measure the
time required for establishing an anonymous secure communication channel over
a cellular network link and transferring 1 kilobyte of data over this channel. The
1 kilobyte data transfer was chosen for deriving an estimate for the latency involved
in a common user-PA operation like the publishing of a promise. HTTPS (HTTP on
top of TLS) was used to download a 1 kilobyte file to model the latency of setting up
a secure TLS connection and transferring 1 kilobyte of data over it. The following
was measured:
• the time for performing this file transfer without Tor
• the time for bootstrapping a Tor circuit
• the compound time for bootstrapping a Tor circuit and performing the file
transfer over the Tor connection.
The measurements were performed on 7 different days in February 2014 during
different times of day. In total, each measurement was repeated 70 times (10 mea-
surements on each measurement day). All measurements were performed using a
cellular network interface communicating via the EDGE standard (3G).
The measurement results are presented in Figure 4.5. The figure depicts the me-
dian of all measured times together with the respective minimum and maximum
times measured during evaluation. According to the measurements, establishing
an anonymous and secure channel using an EDGE-based cellular network link and
performing an operation like a promise publication over it takes between 10 and 37
seconds, with a median duration of 15 seconds. Compared to the baseline latency
in the evaluation scenario - the data transfer over a secure but not anonymous com-
munication channel (2-26 seconds, median of 6 seconds) - this is a median increase
of only about 9 seconds. In any case, all measured latency values are, by a large
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margin, acceptable for a cooperative route planning application. Route planning
is typically done well in advance and operates on a timescale of tens of minutes
instead of on a timescale of seconds.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a system for sharing planned routes in a cooperative route
planning context that enables the anonymous publication of plans while offering
protection against abuse. According to the author’s knowledge, this is the first work
to consider the problem of privacy and abuse-prevention in cooperative route plan-
ning systems where participants publish information about their planned routes.
Plans are published anonymously as a series of promises concerning segments of
the planned route. Abuse resistance is realized by requiring the use of blindly
signed promise coins for making each promise. New promise coins are issued upon
promise fulfillment. Thus, honest users retain their right to participate in the sys-
tem while malicious users get banned quickly. Promise coins are always signed
blindly and thus not identifiable or linkable. Consequently, and as confirmed by
analysis, promises are anonymous as well and not easily linked to trips. Through
performance measurements of the involved cryptographic operations and latency
measurements of the employed anonymous communication channel, it was further-
more shown that the proposed privacy-preserving cooperative route-planning sys-
tem is not limited by significant performance bottlenecks and, therefore, practically
feasible.
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5. Privacy-preserving
long-distance geocast
The availability of Internet access in vehicles offers a variety of new opportunities
to assist road users. Examples include the exchange of current traffic information
or the localization of free parking spaces. Long-distance communication (i.e., com-
munication over more than a few hundred meters) is also important for vehicular
cloud applications like Pics-on-Wheels [48], where vehicles act as service providers
to which location-based service requests need to be propagated. All of these ap-
plications can be realized using an efficient geocast service, and in some cases even
depend on one. Geocast is a communication paradigm enabling the addressing of
users based on their geographic location. The realization of a cost-efficient long-
distance geocast service that effectively protects the location privacy of users would
allow for a variety of smart traffic applications to be realized in a privacy-preserving
manner.
If geocast, respectively services depending on geocast functionality, are realized in
a centralized manner, it is impossible to hide (potentially privacy-relevant) location
data from service operators without heavily deteriorating service utility. Therefore,
this chapter explores decentralized solutions to realizing geocast, focusing on overlay-
based approaches [11, 51, 56, 95] and their privacy characteristics.
The rough idea behind overlay-based geocast services is the creation of a logical
overlay network on top of cellular communication technologies and the Internet Pro-
tocol (IP). In the overlay network, nodes propagate their location to other participat-
ing nodes and use this information for choosing overlay neighbors and forwarding
messages. Thus, neither a central entity nor additional (potentially expensive) in-
frastructure support is necessary. With OverDrive [56], this approach was specifi-
cally adapted to smart traffic scenarios. The evaluation of OverDrive showed [56],
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from a performance standpoint, its viability as an alternative to more traditional,
centralized approaches. However, an in-depth consideration of the privacy charac-
teristics of OverDrive and similar systems is lacking. Geocast in general is discussed
in Section 5.1, focusing on applications and possible realizations. OverDrive is then
introduced in detail in Section 5.2.
In Section 5.3, a privacy analysis of OverDrive is conducted. As a result of the analy-
sis, active attacks are proposed that are specific to the geocast overlay scenario. One
considered attack goal is the establishment of a precise global view over all users and
their positions, thus eliminating the privacy benefit of decentralization. Another is
the individual surveillance of a single user, by leveraging characteristics of the overlay
maintenance logic and neighbor selection.
In Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, respectively, techniques for addressing discovered vul-
nerabilities and improving the location privacy offered by OverDrive are proposed.
Through distance-based location obfuscation and mechanisms for detecting location
spoofing attempts, data locality is realized - precise location data is shared only with
participants in the physical vicinity. Both the discovered attacks and the proposed
enhancements were integrated with the existing OverDrive implementation and
evaluation environment [56] based on the overlay simulation framework OverSim [3].
Details concerning the implementation are found in Section 5.5.
The impact of the discovered attacks was evaluated, showing that they are rele-
vant to the original OverDrive design and effectively prevented by the protection
mechanisms developed in this thesis. Simulation results demonstrate that the pro-
posed extensions render both the large-scale surveillance and the targeted tracking
of OverDrive users infeasible for adversaries controlling hundreds of overlay nodes.
Still, OverDrive continues to achieve high delivery ratios in mobile environments
while communication overhead is kept low. The evaluation setup and results are
described in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, the chapter concludes with a short summary
of the contributions and results.
This chapter is based on [40, 42, 43] as well as, to a lesser extent, [56].
5.1 Long-distance geocast
Geocast (originally proposed in [88]) is a communication abstraction based on the
addressing of points or regions in geographic space. In contrast to, for example,
communication based on the Internet Protocol (IP), entities reachable via geocast re-
ceive messages solely based on their current location, so that no explicit addresses or
unique identifiers are necessary. A geocast service is defined here as a communication
system that allows each participant to send messages to other participants based on
their location. This includes both forwarding a message to a single participant and
flooding a message to all participants in a given area, for requesting or distributing in-
formation. A simple application example for such a service in a vehicular traffic
scenario is the sending of an information query to all vehicles driving on a certain
road.
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Throughout this chapter, the focus is exclusively on long-distance geocast services.
In contrast to geocast systems based on multi-hop ad hoc networks between vehi-
cles (that have been shown not to scale to significant distances [53]), long-distance
geocast places no restriction on the geographic distance between message origin and
destination.
In the following, application scenarios for long-distance geocast in the context of
smart traffic are discussed. Following that, an overview of existing approaches for
realizing geocast is given.
5.1.1 Application scenarios
Geocast enables the realization of various cooperative services for smart traffic, i.e.,
services that are based on users cooperating on the road (cf. Section 2.1). Traffic
monitoring, where users exchange traffic information to improve overall traffic flow,
is a popular example. Some additional example applications are touched upon in
the following, namely parking space discovery, social interactions and vehicular clouds.
5.1.1.1 Trac monitoring
Chapter 4 of this thesis discusses cooperative route planning, i.e., how traffic partici-
pants can coordinate plans for anticipating future traffic. Traffic monitoring is a sim-
pler approach where users exchange current traffic information for adapting to con-
gestions and other traffic events. Using current, fine-granular information about
traffic, faster routes can be found and the overall traffic flow can be improved. Traf-
fic monitoring is a valuable complement to cooperative route planning, in that it
enables individual plans, and thus the global traffic flow, to be quickly adapted to
changing traffic conditions.
A large number of traffic monitoring systems has been proposed that leverage traffic
participants as sources of current traffic information. The predominant approach, if
the deployment of dedicated infrastructure is not an option, is based on a centralized
setup and the continuous collection of self-reported location and speed data from
participants. This is also the approach used by deployed commercial systems like
Google Maps and Waze.
Geocast-based traffic monitoring follows a different approach - traffic data is shared
in an on-demand manner directly between users. For example, a user of a geocast-
based traffic monitoring system can send an information query to a road segment
lying ahead of him. Vehicles residing in the target area will receive the query and can
answer the requester directly, informing him about their own local view on traffic.
In addition to requests, traffic warnings and messages of general interest can be
delivered to participants in a given area, e.g., a section of road that was passed
previously.
5.1.1.2 Parking space discovery
Tightly related to optimizing the flow of traffic is the challenge of reducing the
amount of unnecessary traffic. Cruising for parking spaces was found to be a signif-
icant contributor to the latter, accounting for a non-negligible percentage of total city
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traffic [103]1. In addition to saving the time of individuals, shortening parking space
search times would thus also reduce traffic in general, benefiting the environment
and improving quality of life. The parking space discovery problem might become
even more relevant with the growing popularity of electric vehicles that need to be
charged for extended periods of time, thus blocking possibly scarce charging sta-
tions.
A geocast-based parking space discovery system can support both the distribution
of notifications about freed up spots (initiated, e.g., by a vehicle leaving a spot) and
the delivery of search requests to vehicles and infrastructure elements in a given
destination area. Recipients of such messages can answer if they are aware (via sen-
sors or human input) of any free spots. In this way, no investments in dedicated
infrastructure are necessary for deploying an effective parking space discovery sys-
tem.
5.1.1.3 Social interactions
Geocast-based traffic monitoring and parking space discovery can easily be extended
to support social interactions as well. Drivers can form complex queries that are an-
swered by actual humans in the target region. Examples can include “Have you
noted deer on the road?” and even “Watch out, there is a crazy driver coming that
way!”. The popular demand for such social interaction on the road is evident, con-
sidering popular social navigation systems like Waze and the CB radio-based com-
munication habits of truck drivers and other professionals.
5.1.1.4 Vehicular clouds
Vehicular clouds [116] are a recent paradigm in the context of vehicular interconnec-
tion. Here, vehicles act as service providers, offering services based on available
sensors as well as computational and storage resources. Together, participating ve-
hicles form a cloud as in conventional cloud computing.
A representative example for such vehicular cloud services is the Pics-on-wheels sys-
tem by Gerla et al. [48]. Users of the system can request current pictures from a given
location, e.g., their own house. The request is forwarded to vehicles close to the tar-
get location, who can decide to accept the task and automatically take pictures using
their on-board camera. Participants are compensated for completing such tasks and
might thus even consider making a detour for completing them.
In this particular example application, the delivery of requests is basically a geocast
service. However, in [48], it is realized using a central server, so that participating
vehicles need to continuously report their current locations to the service operator.
5.1.2 Existing approaches
The geocast paradigm was originally proposed by Navas and Imielinski in [88]. It
has been studied extensively, with a focus on short-range communication and ad
1To give an extreme example, the study cited in [103] comes to the conclusion that in 1977, cruising
for parking spaces accounted for 74% of the total traffic in the German city of Freiburg.
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hoc networking [75]. However, one- and few-hop communication based on short-
range radio is insufficient for realizing applications depending on long-distance
communication like the ones discussed in the previous section [53]. For realizing
these types of services, the existence of dedicated infrastructure support [88] or a
trusted service provider (e.g., as in [48]) is usually assumed.
Using locally deployed infrastructure and short-range radio broadcasts (i.e., follow-
ing an approach like in the original geocast proposal [88]) highly reliable geocast
might be achievable. While beneficial in terms of privacy - geocast messages will
simply be broadcast in target regions so that no location data needs to be collected
at all, this approach will likely require a high investment for deployment and main-
tenance. For that reason, it is not considered further here.
Multiple approaches exist for enhancing the privacy guarantees of centralized sys-
tems involving the processing of location data (cf. Section 2.3). However, no ap-
proaches were known to the author that realize geocast in a centralized manner
while ensuring that the service operator is unaware of users’ locations. The realiza-
tion of such an approach is likely impossible; information about the current location
of potential recipients is required by the service operator for determining the correct
recipients of geocast messages2. Obfuscation can be applied when reporting loca-
tions. However, this would lead to incorrect messages deliveries (false positives),
deteriorating service utility.
Decentralized, overlay-based geocast services [11, 51, 56, 95] are a more recent devel-
opment with significant potential for resolving the inherent drawbacks of central-
ized smart traffic systems while not requiring any dedicated infrastructure. Roughly,
the idea is the creation of a logical overlay network on top of IP. In the overlay net-
work, nodes propagate their location to other participating nodes and use this in-
formation for choosing overlay neighbors and forwarding messages. Thus, neither
a central entity nor additional infrastructure support is necessary.
Several proposals for such geocast overlays exist. In GeoKad [95], each node parti-
tions the geographic space in logical concentric rings around its own position. A
constant number of nodes from each ring are stored as neighbors. Ring radii in-
crease linearly with the ring index. GeoKad is explicitly designed towards support-
ing moving nodes: each node sends location updates to its neighbors whenever
its position becomes significantly different than the one advertised last. Geodem-
lia [51] also uses rings to divide up the geographic space. However, the radii of its
rings increase exponentially instead of linearly. Furthermore, each ring is divided
into subdivisions to create a more geographically balanced neighborhood structure.
Both Geodemlia and GeoKad use an iterative routing approach inspired by the key-
based routing overlay Kademlia [78], even though iterative routing is evidentially
slower than recursive methods [55].
2Note that approaches like pseudonymization might help alleviate the raised concerns, but would
still offer insufficient protection in the face of deanonymization attacks based on location samples
collected over an extended period of time (cf. Section 2.2.4).
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With OverDrive [56], the geocast overlay approach was specifically adapted to smart
traffic scenarios, incorporating movement speed into the neighborhood maintenance
logic and basing protocol parameters on performance measurements in actual traffic
scenarios. The evaluation of OverDrive showed it to be a viable replacement for tra-
ditional centralized systems, yielding high overall performance despite the lack of
centralized coordination [56]. OverDrive forms the basis for the privacy-preserving
long-distance geocast service proposed in this chapter. Due to this, Section 5.2 is
dedicated to introducing the protocol in detail.
The idea of tailoring the overlay protocol mechanics to the specific features of the
vehicular traffic scenario was further pursued in [11]. The work focuses mostly
on performance improvements to previous design and does not consider privacy
issues.
Overlay-based geocast systems are interesting in terms of privacy preservation, as
no central entity exists that can collect location data. However, none of the intro-
duced systems have previously been analyzed and evaluated in terms of their pri-
vacy characteristics. Attacks on the location privacy of their users are, thus, poten-
tially possible.
Privacy challenges have been considered in the context of vehicular ad hoc net-
working. A central focus here has been on the usage and the mixing of pseudo-
nyms [37, 92]. However, due to their focus on short-range communication, existing
solutions from this domain are insufficient for ensuring location privacy in long-
distance geocast services. The same is true for generic location privacy techniques
designed for systems controlled by singular service operators. An in-depth discus-
sion of such approaches, as well as a discussion of pseudonymization in the context
of smart traffic, can be found in Chapter 2.
5.2 OverDrive
This section describes OverDrive, a decentralized, overlay-based geocast service
that is adapted to smart traffic scenarios. Information requests for points in geo-
graphic space are routed directly via traffic participants until they reach a node in
the proximity of that point. OverDrive enables effective long-distance geocast while
eliminating the need for a central data sink: location data is shared only with a small
and dynamically changing set of other participants. As originally proposed in [56],
OverDrive is based around two concepts:
• An overlay neighborhood structure based on a partitioning of geographic space
into concentric rings, as well as mechanisms for maintaining this structure.
• A routing mechanism for forwarding messages to nodes in a desired geo-
graphic area. Messages are forwarded using connections from the overlay
neighborhood structure.
An overview of these concepts and their realization in the original OverDrive design
is given in the following. Additionally, the use of pseudonyms in OverDrive is
discussed.
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5.2.1 Neighborhood structure and overlay maintenance
This section describes the structure of OverDrive’s overlay topology as well as the
operations necessary for maintaining it.
5.2.1.1 Neighborhood structure
The overlay neighborhood structure is based on mapping neighbors to a set of k
concentric rings around the position of the current node. The radii of these rings
start with the base ring radius rb and grow exponentially with the distance from the
common center. Based on the distance from the current node, neighbors fall into
one of the different rings. This concept is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Each ring has an index, starting with 0, and the index i for a neighbor with distance
d can be determined as follows:
i =

0 if d < rb
j if rb · 2j−1 < d ≤ rb · 2j for 0 < j ≤ k
k if rb · 2k < d
The amount of neighbors present in each ring is determined by the parameters ndes
and nmax. The parameter ndes indicates the desired number of neighbors a node
wishes to keep in each ring. As long as ndes hasn’t been reached, the node will ac-
tively search for more nodes, a process described in the next section. The parameter
nmax indicates the maximum number of neighbors that are kept for each ring. For
a ring that has a neighbor count between ndes and nmax, new neighbor connections
will be accepted but no active search for new neighbors will be conducted.
5.2.1.2 Discovery of new neighbors
Each node periodically calculates its satisfaction with each of its rings. If, amongst
other things, there are less than ndes neighbors in a ring, the respective node starts
a search for new neighbors for this ring. The search for new neighbors for a ring
works by routing a find neighbors request to a random point within the geographic
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area covered by that ring. The request is answered by the node that is closest to that
point by sending a find neighbors response back to the requester. The find neighbors
response contains descriptors of a subset of the responding node’s neighbors. The
subset is chosen by filling the response with nodes starting from the neighbors in its
innermost ring and going outward from there.
Once the response has arrived at the originator of the request, if the current number
of neighbors n for the given ring is lower than ndes, the node tries to add (ndes −
n) new neighbors to this ring. This is done by sending neighbor connect requests to
(ndes − n) of the received neighbor candidates.
Whenever a node X receives a neighbor connect request from another node Y, it
needs to decide whether to accept it. If there are less than nmax neighbors in the
appropriate ring, Y is always accepted. Neighbors are accepted by replying to the
neighbor connect request with an appropriate neighbor connect response.
5.2.1.3 Updating location data
Since OverDrive is specifically designed for mobile nodes, keeping the information
about neighbor locations up-to-date is a critical part of overlay maintenance. Loca-
tion updates are periodically sent out to overlay neighbors. These messages include
the current location of the sending node. In addition to this location, recipients store
the time at which the last location update was received. Neighbor connections are
always bidirectional so that all nodes that learn a node’s location also share their
own location with it.
5.2.2 Message routing
OverDrive uses a recursive, greedy routing scheme for delivering messages towards
destinations in geographic space. At every hop, the message is forwarded to the
neighbor that is closest to the target point in geographic space. If none of the current
hop’s neighbors is closer to the target than itself, it assumes the responsibility for the
message and processes it. This routing mechanism is used for both geographic unicast
and geographic flooding.
5.2.2.1 Unicast
Geographic unicast enables an application to send a payload to a node in a given tar-
get area. The overlay encapsulates the payload in a geographic unicast message (GUM)
and routes it to the node closest to the center of the target region. On the destination
node the payload is passed to the application, which may send a direct response
back to the originator.
An example is given in Figure 5.2. The figure depicts a possible application for the
geocast service, namely the sending of a query to a point in geographic space (e.g.,
a road segment) lying ahead of the requester. The query is realized as a GUM. From
all of its neighbors, which are chosen based on a partitioning of geographic space
into concentric rings, the requester greedily chooses the one neighbor that is closest
to the destination region in terms of geographic distance. The GUM is sent to this
neighbor, who then forwards it according to the same rule, sending it to the one of
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Figure 5.2 Delivery of a geographic unicast message (GUM).
its overlay neighbors that is closest to the destination region. Once the GUM arrives
at a node residing in the target area, that node might, depending on the application,
decide to answer the query by directly sending a response to the requester.
As in other greedy routing approaches, the routing approach used in OverDrive is
theoretically prone to getting stuck in local minima. In other words, it cannot be
guaranteed that the actual destination will be reached. No explicit measures for
avoiding local minima during routing have been taken in OverDrive’s design. De-
spite this, simulation-based evaluations in scenarios with realistic node movement
have demonstrated a high percentage of correct GUM deliveries [56].
5.2.2.2 Flooding
Geographic flooding allows applications to broadcast a payload to all nodes within
a certain area. To reach the flooding area, a geographic flooding message is routed
geographically towards the center of that area (using the same mechanism as for
geographic unicast messages). The first node within the destination area that re-
ceives the message is called the initial flooder. It will send a confirmation that the
flooding has started back to the sender of the flooding request. It will then start the
actual flooding process, recursively forwarding the request to other peers within the
destination area.
Geographic flooding is largely ignored in the remainder of this chapter, as, except
for the final flooding step, it is realized in the same way as geographic unicast.
5.2.3 Use of pseudonyms
As in other vehicular networking approaches (e.g., [92]), OverDrive nodes use pseu-
donym certificates (pseudonyms for short) to protect the identity of drivers while pre-
venting sybil attacks (i.e., bounding the number of pseudonyms per user), enabling
the revocation of participation rights and ensuring the authenticity of messages
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(e.g., through cryptographic signatures). Pseudonymization can be realized using a
trusted certificate authority or a decentralized system like BitNym (cf. Chapter 6). It
is also possible to reuse pseudonym certificates from other domains. For example,
certificates used in short-range vehicular networking, as standardized by the ETSI3
and the IEEE4, can be used. However, following properties must be realized by the
employed pseudonymization approach:
1. Pseudonyms must be unlinkable to user identities and other pseudonyms of
the same user.
2. It must be ensured that sybil attacks are not possible. Only a bounden number
of simultaneously active pseudonyms must be allowed per user.
3. Mechanisms must be provided for explicitly linking messages to pseudonyms
and it must be ensured that only the holder of a given pseudonym can realize
such links with that pseudonym. For example, pseudonym representations
can include cryptographic public keys usable for verifying signed messages.
4. Pseudonym holders must be able to unlinkably change their pseudonyms.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the pseudonymization approach proposed in
Chapter 6 of this thesis is currently the only one to fulfill all of these requirements
without requiring the existence of a single trusted entity (and, therefore, a weaker
adversary model).
The last requirement, that pseudonyms must be changeable, is required for avoid-
ing identification attacks based on recorded trips linkable to a single pseudonymous
user. In OverDrive, new pseudonyms are chosen at the beginning of each trip. Ad-
ditionally, the option of changing pseudonyms during trips is supported. In order to
reduce the linkability of pseudonyms based on observed times and locations before
and after a change, pseudonym changes must be coordinated with other partici-
pants (cf. Section 2.3.4). OverDrive nodes communicate with each other over IP or
PTP (cf. Section 2.6). Therefore, their communication addresses must be changed
as well during pseudonym changes in order for the unlinkability between pseudo-
nyms to be ensured.
If OverDrive nodes retain the same set of neighbors after a pseudonym change,
their neighbors might be able to link the new pseudonym to the old one based on
timing, i.e., the fact that the new pseudonym appears just after the old pseudonym
disappeared. However, pseudonym changes should not significantly impact per-
formance, so that a discarding of multiple existing neighbor relationships should be
avoided.
Based on the preceding considerations, an approach for the changing of pseudo-
nyms in OverDrive is proposed that consists of the following sequential steps:
3http://www.etsi.org/index.php/technologies-clusters/technologies/
intelligent-transport
4http://standards.ieee.org/develop/wg/1609_WG.html
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1. Whenever a pseudonym change is desired, OverDrive nodes attempt to form
mix groups with nearby neighbors.
2. Nodes in a mix group exchange their complete neighbor sets, i.e., the commu-
nication addresses, pseudonyms and known locations of all of their individual
neighbors.
3. All nodes in a mix group cease the use of their old pseudonyms and all com-
munication with other nodes.
4. Each node independently chooses (or obtains) a new pseudonym for itself, as
well as a new communication address (IP address or PTP identifier).
5. Each node independently chooses a random subset of the set of all neighbors
shared in the mix group.
6. Using its new pseudonym and communication address, each node forms new
neighbor relationships with all nodes selected in the previous step.
7. Regular operation is resumed.
In essence, this approach is an adaptation of the SwingSwap approach [71].
With pseudonyms for every participant, a central challenge for an adversary inter-
ested in large-scale surveillance or targeted tracking becomes the linking of pseudo-
nyms to real-world identities, i.e., the breaking of pseudonyms.
5.3 Privacy analysis
A privacy analysis of OverDrive is conducted in the following, based on the ap-
proach outlined in Chapter 3. While focused on OverDrive, the results of this analy-
sis are applicable to other geocast overlay approaches like Geodemlia and GeoKad.
An adversary model is defined first. The analysis is then performed in two parts
separated based on the addressed privacy threats:
1. Detection and disclosure.
2. Linking and identification.
5.3.1 Adversary model
In accordance with Section 3.2, an adversary is assumed that is not colluding with
cellular network operators5. The main goal of the adversary is the collection of iden-
tifiable location samples. Subgoals towards this end and metrics associated with
these subgoals are introduced in subsequent sections.
Following assumptions are also made that are specific to the geocast overlay context:
5In currently deployed cellular networks, network operators can always determine both the iden-
tity and the location (with high precision) of connected users.
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• The adversary is able to control multiple attacker nodes in the overlay network,
i.e. virtual identities within the OverDrive overlay. Sybil attacks are impossi-
ble and the maximum number of attacker nodes is bounded to up to 1% of the
remaining node population6.
• Attacker nodes are able to lie about their position. Apart from that, they run
the OverDrive protocol like regular nodes.
• Attacker nodes cannot arbitrarily influence their physical location. They are ei-
ther static or follow the mobility behavior of a regular traffic participant (which
can’t be influenced by the adversary).
• The adversary is unable to identify nodes using communication metadata or
by breaking the employed pseudonymization scheme.
• Unless directed at an attacker node, the adversary is unable to detect or eaves-
drop on communication between nodes7.
• All messages associated with a pseudonym (i.e., a message sent by a given
node) are cryptographically signed so that their integrity and authenticity is
maintained across forwarding hops.
5.3.2 Detection and disclosure
This section considers the following questions:
1. What data does the adversary gain from passive observation during normal op-
eration?
2. What actions are possible for him and are expected to have a significant impact?
3. In what way can the previously identified actions be leveraged by the adver-
sary for increasing his knowledge?
5.3.2.1 Knowledge from passive observation
During normal operation, each OverDrive node maintains overlay connections to a
number of other nodes from which it periodically receives location updates. Less
frequently, it also receives find neighbors requests and neighbor connect requests.
With a similarly low frequency, it will send out find neighbors requests itself and
receive find neighbors responses. In addition to the message type, which can be
ignored here, all of these messages must include one or more pseudonymized node
locations, i.e., (pseudonym, location)-tuples. So, during normal operation, each
OverDrive node is able to collect samples of the form (pseudonym, location, time)
6In practice, this is achieved through the use of a sybil-resistant pseudonymization approach (cf.
Section 5.2.3).
7Otherwise, he might be able to infer all neighbor relationships in the overlay network and use
this information as an additional data source when inferring locations through correlation.
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from multiple other nodes. The majority of these samples will be collected from
neighbors via periodic location updates. As the adversary may control multiple
attacker nodes, he is able to collect (pseudonym, location, time)-samples from mul-
tiple vantage points in the overlay network.
Depending on the specific scenario (e.g., what kind of smart traffic application is
using the geocast overlay), nodes will also frequently receive GUMs. GUMs include
a destination region as well as a pseudonym (e.g., a communication address) for
directing answers to. However, the relation between the destination region and
the location of the pseudonym holder is not obvious. Additionally, it can easily be
obfuscated further, e.g., by using different pseudonyms for initiating GUMs than
these used for maintaining the geocast overlay and by choosing the first hop for a
GUM in a randomized fashion. The quantity, destinations and content of GUMs is,
also, scenario-specific and, therefore, difficult to evaluate in a general fashion. For
all of these reasons, GUMs are not considered further here.
A different reasoning applies for GUM responses. Here, the answering node dis-
closes its proximity to the destination region. Depending on the scenario, nodes may
send out many GUMs during regular operation. In this way, they will likely receive
many GUM responses and, thus, multiple additional (pseudonym, location, time)-
samples extractable from them. Again, however, answering nodes are not required
to use the same pseudonym for answering GUM queries that they use for interact-
ing with overlay neighbors (or, for that matter, any pseudonym at all). Answering
GUM queries without the use of linkable identifiers lowers the linkability of GUM
responses to other data items and, consequently, the usefulness of GUM responses
for the adversary. Additionally, the location data extractable from a GUM response
must correspond only to the destination region of the associated GUM request, i.e.,
is likely of low precision.
5.3.2.2 Possible actions
The purpose of this section is to exhaustively enumerate the actions that are possible
for the adversary in the considered adversary model. More specifically, this involves
the actions that attacker nodes can perform, as the adversary has no significant ca-
pabilities exceeding the injection and control of such nodes. The tackled question is,
therefore, what non-standard forms of behavior are possible for attacker nodes that
can potentially lead to benefits for the adversary. Recall that the main goal of the
adversary is the obtaining of large quantities of identifiable location samples.
As part of the adversary model, the adversary is unable to influence the physical lo-
cations of attacker nodes. OverDrive nodes are mainly characterized by their phys-
ical location and their communication behavior with other nodes. Consequently,
the actions considered here are restricted to different non-standard ways in which
attacker nodes can interact with regular nodes. This involves the sending and for-
warding of messages that are accepted by regular nodes. Other messages or com-
munication attempts are, in the best case for the adversary, ignored by regular nodes
and is not considered further here. Messages accepted by regular nodes are:
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• Location updates from neighbors. As a form of non-standard behavior, at-
tacker nodes can fake the location included in these messages, essentially lying
about their own locations. However, they must remain consistent with their
reported (fake) locations in order to escape detection. Reported locations must
be chosen based on the capabilities of real vehicles (e.g., maximum movement
speed). Inconsistent location updates are non-repudiable. Nodes that receive
such updates can immediately identify the attacker node, blacklist it locally
(avoiding any further communication to it) and distribute the proof of the in-
consistency to its neighbors, so that they can blacklist the node as well. In the
following, it is assumed that location faking, if applied, is always consistent
and based on realistic vehicular movement.
• Find neighbors requests. The sending of find neighbors requests triggers the
receipt of find neighbors responses (containing location samples from several
pseudonymous nodes). Additionally, received find neighbors requests can be
discarded instead of forwarding or answering them.
• Find neighbors responses. Attacker nodes can respond to a find neighbors
request even if they are aware of better suited nodes to forward it to. Addi-
tionally, they can prefer other attacker nodes when forming the returned set
of nodes. Lastly, they can also include invalid pseudonyms or communica-
tion addresses in find neighbors responses. Since the resulting find neighbors
response is of little use to the requester, this is comparable to dropping the
request and not sending any response at all.
• GUMs and GUM responses. A similar analysis applies here as for find neigh-
bors requests and responses. The explicit consideration of GUMs and GUM
responses is, therefore, omitted in this analysis step.
• Neighbor connect requests. Can be sent to each newly discovered node, effec-
tively removing the limit on accepted neighbors.
• Neighbor connect responses. All neighbor connect requests can be accepted,
effectively removing the limit on accepted neighbors.
5.3.2.3 Increasing knowledge
Based on the preceding analysis, attacker nodes are left with the following classes
of actions that may be used to increase the adversary’s knowledge:
• Fake own locations in location updates and other messages. However, consis-
tency must be maintained and unrealistic jumps in the reported locations are
avoided.
• Send out large numbers of find neighbors requests (or, analogously, GUMs).
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• Drop find neighbors requests (and, analogously, GUMs) or answer them even
if they should actually be forwarded further8.
• Choosing the nodes to include in find neighbors responses according to non-
standard criteria, e.g., preferring other attacker nodes.
• Try to add all newly discovered nodes as neighbors and accept all incoming
neighbor connect requests.
• Any combination of the preceding.
Based on these actions, in Section 5.3.4, two specific attacks are proposed that are ap-
plicable to the original OverDrive design and similar geocast overlay proposals. The
proposed attacks do not cover all possible combinations of the identified adversary
actions. In other words, additional attack vectors towards obtaining identifiable lo-
cation samples using the identified actions might be possible. However, none could
be determined that pose a significant and not easily mitigated threat. Additionally,
preliminary simulation results demonstrated that the proposed attacks are already
tremendously effective even with a modest number of attacker nodes. Indepen-
dently of any other possible attacks, this necessitates their deeper investigation.
5.3.3 Linking and identication
Linking and identification attacks are not explicitly discussed in the scope of this
chapter. Significant open questions exist concerning the detection and disclosure
threat that forms the basis for linking and identification. If the adversary is able
to collect pseudonymous location samples from nearly all participating users, the
same linking and identification threats will apply like in a similar centralized system
using pseudonyms. Such a setup has been widely studied in the literature (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2). A central question tackled in the remainder of this chapter is the mapping
of the data gathered through attacks on the OverDrive system (both the original and
the improved form introduced later in this chapter) to the data gathered in similar
centralized system (in which the adversary is able to collect pseudonymous loca-
tion samples from nearly all participants). Additionally, one of the specific attacks
discussed in the following realizes a simple identification attack for the targeted
collection of location samples from a specific victim.
5.3.4 Specic attacks
In the following, two specific attacks towards obtaining identifiable location sam-
ples are discussed. They differ in their respective subgoals. The first attempts to
establish a global view over all nodes, allowing the application of linking and iden-
tification attacks from the literature. The second aims at the surveillance of an indi-
vidual target that the adversary can identify directly (e.g., using context knowledge).
The effect of both attacks was evaluated using simulations. The evaluation setup
and results is discussed in Section 5.6.
8Note that this is also a threat to the functionality of the geocast service. However, the focus here
is on privacy characteristics, so security concerns are not considered further.
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5.3.4.1 Establishment of a global view
A straightforward attack approach is the establishment of a global view comprised
of pseudonymous location samples, i.e., (pseudonym, location, time)-tuples, from
as many overlay nodes as possible. Given a global view, pseudonyms can be broken
using known techniques (cf. Section 2.2.4). The establishment of a global view is
possible using the following attack:
1. The adversary controls multiple attacker nodes that may behave like regular
traffic participants. As attacker nodes can lie about their location, they can
also be co-located in reality with individual node movement being simulated
by the adversary.
2. The attacker nodes attempt to become overlay neighbors with as many regular
overlay nodes as they can (e.g., by sending out many find neighbors requests
and accepting all neighbor connect requests they receive).
3. The attacker nodes forward (through a separate channel) all location updates
they receive to the adversary who combines them into one global view.
5.3.4.2 Surveillance of an individual target
A more sophisticated attack approach is the exploitation of inherent properties of
the geocast system for identifying and tracking targets with far less resources. In
the following, a representative attack from this class is presented. The approach as-
sumes that the adversary targets one user about which he has context knowledge
in the form of the location at which he will start his trip. Depending on the sce-
nario, such information can be obtained easily. For example, the home address of
the victim might be used.
Given such context knowledge, the adversary faces two challenges: (1) mapping
the victim to an overlay node and (2) continuing to track the location of that node.
For the first step, following two properties of OverDrive (which are shared by the
majority of existing geocast overlays) can be leveraged:
Property 1. For any given pair of overlay nodes, the probability of them being overlay
neighbors is inversely proportional to the geographical distance between them.
Property 2. If a node discovers another node for the first time, the probability that this
node has just joined the overlay or changed its pseudonym is inversely proportional to the
geographical distance between the two nodes.
Note that property 2 is an implication of property 1. With these properties of geocast
overlays, the adversary can attempt to map a victim to an overlay node by placing
attacker nodes around the start point of the victim (e.g., by instructing them to lie
about their positions). The attacker nodes can then report all new nodes they dis-
cover to the adversary. Whenever a new node X is discovered in the vicinity of the
victim start position, following reasoning applies:
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• X is close to the victim start point→ it is also close to the attacker nodes.
• X is close to the attacker nodes and seen by them for the first time→ it is likely
to have just joined the overlay (cf. property 2).
• X is close to the victim start point and has likely just joined the overlay → it
likely belongs to the victim.
Having acquired a likely victim node, the next step for the adversary is to continue
tracking it. For this, an approach specific to geocast overlays is introduced - the
follower attack. This attack is based on property 1. Given a node which the adversary
wants to track, one attacker node continuously fakes its position so as to appear
in the vicinity of the victim node. Being in the vicinity of the victim node, it is
very likely to remain in the victim node’s neighborhood and continuously receive
location updates from it.
The potential victim node can be continuously followed in a virtual fashion, i.e.,
without requiring any form of physical proximity. Possibly, this also leads to an
increase in the certainty about the victim’s identity, as the adversary can collect more
location data that can be matched with context knowledge.
Summing up, by combining context knowledge, the careful placement of attacker
nodes and the follower attack, an adversary might be able to successfully identify
and track a real-world target at a potentially much lesser cost (in terms of required
attacker nodes) than surveilling the whole overlay for creating a global view.
5.4 Location privacy enhancements
Two enhancements are now proposed that tackle the major weaknesses enabling
attacks like the ones described in Section 5.3. The contributions aim at establishing
data locality, i.e., ensuring that precise location data is only shared with entities that
are physically located in the close vicinity.
First, a mechanism is presented that decreases the accuracy of the location data an
adversary is able to acquire (location obfuscation). Second, a countermeasure is pro-
posed against malicious nodes that fake their location data in order to receive de-
tailed location updates from targets (location spoofing detection).
5.4.1 Location obfuscation
For establishing a global view on the location of all nodes, an adversary’s goal is to
gain as accurate location data as possible about as many nodes in the network as
possible. An efficient way to defend against this attack is to avoid delivering accu-
rate location data to the adversary. This approach does not prevent an adversary
from collecting location data about many nodes but will decrease the value of the
collected information, i.e., its suitability for breaking pseudonyms or determining
the exact location of a given node.
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5.4.1.1 General approach
The basic approach here is to decrease the accuracy of the location data shared be-
tween two nodes A and B with growing distances between them. OverDrive uses a
greedy forwarding algorithm where each node forwards a message to the one of its
neighbors that it estimates to be closest to the destination location of the message.
Thanks to OverDrive’s neighbor selection logic, it is expected that the distances be-
tween individual hops decrease with each routing step and that the distance to the
destination decreases in smaller and smaller steps with each hop. Thus, the pro-
posed enhancement is not expected to impact geographic routing performance in a
significant way.
5.4.1.2 Obfuscation regions
The obfuscation approach proposed here is based on the concept of obfuscation re-
gions. An obfuscation region is a quadratic geographic region with an edge length
of ledge. Instead of transmitting precise location data, the nodes A and B share the
center position of an obfuscation region they currently reside in. In order to allow
different levels of obfuscation based on the distance between two nodes, the size of
the obfuscation region can be varied. For denoting the desired degree of obfusca-
tion, the zoom level z is defined so that ledge = 2z kilometers. The zoom level is linked
to the (presumed) geographic distance to the node with which location data should
be shared. More faraway nodes receive larger obfuscation regions and, thus, more
heavily obfuscated location data.
5.4.1.3 Obfuscation grid
Given a zoom level and the accurate location of a node, an obfuscation region can
be constructed. If each node calculates its obfuscation region by choosing a random
quadratic region around its position, an adversary might break the obfuscation by
intersecting multiple views collected from different nodes under the adversary’s
control. To avoid this kind of attack, obfuscation regions must be constructed in
such a way that the information gained from combining multiple received obfusca-
tion regions for the same location never exceeds the information contained in the
obfuscation region with the lowest zoom level.
To achieve this property, the concept of an obfuscation grid is proposed. An obfus-
cation grid is a division of geographic space into disjoint squares as shown in Fig-
ure 5.3. Each of the squares represents a single quadratic obfuscation region. Every
node in the overlay uses the same origin for the obfuscation grid, regardless of the
used zoom level. Since ledge = 2z, each obfuscation region at zoom level z can be
divided into four disjoint regions at zoom level z− 1, as shown in Figures 5.3a and
5.3b. Thus, obfuscation regions never intersect and two obfuscation regions for the
same location are either identical (in case their zoom level matches) or the region
with the lower zoom level is contained within the other. With this, adversaries can-
not gain any additional information from combining multiple obfuscated views of
the same location compared to using only the most precise view available.
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(a) obfuscation grid at level z (b) obfuscation grid at level z− 1
Figure 5.3 Obfuscation grid.
5.4.1.4 Creating obfuscation regions
Two pieces of data are needed for calculating an obfuscation region. First, the lo-
cation L(lonL, latL) that is to be obfuscated. Second, the zoom level z determining
the size of the obfuscation region. Furthermore, an origin point O(lonO, latO) for the
obfuscation grid must have been defined. As already discussed, O must be identi-
cal for all nodes. For simplicity, the origin point is defined at (0, 0) in geographic
space, i.e. O = (0, 0). The zoom level is determined by the index i of the ring
in which neighbor B resides. As a parameter to the system, the downscaling fac-
tor f d is introduced so that z = i − f d. Thus, if B resides in the i’th ring of A’s
neighborhood structure, A will share its location with B using an obfuscation re-
gion with edge length ledge = 2(i−d) (in kilometers). By varying the value for f d,
different degrees of obfuscation can be tested (larger values for f d decrease the level
of obfuscation). To calculate the correct obfuscation region using the given data,
the latitude/longitude-based location L must first be transformed into the coordi-
nate space of the obfuscation grid, yielding the grid point L′(xL′ , yL′). Based on
the haversine formula for calculating approximate distances on spheres and with r
denoting the earth radius, following formula applies:
xL′ = 2r ∗ arcsin
(
cos (latO) sin
(
lonL− lonO
2
))
yL′ = r ∗ (latL− latO)
For O = (0, 0), we arrive at:
L′(xL′ , yL′) = (r ∗ lonL, r ∗ latL)
Using L′, the points Pmin and Pmax defining opposite corners of the resulting region
can now be calculated as:
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Pmin =
(
2z ∗ bxL′
2z
c, 2z ∗ byL′
2z
c
)
Pmax =
(
2z ∗ dxL′
2z
e, 2z ∗ dyL′
2z
e
)
Pmin =
(
2z ∗ br ∗ lonL
2z
c, 2z ∗ br ∗ latL
2z
c
)
Pmax =
(
2z ∗ dr ∗ lonL
2z
e, 2z ∗ dr ∗ latL
2z
e
)
Once these points are known, the center point P(xP, yP) of the obfuscation region
can be calculated as:
P =

(
xPmin + xPmax
)
2
,
(
yPmin + yPmax
)
2

The last step is to transform P(x, y) back into geographic coordinates. The transfor-
mation is realized by inverting the formulas used for calculating L′, which yields:
lonP =
xP
r
latP =
yP
r
5.4.1.5 Determining the ring index
Whenever A wants to share location data with B, it has to determine the correct
level of obfuscation to be applied to the location data. Simply calculating a ring
index based on A’s real position and B’s reported position might lead to inconsis-
tencies in cases where A is located close to a ring boundary. A’s obfuscated position
might not be within the same ring of B’s neighborhood structure as A’s real position.
Therefore, the correct ring index of A in B’s neighborhood structure is dependent on
the distance do between B’s reported position and the center of the correct obfusca-
tion region for A. Based on do, and analogously to the original OverDrive design,
the ring index i for a neighbor is determined as follows:
i =

0 if do < rb
j if rb · 2j−1 < do ≤ rb · 2j for 0 < j ≤ k
k if rb · 2k < do
In the scenario depicted in Figure 5.4, for example, A must send a location obfus-
cated with a zoom level for the ring with index 2 (the obfuscation region is depicted
as a green box), even though it is actually residing in B’s fourth ring (ring index 3).
The correct obfuscation region is determined iteratively according to Algorithm 5.1.
For each ring index i starting from 0, an obfuscation region for the corresponding
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node A
0 1 2
node B
Figure 5.4 The correct ring is 2, even though the actual location is in ring 3.
zoom level z is calculated. If the center PA of that obfuscation region lies within B’s
ring with index i (based on the distance do between PA and B’s reported location
PB), this is the correct obfuscation region. If not, the check continues with the next
highest ring index i + 1.
Algorithm 5.1: Determining the correct obfuscation region center for sharing the
actual location LA to a neighbor with reported location PB.
i = 0;
z = getZoomLevel(i);
PA = getObfuscationRegionCenter(z, LA);
do = getDistance(PA,PB);
while i > getRingIndex(do) do
i = i + 1;
z = getZoomLevel(i);
PA = getObfuscationRegionCenter(z, LA);
do = getDistance(PA,PB);
end
return PA;
5.4.1.6 Neighborhood structure and neighbor scoring
The general neighborhood structure concept remains the same as presented in [56]
and Section 5.2. Changes include the type of information shared with neighbors: in-
stead of precise location, bearing and speed, nodes only share the center of the cor-
rect obfuscation region. Consequently, the scoring function, used to rank neighbors
within the same ring for determining whether an old neighbor should be ejected
from the neighborhood in favor of a given new candidate, was simplified as well.
Scores are no longer based on bearing and speed, but only on the number of neigh-
bors in the vicinity of the scored node (fewer neighbors in the vicinity lead to higher
scores). The simplified scoring function (for a neighbor A) is shown in Algorithm 5.2.
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Algorithm 5.2: Calculating the score of a node A.
i = getRingIndex(A);
PA = getObfuscationRegionCenter(A);
c = 1;
foreach N ∈ {neighbors in ring i} do
PN = getObfuscationRegionCenter(N);
if (N 6= A) ∧ (PN == PA) then
c = c + 1;
end
end
return 1/c;
5.4.2 Location spoong detection
In the following, an approach is presented for identifying malicious nodes that spoof
their location, so that adversaries need to be physically close to their victims in order
to receive precise location data.
5.4.2.1 Private proximity testing
Solutions for the protection against location spoofing exist that require additional
infrastructure support [15] or spot checks [96]. If the problem can be reduced to
proximity checks, short-range radio beacons can be used. However, approaches
based on short-range radio have a limited reach, especially in environments with
many obstructions like buildings.
An alternative approach is to compare environmental features that are unpredictable
and unique to a given location and time. Originally proposed in [87], private proxim-
ity testing (PPT) realizes such a comparison in a privacy-preserving manner. More
specifically, PPT enables users to verify whether a certain other user is in their vicin-
ity, without having to reveal their own location. PPT can be realized using the loca-
tion tag and location sketch concepts proposed in [87] and [73].
A location tag is a set of features that are unique in space and time. The generation of
a correct location tag for a location is only possible if an entity is physically present
at that location. In [73], location tags are constructed from GSM broadcast traffic.
By collecting immediate assignment (IA) messages, location tags specific to individ-
ual GSM cells can be constructed. Using signaling traffic from the broadcast paging
channel (PCCH), the same is possible for GSM location areas, i.e., groups of multiple
cells. By comparing location tags generated in this way, reliable proximity tests over
distances of 10 km and more are possible.
A location sketch is a single value generated from a location tag using the shingling
technique [73]. It enables the efficient comparison of location tags using private equal-
ity testing (PET), i.e., verifying the equality of another party’s location tag without
either party needing to disclose its location or location tag. Here, the use of a syn-
chronous PET protocol based on El Gamal encryption is proposed, as presented in
[87]. Alternative forms of PET are possible. However, the novel contributions pre-
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sented in this chapter are independent of any specific implementation. The focus
here is on the general applicability of PPT and the integration of existing techniques
into OverDrive.
5.4.2.2 Integration into OverDrive
For enabling location spoofing detection using PPT, OverDrive nodes need to con-
tinuously collect local GSM broadcast traffic - IA messages and traffic on the PCCH.
From the collected data they can create location sketches proving their location in
a cell (using IA traffic) and location area (using PCCH traffic). Using PET, two
nodes can check if their location sketches match without having to share the actual
sketches. If their IA-based sketches match, the nodes assume that they reside in the
same GSM cell and are, therefore, not significantly more than 4 km apart. The value
of 4 km is a conservative estimate to reduce the number of false negatives when ver-
ifying the proximity of neighbors. In practice, GSM cells can have radii of up to
35 km [102]. If only their PCCH-based sketches match, they assume to be located
in the same location area and not significantly more than 10 km apart. The value
of 10 km is, again, a conservative estimate (location areas are comprised of multiple
cells). The parameters derived from assumed cell and LA sizes can be fine-tuned
with more specific information about the used GSM network.
current node
neighbor
GSM cell
Figure 5.5 Cell verification between a node and its neighbors.
With a base ring radius of 2 km (as proposed in [56] and Section 5.6.2.1 of this chapter),
it is proposed that nodes use the location spoofing detection for neighbors in the
three innermost rings of their neighborhood structure. For the innermost ring (i.e.
for neighbors up to 2 km away), they will try to perform a cell verification, thus trying
to verify that they are located in the same GSM cell as neighboring nodes. A cell
verification between a node and two of its neighbors is depicted in Figure 5.5. While
one of the neighbors resides in the same cell, leading to a successful verification, the
other does not and consequently fails the verification. For nodes in the second and
third ring (up to 4 km and 8 km away, respectively), location area verification is used.
Location area verification is performed in an analogous manner to cell verification,
but uses data from the GSM PCCH that is visible within groups of multiple cells.
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For more faraway nodes, no location verification is used. Locations shared with
nodes in the outer rings are obfuscated into obfuscation regions with an edge length
of 4 km9 or more, making them less valuable for identification attacks or the infer-
ence of sensitive information. Without verification, no neighbor receives location
updates with a higher precision than that. Likewise, if a node B shares a location
that implies that it needs to be allocated to the innermost ring of a node A, but has
only proven that it resides in the same location area as A, it only receives location
updates with the precision corresponding to the second ring (ring index 1).
Algorithm 5.3: Periodic checks part of location verification.
foreach N ∈ {neighbors in rings 0, 1 and 2} do
t = getCurrentTime();
if N.cellVerificationPending == true then
if t - N.lastSuccessfulCellVerification > maxCellVerificationDelay then
addToBlacklist(N);
else if t - N.lastVerificationAttempt > cellVerificationAttemptTimeout then
sendLocationVerificationRequest(N);
end
else if N.LAVerificationPending == true then
if t - N.lastSuccessfulLAVerification > maxLAVerificationDelay then
addToBlacklist(N);
else if t - N.lastVerificationAttempt > LAVerificationAttemptTimeout then
sendLocationVerificationRequest(N);
end
else
if (getRingIndex(N) == 0) ∧
(t - N.lastSuccessfulCellVerification > cellVerificationInterval) then
cellVerificationPending = true;
LAVerificationPending = true;
sendLocationVerificationRequest(N);
else if t - N.lastSuccessfulLAVerification > LAVerificationInterval then
LAVerificationPending = true;
sendLocationVerificationRequest(N);
end
end
end
5.4.2.3 Verication process
Each node A periodically performs checks about the verification status of all of its
neighbors in its innermost three rings. A detailed description of these checks is
presented in Algorithm 5.3. If a cell or location area verification is pending for a
neighbor B, a location verification request is sent to it. The request message contains
the pseudonym of A as well as two encrypted location sketches according to the
9For a downscaling factor of f d = 1 (cf. Section 5.6.2.3) and nodes in the ring with index 3.
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synchronous PET protocol outlined in [87]. One sketch is based on cellular-level
broadcast data, the other on location area-level data. Upon receiving the verification
request, neighbor B combines its own location sketches with the ones he received,
according to the PET protocol. He sends the result of the operation back to A in
a location verification response. Based on B’s response, A can now check if B is in
the same location area or even in the same cell as itself. Together with the location
verification response, B also sends a new verification request, thus initiating the
verification process in the other direction (A must now form a location verification
response himself).
Once the proximity to a neighbor is verified, a more accurate location can be shared
with him accordingly. The verification process is repeated periodically in order to
protect against follower attacks. Without such a periodic reverification of neighbors,
an adversary needs to be physically close to his victim only once, after which he can
track the victim’s movement by faking his location.
5.4.2.4 Dealing with identied attacker nodes
If, despite repeated attempts, a node A was unable to successfully verify its proxim-
ity to a node B claiming to reside within A’s innermost 3 rings, the maximum verifi-
cation delay will be reached. In this case, A assumes that B is a malicious node that
has spoofed its location data. A then evicts B from its neighborhood structure and
adds it to a blacklist of identified malicious nodes. This mechanism is also shown
in Algorithm 5.3. While B is in A’s blacklist, A doesn’t send any messages to B and
ignores all messages received from B. After a retention period, B is removed from the
blacklist again. This approach prevents a malicious node from quickly regaining
access to A’s neighborhood, while at the same time reducing the impact of falsely
accused nodes.
5.4.2.5 Practical considerations and alternative data sources
Based on the proof of concept provided in [73], it is assumed that the continuous col-
lection of both IA and PCCH traffic and the efficient generation of location sketches
from collected messages is possible for traffic participants. As the authors point out,
however, changes to the GSM stack implementation might be necessary on client
devices for the collection of the required broadcast traffic. An additional open ques-
tion is whether the same networking interface used for data communication can be
used for collecting GSM broadcast messages.
As an alternative to GSM-based private proximity testing, location tags can likely
also be generated from signaling traffic generated in more recent cellular network-
ing standards (e.g., 4G and beyond). However, to the best of the author’s knowl-
edge, no specific proposals for this existed at the time of writing. For cities and
densely populated areas, packets broadcast on private wireless LANs are another
promising option (as also identified in [87]).
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5.5 Implementation and simulation model
A prototype of OverDrive was previously ([56]) implemented for the overlay simu-
lation framework OverSim [3], with the goal of evaluating the system’s performance
characteristics. In order to evaluate the privacy enhancements proposed in this the-
sis, they were implemented as extensions to this prototype. In this section, several
models are first introduced that are part of OverSim and are relevant to the eval-
uation presented in Section 5.6. Following that, implementation details about the
location spoofing detection extension are presented.
In addition to the implementation of simulation models and privacy enhancements,
an interactive demonstrator of the OverDrive protocol was developed that visual-
izes OverDrive’s neighborhood structures and routing approach. Details concerning
this demonstrator are presented in Appendix B.
5.5.1 Scenario-specic simulation models
OverSim was originally designed for non-mobile nodes using Ethernet or DSL con-
nections. Thus, in [56], OverSim’s underlay abstraction was extended by several
new models: (1) a network model, that reflects the characteristics of data transmis-
sions over 3G cellular networks, (2) a mobility model providing geographic informa-
tion (such as position, speed, and direction) and modelling node movement and
(3) a churn model, to handle the arrival and departure of nodes at the beginning and
the end of car trips.
In the following, the focus is on the aspects of these models that are most relevant
for realistically evaluating the privacy-related characteristics of OverDrive.
5.5.1.1 Network model
The purpose of the network model used for evaluation is to reflect the characteristics
of common 3G cellular networks. The simulated area is divided into hexagons with
an average cell radius of 2 km, representing mobile network cells. This division is
used for calculating communication latencies based on the geographic position of
nodes. On a side note, the same grid parametrization is also used for simulating
GSM-based PPT (cf. Section 5.5.2).
5.5.1.2 Mobility model
A mobility model was implemented that associates nodes with geographic loca-
tions. This positioning information is available to overlay implementations and
applications running on the simulated nodes, thus emulating the existence of po-
sitioning sensors like GPS receivers.
Additionally, a pathfinding movement model was implemented for modeling ve-
hicular movement. Using this model, each node randomly chooses a source and
destination location within the simulated area. Then, the fastest path is calculated
between these two nodes, taking into account the different driving speeds on the
individual roads comprising the path. Nodes move along this path until they reach
their respective destination. To improve simulation performance, nodes can select
their paths randomly from a pool of precomputed paths.
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The road network underlying the simulation can be extracted from map data avail-
able through the OpenStreetMap project10.
5.5.1.3 Churn model
The observed degree of node churn depends on the desired number of nodes in
the population as well as the average path length. When the pathfinding mobility
model is used, the end of a path also signals to the churn model that the node should
be deleted. The node will leave the overlay immediately and a new one will join
from another position.
5.5.2 Location spoong detection
For assessing the impact of the location spoofing detection mechanism, an abstract
model for the GSM-based PPT technique proposed in [73] was implemented. Specif-
ically, oracles are used per node that, given a location tag, can determine if it was
generated in the same GSM cell or location area as the node that the oracle belongs
to.
A hexagonal grid with a cell radius of 2 km is used to model the cell structure of
the used GSM network, and a hexagonal grid with a cell radius of 5 km to model the
partitioning of the network into location areas. This model represents a conservative
approximation to real GSM networks, which have a high variance in cell sizes and
location area span (both usually larger than in the proposed model) [102, 108].
5.6 Evaluation
In this section, an evaluation of both the original OverDrive system and the novel
enhancements proposed in Section 5.4 is presented. The main focus lies on the eval-
uation of privacy-related characteristics and on determining the effectiveness of the
novel location privacy enhancements.
The general setup of the evaluation is outlined first and, following that, the discov-
ery of a suitable parametrization of the enhanced OverDrive protocol is described.
Based on the common setup and parameters, simulation models are constructed
for the attack scenarios presented in Section 5.3: (1) the establishment of a global
view with as accurate location data as possible about as many nodes in the network
as possible and (2) the identification and tracking of a single victim using context
knowledge. Both attacks are evaluated, comparing the original OverDrive design
with a version enhanced with location obfuscation and location spoofing detection.
5.6.1 General evaluation setup
For simulating mobile nodes (OverDrive-enabled vehicles), the simulation models
proposed in Section 5.5 are used. As an underlying road network, the highway
network of the German state of Baden-Württemberg is used, which features around
5300 km of road in an area of around 56 000 km2.
10http://www.openstreetmap.org/
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For reducing simulation overhead, nodes do not calculate their paths through the
road network on the fly, but instead choose them from a pool of 105 precomputed
paths. Focusing on scenarios that have a higher percentage of longer drives, half of
the paths that had a shorter driving time than the total simulation time were filtered
out during path computation.
Unless noted otherwise, all results presented here were gathered using simulations
with 10 000 honest mobile nodes. For some experiments, an additional number of
adversary-controlled attacker nodes was introduced into the overlay.
Unless noted otherwise, no application apart from the overlay component was run-
ning on regular nodes. Consequently, no application-specific location leaking was
evaluated and adversaries can only exploit the properties of the OverDrive protocol.
On each attacker node, an attacker application was running that realizes the logic of
the currently evaluated attack, the coordination of attacker nodes and the collective
gathering of information.
For building up the overlay, nodes are initially inserted into the simulation at a low
rate of 2 nodes per second. After 200 nodes have been added, nodes are inserted at
a rate of 20 nodes per second until the desired node population size is reached. The
bootstrapping of nodes, i.e., their initial integration into the overlay, is realized by
providing each new node with the address of a random node that is already part of
the overlay.
For each simulated parameter combination, four independent simulation runs were
performed, each covering a period of 4200 s (simulated time). Measurements started
after a 600 s warm-up period. Unless noted otherwise, the presented plots depict
average values with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. The parameter-
ization of the modified OverDrive component is kept similar to the optimal config-
uration of the original OverDrive component as determined in [56]. Changes were
made concerning the parameterization of OverDrive’s neighborhood structure for
the modified version of the protocol (cf. Section 5.6.2).
The simulation parameters used for generating the results depicted in this chapter
are summarized in Table C.1 (Appendix C).
5.6.2 Parametrization of OverDrive
The following section describes how suitable parameters for the OverDrive compo-
nent and the novel privacy extensions were found. The parameters determined here
are used for all simulation studies in this chapter.
5.6.2.1 Original OverDrive system
In order for new results to be comparable with the ones in [56], a parametrization for
the original OverDrive protocol is used that resembles the optimal parameters pro-
posed there. In [56], parameters were found using a comprehensive performance ver-
sus cost (PVC) evaluation, balancing delivery ratios with bandwidth requirements.
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Amongst others, following parameters were determined as suitable for the Baden-
Württemberg scenario11:
• A desired number of neighbors per ring of ndes = 4. Nodes actively search for
new neighbors for a ring if less than ndes neighbors reside in it.
• A maximum number of neighbors per ring of nmax = 20. Nodes do not maintain
more than nmax overlay neighbors per ring.
• A base ring radius (the radius of the innermost ring) of rb = 2 km. Since the
rings used in OverDrive’s neighborhood structure are concentric with expo-
nentially increasing radii, this implies the second ring having a radius of 4 km,
the third 8 km etc.
As a preliminary step to the evaluation of extensions proposed in this chapter, a
similar simulation study was conducted to determine a parametrization of the en-
hanced OverDrive system that strikes a balance between privacy gain and perfor-
mance impact.
5.6.2.2 Performance-centric parameters
In order to keep the simulation overhead at a reasonable level, suitable values were
first determined for parameters with lesser expected impact on the system’s privacy
characteristics. This includes, for example, the number of nodes a node will accept
as neighbors. As in [56], a PVC evaluation was used to determine parameter combi-
nations with a good trade-off between routing success and bandwidth consumption.
Using this approach, following combination of parameters was found to be suitable
for the given scenario12:
• A desired number of neighbors ndes = 8. (Each node actively searches for new
neighbors for a ring if that ring has less than 8 neighbors.)
• A maximum number of neighbors nmax = 32. (Nodes never maintain more
than 32 neighbors per ring.)
• A base ring radius of rb = 2 km, which was also identified as an optimal value
in [56].
This parametrization was used in all subsequent simulations.
11A few less relevant parameters are omitted here. A more complete list is presented in Table C.1
(Appendix C).
12The chosen parameters differ from those found for the original OverDrive system, as the pro-
posed location privacy enhancements have an impact on geographic routing (due to obfuscated
neighbor locations), maintenance overhead (location updates can be sent more rarely) and neigh-
bor selection. A more complete list of parameters is presented in Table C.1 (Appendix C).
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5.6.2.3 Privacy-relevant parameters
A suitable obfuscation level was determined for the obfuscation extension, i.e. a
value for the downscaling factor f d. Towards this goal, the impact of different val-
ues for f d on the adversary’s success at establishing a global view on the network
was considered (the evaluation scenario is described in Section 5.6.3). Simulation
results confirmed that the average error in the location data known to the adver-
sary grows with the degree of applied obfuscation. However, using a high degree of
obfuscation also tampers with the system’s performance in delivering geocast mes-
sages. Based on the results, a downscaling factor of f d = 1 was selected, leading
to an improvement to the regular OverDrive design in both performance (cf. Sec-
tion 5.6.5) and adversary uncertainty.
Suitable parameters for the location spoofing detection extension were needed as
well. Here, the main optimization goal was to decrease the additional communica-
tion overhead while increasing the chance that two proximate nodes will correctly
verify each other as such. Location verification is prone to false negatives when
nodes reside in different cells or location areas despite their proximity. Simulations
were performed using the same base scenario as in the remaining parts of this chap-
ter, varying the relevant parameters. Based on the gathered simulation results, a
parametrization was selected in which nodes require a successful cell-based veri-
fication every 600 s and consider a node malicious if the verification has failed for
150 s. For LA-based verification, 900 s and 300 s are, respectively, used. Nodes are
removed from blacklists after a retention period of 300 s.
5.6.3 Establishment of a global view
In the following, the evaluation of the difficulty for an adversary to construct a
global view of the OverDrive network, including the positions of all (pseudonym-
ized) nodes, is presented.
5.6.3.1 Evaluation scenario and metrics
Simulations were conducted with 10 000 mobile nodes and an additional population
of attacker nodes that exhibit the same mobility pattern as regular nodes. Differ-
ent sizes of the attacker node population were evaluated up to a maximum of 100
nodes. All attacker nodes were considered to be under the control of one adversary
that combines their views on the overlay network into one global view. For eval-
uating the location spoofing detection, attacker nodes were additionally assumed
to be lying about their location, i.e., never being physically present at the locations
they claim to be. This assumption models an adversary without the resources to use
actual vehicles for gathering surveillance data.
In order to establish a global view on the overlay network, attacker nodes attempt to
become overlay neighbors to as many regular nodes as possible, thus learning their
geographic positions. The positions are then sent to a centralized attacker observer
who combines the input of all attacker nodes into one global view of the network.
The completeness of this view, in terms of the metrics introduced shortly, is verified
every minute.
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A central evaluation metric for evaluating the attack success in this scenario is the
percentage of nodes known to the adversary, referred to as the surveillance coverage.
Additionally, the distance disparity metric is introduced, which describes the distance
between the node position known to the adversary pos att and the actual position
of the node pos real at any given time. Given the distance (in km) between two
geographic locations P and Q as d(P, Q), the distance disparity disp for node X can
be calculated as:
disp(X) = d(pos att(X), pos real(X))
5.6.3.2 Results
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Figure 5.6 Surveillance coverage in relation to the number of attacker nodes.
Figure 5.6 depicts the average surveillance coverage measured using the unmodi-
fied OverDrive from [56], OverDrive with enabled obfuscation and OverDrive with
both enabled obfuscation and enabled location spoofing detection. Since the surveil-
lance coverage metric expresses the percentage of nodes for which the adversary
has location data but gives no information about that location data’s precision, the
impact of applying obfuscation and location spoofing detection is negligible. The
use of obfuscation even leads to an increase in surveillance coverage. This increase
can be explained through the fact that the parametrization used for the obfuscation-
enabled OverDrive (with nmax = 32) causes a larger number of nodes to be ac-
cepted as neighbors. Concerning the effect of location spoofing detection, it should
be noted that the blacklisting of nodes that fake their location is ineffective at re-
ducing surveillance coverage. First, blacklisting is only local, i.e., only nodes that
have failed to verify the proximity of an attacker node cease communication with
it. Second, nodes are removed from blacklists after a retention period to reduce the
impact of verification false negatives.
More importantly, a significant improvement can be noted concerning the precision
of the locations known by the adversary. Figure 5.7 depicts a cumulative distribu-
tion of measured distance disparity values, in a scenario with 100 attacker nodes and
averaged between simulation runs with identical parameters. The plot depicts the
distance disparity plotted against the fraction of all known nodes with a smaller or
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Figure 5.7 Cumulative distribution of the distance disparity of all nodes known to
an adversary with 100 attacker nodes.
equal distance disparity. It can be seen that with the unmodified OverDrive system,
the adversary knows the positions of 80% of the nodes known to him with a pre-
cision of less than 500 m. When using the obfuscation-based privacy enhancement,
the adversary reaches this accuracy with only about 30% of the nodes known to
him. With location spoofing detection, more than 54% of the node positions known
by the adversary are wrong by more than 1.5 km. Here, location spoofing detection
prevents nodes from sharing accurate location data with attacker nodes, as the latter
always fake their location. Note that these numbers also include nodes which hap-
pen to be near the center of their obfuscation region, thus yielding a low distance
disparity even at a large level of obfuscation. Especially in populated areas, the mea-
sured levels of uncertainty make the collected location data unusable for breaking
pseudonyms or determining the destinations of pseudonymized nodes. Thus, es-
tablishing a global view becomes significantly less useful for obtaining identifiable
location samples.
5.6.4 Identication of an individual target
This section presents the evaluation of the difficulty for an adversary to identify the
pseudonymized node belonging to a specific victim. The adversary is assumed to
have context knowledge about his victim in the form of the location at which it will
start its trip (cf. Section 5.3.4.2).
Instead of building a global view, the adversary’s approach here is to identify a
pseudonymized victim using context knowledge and only a minimal number of
attacker nodes.
5.6.4.1 Evaluation scenario and metrics
An evaluation scenario was constructed based on the attack described in Section 5.3.4.2.
A network with 10 000 regular OverDrive nodes was simulated. These nodes start
their trips from random locations as described in Section 5.5.1. An additional popu-
lation of 100 victim nodes was introduced, that behave like regular OverDrive nodes
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Figure 5.8 Attack success for identifying individual target.
but enter the network at wider intervals (randomly distributed around 2 minutes)
and at a common fixed victim start point. The start point is chosen randomly at the
beginning of each simulation and is known by the adversary.
The victim start point is the only information the adversary has in order to distin-
guish between victim nodes and regular nodes.
The adversary introduces a set of up to 10 stationary attacker nodes to the network,
that fake their location to random positions within a radius of 1 km around the vic-
tim start point. The attacker nodes continuously report new nodes they discover via
overlay maintenance traffic like neighbor discovery messages. Based on the reason-
ing in Section 5.3.4.2, if the adversary learns about a node for the first time while that
node is within 1 km of the victim start point, that node is marked as a potential vic-
tim. Based on this recognition approach, the victim recognition rate can be measured
- the ratio of victim nodes that were correctly identified by the adversary. As the
attacker success greatly depends on the choice of a victim start point, e.g., because it
influences the likelihood of regular nodes appearing in the vicinity of that point as
well, four times as many simulation runs were performed for this experiment, i.e., a
total of 16 per configuration.
5.6.4.2 Results
Figure 5.8 depicts the results for this experiment. The adversary achieves a victim
recognition rate of above 90% for the unmodified version of OverDrive, due to the
unrestricted sharing of accurate location data by victim nodes. The recognition rate
is not 100%, because victim nodes move away from their start position and are not
always immediately discovered by attacker nodes. When using the obfuscation-
enabled OverDrive system without location spoofing detection, the recognition rate
remains similarly high. This effect is due to the fact that the attacker nodes pretend
to be very close to the victim, which causes the victim node to share more accurate
location data. When using the location spoofing detection mechanism, the adver-
sary scores a much lower recognition rate of only about 20%. Here, nodes will not
share accurate location data with neighbors with whom the physical proximity has
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not been verified. Since attacker nodes are not physically in the area of the victim
start point, the adversary will receive location data with an average error of around
1 km (corresponding to an obfuscation region with an edge length of 4 km), which
greatly diminishes the success rate of state-of-the art identification attacks.
Location spoofing detection also hinders a subsequent tracking of victims. Mali-
cious neighbors in the innermost rings are blacklisted after multiple verification at-
tempts have failed. Nodes in the outer rings, on the other hand, have a lower chance
of remaining in the neighborhood due to the overlay maintenance logic. Thus, even
if an adversary achieves a higher recognition rate by using additional side chan-
nels (e.g., physical observation), the subsequent tracking via a follower attack is no
longer practical.
5.6.5 Impact on performance
Here, results are presented concerning the impact of the proposed extensions on
system performance.
5.6.5.1 Evaluation scenario and metrics
In line with [56], the main focus here is on two metrics: the consumed bandwidth
of the system measured in sent bytes per node, and the success rate for GUMs. For
measuring both in a realistic environment, a test application was running on each
node, that sends GUMs to randomly placed circular areas and keeps track of suc-
cessfully delivered messages. In line with [56], the GUM success rate SR GUM is
defined as the ratio between the number of messages that were successfully deliv-
ered msucc and the number of messages that could have been successfully delivered.
The number of messages sent to areas without any nodes (resulting in unavoidable
errors), denoted by munavoid, is not counted towards the GUM success rate. Thus,
with mtotal denoting the total number of messages sent,
SR GUM =
msucc
mtotal −munavoid
The presented results were gathered using simulations with 10 000 honest mobile
nodes. Again, four independent simulation runs were performed for each evaluated
configuration.
5.6.5.2 Results
Despite the fact that the modifications presented here are aimed at improving the
privacy characteristics of OverDrive, they also have a positive impact on perfor-
mance. Figure 5.9 depicts results measured for the OverDrive system presented
in [56] in comparison with values measured for the enhanced versions of the sys-
tem that were presented here. While the average success rate increases slightly, the
bandwidth consumption of the system drops significantly when obfuscation is en-
abled. With obfuscation, location updates to neighbors need to be sent significantly
less often, namely only on changes in the reported obfuscation region. Thus, nodes
5.7. Conclusion 117
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1000
By
te
s 
se
nt
 [B
/s] Unmodified OverDrive
Without location spoofing detection
With location spoofing detection
(a) bandwidth consumption
0.8
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
1
G
UM
 s
uc
ce
ss
 ra
te
(b) GUM success rate
Figure 5.9 Performance impact
are able to maintain more neighbors without causing an increase in bandwidth con-
sumption, while causing an increase in success rates due to a higher interconnection
in the overlay. The activation of location spoofing detection has a more moderate
impact on performance. The GUM success rate drops slightly, as proximate nodes
start sharing precise location data only after a successful location verification. The
bandwidth consumption increases by about 100 B/s. Compared to the sending of
location updates, the private proximity test protocol needs to be performed less fre-
quently, which explains its lower impact on bandwidth consumption.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduces key mechanisms needed for realizing privacy-preserving
long-distance geocast services that do not rely on individual service providers or
dedicated infrastructure support. Through the proposed location obfuscation con-
cept, the precision of location data shared with peers in a decentralized system
can be decreased with increasing distances to those entities, enforcing data locality.
Through the integration of location spoofing detection using GSM broadcast traffic,
the information gain for an adversary from faking his position is reduced signifi-
cantly. Both proposed techniques were designed as extensions to the overlay-based
geocast service OverDrive. Through simulation studies, their effect on location pri-
vacy was evaluated as well as their impact on performance. The results demonstrate
that even strong adversaries controlling hundreds of nodes are effectively prevented
from identifying and tracking users with an acceptable level of certainty.
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6. Sybil-resistant
pseudonymization and
pseudonym change
As an important challenge in the context of cooperative services, the preservation
of user privacy must be balanced with the protection against abuse from malicious
participants. The protection against sybil attacks, where adversaries create large
numbers of fake virtual identities (sybils), is especially relevant in this context. Sybil
attacks enhance the potential magnitude of abuse and enable malicious users to
avoid punishment (e.g., blacklisting) by switching to fresh identities. In this way,
sybil attacks can greatly reduce the utility of smart traffic services.
The issuing of pseudonyms to users is a common solution to the challenge of hid-
ing user identities while enabling access control and preventing sybil attacks. To
prevent pseudonym deanonymization through continuous observation and corre-
lation, frequent and unlinkable pseudonym changes must be enabled.
Existing approaches for realizing sybil-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym
change are either inherently dependent on trusted third parties (TTPs) or assume the
existence of significant resources at end-user devices. TTPs take the form of certifi-
cation authorities and pseudonym issuers and are used for enforcing issuing criteria
and ensuring the correct (sybil-free) distribution of pseudonyms. Upon compromise
of such a TTP, large-scale sybil attacks become possible and the trustworthiness of
issued pseudonyms is reduced. Centralized pseudonym issuers thus become at-
tractive targets for attacks, resulting in high operational costs for maintaining their
security. Additionally, the notion of universal trust anchors shared by all system
participants is questionable when considering mobile users in a globally intercon-
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nected world. In this chapter, the use of distributed append-only bulletin boards, as
provided by block chain networks, is explored as an alternative to centralized TTPs
for realizing sybil-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym change.
Related work is introduced first in Section 6.1. Following that, in Section 6.2, a novel
approach towards TTP-free and abuse-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym
change is proposed. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first proposed
pseudonymization and pseudonym change system that both prevents sybil attacks
and doesn’t rely on a TTP for ensuring the correctness and security of any of its op-
erations. BitNym, a specific instantiation of the approach that leverages the security
of the unmodified Bitcoin [84] network, is presented in Section 6.3. TTP-independent
mechanisms for realizing sybil-free initial access control (IAC), pseudonym validation
and pseudonym mixing are discussed and proposed. The sybil-resistance of BitNym
is then investigated in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 applies the analysis approach intro-
duced in Chapter 3 to identify potential privacy threats applying to BitNym and the
general approach. Suitable metrics are furthermore defined. Section 6.6 introduces
a proof-of-concept prototype of BitNym and a simulation-based study investigat-
ing pseudonym mixing and anonymity set development. Section 6.7 concludes this
chapter with a summary of contributions and results.
This chapter is largely based on [44].
6.1 Related Work
A discussion of existing approaches to preventing sybil attacks can be found in Sec-
tion 2.5.1. Here, a concise overview of such works is given, focusing on approaches
that realize pseudonymity and pseudonym change.
Approaches based on blind signatures [60] and zero-knowledge proofs [14] have
been proposed for enabling the centralized issuing of pseudonyms that are not iden-
tifiable by the pseudonym issuer (i.e., the TTP does not have to be trusted for pre-
serving the pseudonymity of users). Here, a TTP is also required for changing pseu-
donyms, as the old pseudonym must be marked invalid to prevent sybil attacks.
Alternative approaches like e-token dispensers [13] or the issuing of pools of pseu-
donyms with non-overlapping validity periods still inherently require a TTP for
enforcing issuing criteria and ensuring that the issuing of pseudonyms is sybil-free.
As an alternative to TTP-based access control, decentralized approaches for prevent-
ing sybil attacks were proposed. Proof-of-resource schemes like proof-of-work [10]
and CAPTCHA [113] are ineffective for systems involving end-users, as determined
adversaries can amass orders of magnitude more resources than regular users are
ready to spend for continuously using a system [69]. Approaches based on the so-
cial graph between users [112] are more promising. However, existing designs either
mandate the identifiability of users or are suited only for scenarios in which nearly
all users are continuously reachable and active within a large-scale peer-to-peer sys-
tem.
The usage of proof-of-burn, i.e., the provable destruction of a non-replenishable re-
source, was proposed for establishing sybil-free and trustworthy online identities [54]
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using the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [84]. However, resulting identities are linkable to
the originating users. Even if funded via anonymous sources, changing such iden-
tities is not possible without repeating the initial investment (which should be sig-
nificant in order to effectively limit attackers).
In [47], Garman et al. propose a scheme for realizing decentralized anonymous cre-
dentials. As in the proposal developed here, the authors build upon cryptocurrency
systems like Bitcoin for avoiding the dependence on TTPs. However, the proposal
is based on computation-intensive zero-knowledge proofs, making it less suited
for more resource-constrained devices, and requires a TTP during the initial setup
phase. The challenge of initially issuing pseudonyms in a TTP-independent and yet
sybil-resistant manner is discussed only marginally. Also, the blacklisting of mali-
cious users is not supported. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this chapter
introduces the first pseudonymization system that is fully decentralized, resistant
to sybil attacks and supports efficient and unlinkable pseudonym changes as well
as the blacklisting of malicious pseudonym holders.
6.2 General approach
In the following, the goals of the presented approach are introduced as well as tech-
nologies and assumptions that it is based on. A rough overview of the abstract
system is then given.
6.2.1 Goals and o ered functionality
An approach towards TTP-free and abuse-resistant pseudonymization and pseudo-
nym change is proposed. At its core, it aims at providing users with non-identifiable
pseudonyms that can be used in cooperative services of any kind. In addition to
smart traffic applications, i.e., in systems like OverDrive (cf. Chapter 5), the pro-
vided pseudonyms can be used for authenticating to online services, in peer-to-peer
systems and for protecting collaborative sensing in the Internet of Things. In accor-
dance to Pfitzmann et al. [94], and as in the remainder of this thesis, “pseudonym”
is understood here as an identifier of a subject other than one of the subject’s real
names. While hiding the identity of users, pseudonyms generated by the presented
approach should offer security against abuse, by effectively preventing sybil attacks
and supporting the punishment of malicious pseudonym holders. More specifically,
the goal is the realization of following properties:
1. Unlinkability of pseudonyms to user identities (i.e., non-identifiability) and to
other pseudonyms by the same user.
2. Limitation to a bounded number of simultaneously active pseudonyms per
user.
3. Authenticity of the linking between a pseudonym and its holder.
4. Possibility of unlinkable pseudonym changes.
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5. Possibility of blacklisting pseudonym holders.
6. Complete independence of trusted third parties (TTPs) for realizing any of the
preceding properties.
Properties 1 to 5 have been widely discussed in the literature [94] and are shared
by multiple existing and proposed systems. Their combination with property 6, on
the other hand, is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, unique to the presented
solution.
6.2.2 Decentralized append-only bulletin boards
The followed strategy for avoiding the reliance on TTPs is to build upon recent re-
sults on realizing distributed consistency in highly adversarial environments. More
specifically, the presented solutions are built upon decentralized cryptocurrency
systems like Bitcoin [84], in which a globally consistent transaction log is collabo-
ratively maintained within a network of non-colluding peers. Transactions are typi-
cally grouped in blocks, yielding a cryptographically secured block chain as the prac-
tical manifestation of the network consensus. In the scope of this thesis, Bitcoin-like
networks are therefore referred to as block chain networks. A high-level overview of
the block chain paradigm and its underlying trust assumptions was given in Sec-
tion 2.4.5. In the following, a few more technical details are elaborated.
Transactions in block chain networks are typically composed of:
• outputs - the number of funds exiting the transaction in combination with a
challenge that needs to be solved for spending them - and
• inputs - references to preceding outputs in combination with a valid solution.
Figure 6.1 depicts an example involving two linked Bitcoin transactions. The first
(tx 1) references two outputs of transactions that are not depicted, giving the whole
transaction a value of 119.9 millibitcoin (mBTC)1. In Bitcoin, transaction fees are typ-
ically payed for including a transaction on the block chain. These fees are harvested
by so called miners, peers that invest computational resources for maintaining the
security of the system. The fee included in a transaction is determined by subtract-
ing the sum of all inputs from the sum of all outputs. While the fee is, thus, chosen
by the transaction’s author, transactions with fees that are too low might not be in-
cluded in upcoming blocks or only with a significant delay.
In the depicted example, the whole value of tx 1 is concentrated in one output. The
challenge in this output is such that it can be solved only by the holder of a specific
cryptographic key (in this case Alice). Alice presents a solution in the first (and only)
input to the second transaction (tx 2). In this transaction, she allocates 50 millibitcoin
to an output encoded in such a way that only Bob can present a correct solution. In
effect, the 50 millibitcoin are transferred to Bob. The remaining value, or change
money, is encoded in the second output of tx 2. This output is encoded so that only
Alice can present a solution. In effect, the change is transferred back to Alice.
10.1199 bitcoin (BTC).
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Figure 6.1 Example transaction chain. Typical payment scenario.
Typically, outputs contain the public part of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair
(respectively a hash thereof) and can be spent upon proving the possession of the
corresponding secret key2. In addition, the inclusion of arbitrary data in transac-
tions is possible. At the very least, without dedicated support from the underlying
block chain protocol, transaction outputs can be used for this purpose (possibly ren-
dering the funds allocated to the output unspendable). In this spirit, and despite the
original design goal of facilitating online payments, the block chain paradigm has
been previously adapted for a wide variety of different applications. Using colored
coins [99], for example, the ownership of arbitrary assets can be encoded and trans-
ferred by marking (coloring) cryptocurrency units. Other examples include name
services3, anonymous credentials [47] and the timestamping of cryptographic com-
mitments [24]. In the context of this trend, it can be observed that block chain
networks effectively realize general-purpose, decentralized append-only bulletin
boards.
Despite their independence of TTPs, block chain networks are highly resilient to ma-
licious tampering. This property is mainly due to the extensive use of cryptography
for securing ownership and the transfer of funds as well as dedicated mechanisms
for ensuring the append-only feature of the transaction log in the face of sybil at-
tacks. Sybil attacks are prevented by tying the levels of influence individual peers
are able to exert on the block chain to the possession of limited resources. In Bitcoin,
for example, computing power in the form of extensive proofs of work is required
for adding new blocks to the block chain (also referred to as mining)4. An adversary
must control more computing resources than the remainder of the network in order
2In Bitcoin, this is realized via the pay-to-pubkey-hash output type depicted in Figure 6.1.
3https://namecoin.info/
4Note that this is different from creating a new transaction. Transactions are simply broadcast to
the network. Valid transactions are then later included in blocks.
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to cause significant disturbances. In the case of Bitcoin, this requires a significant
investment.
The general approach outlined here can be applied to any type of block chain net-
work. Still, for the remainder of this chapter, the focus is on Bitcoin for developing a
specific design that is immediately deployable. By layering on top of the Bitcoin net-
work, the high level of security stemming from its large population of non-colluding
mining peers can be leveraged.
6.2.3 Assumptions and adversary model
It is assumed that the cryptographic building blocks used in the underlying block
chain network are secure. For Bitcoin, this includes, most prominently, SHA-256
and ECDSA with the secp256k1 curve. It is also assumed that users are able to gen-
erate secure asymmetric key pairs and maintain the confidentiality of their secret
keys. It is also assumed that users can form communication links to services and
between each other without leaking identifying information like IP addresses. This
assumption can be realized in practice by building upon anonymous communica-
tion services like Tor and PTP (cf. Section 2.6.2).
Concerning the assumed adversary model, the focus is on adversaries that attempt
to either disrupt the pseudonymization system, launch sybil attacks or link pseudo-
nyms to user identities. Adversaries are considered that can observe and modify all
communications but are unable to identify pseudonym holders based on commu-
nication metadata, i.e., are effectively stopped by the used anonymous communica-
tion services. Adversaries might collude with (or compromise) individual users, in
which case that users’ pseudonyms are known to them, but with no more than 50%
of the user population. Additionally, it is assumed that adversaries cannot attack the
underlying block chain network, disturbing its functionality as an append-only bul-
letin board. In the case of Bitcoin, for example, it is assumed that no adversary can
control more than 50% of the computing resources (“hash power”) in the network.
6.2.4 Overview
The presented pseudonymization and pseudonym change approach is based on
three core building blocks: genesis pseudonym creation, pseudonym change and pseu-
donym validation and use. These building blocks and the interplay between them is
depicted in Figure 6.2. The building blocks directly address the desired properties
discussed in Section 6.2.1. A central challenge that is tackled is to ensure the re-
sistance to sybil attacks (property 2) in all three building blocks while remaining
independent of TTPs (property 6).
At the core of the presented approach, pseudonyms are encoded in the outputs of
transactions. Ideally, cryptocurrency addresses from the underlying block chain net-
work can be reused. For example, if Bitcoin is used, pseudonyms can be chosen to
correspond to Bitcoin addresses and be represented by the hash of an ECDSA pub-
lic key. Users can authenticate their holding of a pseudonym in the same way they
would prove their ownership of the corresponding address (satisfying property 3).
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Figure 6.2 Overview of presented pseudonymization and pseudonym change ap-
proach.
The validity of a pseudonym, however, depends on additional factors. A pseudo-
nym is only valid if the output it is encoded in exists on the block chain and hasn’t
been spent. Additionally, a chain of transactions leading from the output to a valid
genesis pseudonym transaction (GPTx) must be provided. The latter is a special trans-
action encoding a proof that a predefined set of issuing criteria has been met by a
user. A genesis pseudonym is included in one of the outputs of a GPTx and might, de-
pending on the used access control approach, not be completely unlinkable to a user
identity. Thus, for ensuring the unlinkability of pseudonyms and allowing unlink-
able pseudonym changes (satisfying properties 1 and 4), state of the art techniques
for anonymizing cryptocurrency transactions are adapted for realizing pseudonym
mixing. After a successful mix involving several pseudonym holders, a user will
likely begin using a different GPTx for proving his current pseudonym’s validity.
For ensuring that pseudonym changes do not enable sybil attacks, unambiguous
transaction chaining rules are defined so that each GPTx can be used for validating
only one currently active pseudonym.
6.3 BitNym
This section introduces BitNym, a specific design of TTP-free and sybil-resistant
pseudonymization and pseudonym change based on the Bitcoin network. The dis-
cussed techniques are, in principle, directly applicable to other block chain net-
works. In accordance to 6.2.4, BitNym is divided into the building blocks genesis
pseudonym creation, pseudonym validation and use and pseudonym change. The possibil-
ity for blacklisting pseudonym holders based on malicious behavior is discussed as
well.
6.3.1 Genesis pseudonym creation
The number of genesis pseudonyms a user has created forms the upper bound for
the number of pseudonyms he is able to simultaneously hold. Thus, initial access
control (IAC) needs to be performed in the course of genesis pseudonym creation, to
ensure that only legitimate users receive pseudonyms and that sybil attacks can be
prevented. In the following, technical details regarding the realization of GPTxes in
BitNym are introduced, followed by a discussion of approaches for handling IAC.
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6.3.1.1 Genesis pseudonym transaction
As noted in Section 6.2.2, transactions in Bitcoin are composed of one or more inputs
and one or more outputs. For the GPTx, inputs come from regular Bitcoin transac-
tions (i.e., transaction without any special semantic in the context of BitNym). These
are required for funding - without the provision of transaction fees, transactions can-
not be written to the block chain. As the genesis pseudonym can be changed imme-
diately after creation, funds are not required to come from an anonymous source.
The GPTx is required to contain two special outputs: the marker output and the pseu-
donym output. The outputs are defined by their ordering within the transaction: the
first output is the marker output and the second the pseudonym output. GPTxes
may also have additional outputs, but these are ignored in the context of BitNym.
The marker output is provably unspendable (any funds allocated to it are lost) and
has the capacity for holding 40 bytes of arbitrary data. These qualities are realized by
using an OP_RETURN code in the beginning of the output script5. Similar marker
outputs are also used in the colored coin approach. The marker outputs in BitNym
contain a magic number in the first two bytes (that is the same for all GPTxes), for
easing the detection of GPTxes. The remaining 38 bytes are used for storing a proof
that the IAC criteria have been met.
The pseudonym output is based on the pay-to-pubkey-hash pattern, i.e., it is a reg-
ular output used for funding a Bitcoin address. The destination Bitcoin address
is generated by the user (who then also holds the corresponding private key) and
forms the genesis pseudonym. The amount of bitcoin allocated to the pseudonym
output determines the value of the genesis pseudonym. The value of a pseudonym
roughly determines the number of pseudonym changes its holder can perform with-
out recharging it with additional funds. An example GPTx is depicted in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3 Example genesis pseudonym transaction (GPTx).
5Bitcoin uses a scripting system for encoding the requirements for spending an output.
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6.3.1.2 Initial access control
The initial access control (IAC) building block defines the criteria based on which the
validity of a GPTx is determined. In a sense, it provides a certification service for
genesis pseudonyms. Thus, as a naive solution, it can be realized using a TTP that
verifies if a user meets some predefined issuing criteria (e.g., that he can present an
identity document and that he hasn’t received a genesis pseudonym before). Upon
verification, the TTP can provide a cryptographically signed validity acknowledge-
ment that the user can include in the marker output of his GPTx.
One of the central advantages of the pseudonymization approach presented in this
chapter is that a dependence on a TTP is not inherently given. In the following,
several approaches for realizing IAC without a TTP are discussed that are compati-
ble with BitNym. The approaches focus primarily on ensuring that sybil attacks are
prevented, i.e., that every human user is able to create only a bounded number of
valid genesis pseudonyms. Following approaches are possible:
• Proof-of-work. Users can be required to solve a computational puzzle (as in [10]
or [4]) for producing a valid GPTx. While easy to realize, the security of this ap-
proach is questionable. Specifically, regular users often feature both restricted
computational resources and a low time budget while adversaries can rent
or buy specialized hardware and leave it running for longer periods of time.
Thus, the puzzle difficulty will likely be either too high, deterring honest users
and slowing adoption, or too easy, making large-scale sybil attacks possible for
adversaries with moderate computational resources.
• Proof-of-burn. A related approach to proof-of-work is the use of proof-of-burn,
i.e., the provable destruction of valuable resources. In the context of Bitcoin,
proof-of-burn is implemented by provably rendering a certain amount of funds
unusable for future transactions [54]. In BitNym, proof-of-burn can be realized
by allocating a certain amount of Bitcoin to the marker output of the GPTx
(cf. Figure 6.3). In contrast to proof-of-work, proof-of-burn enables the in-
stant creation of genesis pseudonyms and adversaries are unable to leverage
economy of scale effects: every genesis pseudonym “costs” the same for every-
body. Large-scale sybil attacks are thus rendered unattractive even with small
proof-of-burn requirements. Additionally, spending “money” for registering
an online identity may cause users to reconsider malicious actions if blacklist-
ing is possible [54]. Thus, while not perfect (participation rights and influence
become tied to economic wellbeing), proof-of-burn is a viable option for IAC
and is also used in the proof-of-concept prototype presented in this chapter.
• Social graph-based IAC. A third avenue for exploration is to leverage social con-
nections for deciding about the trustworthiness of new users and preventing
sybil attacks. For example, genesis pseudonyms can be considered valid only
if backed by sufficient “is not a sybil” acknowledgements from established
users. Additionally, such acknowledgements can be issued only to users ful-
filling some set of predefined access criteria that are verified by established
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users (e.g., access might be restricted to members of a given organization).
Acknowledgements can be issued pseudonymously, therefore not leaking any
social graph information. For ensuring that a small group of users cannot in-
troduce an arbitrary number of sybils, a high threshold must be chosen for
the number of required acknowledgements. This requirement can quickly be-
come unpractical; honest users might not have sufficient social contacts. Thus,
a preselection mechanism is necessary. The use of a delay-tolerant darknet is en-
visioned for facilitating this. In a darknet, only trusted users (e.g., users with
whom a social connection exists) are accepted as peers and only direct neigh-
bors are aware of each other’s identities. In this way, the social relationships
between users can remain hidden.
The darknet can be used by new users to convince a large number of existing
users of their own non-sybilness, collecting acknowledgements from them. As
a more specific proposal, individual darknet links can be used only a bounded
number of times for forwarding queries, therefore limiting the impact of sybil
clusters and ensuring that the preselection mechanism is in itself sybil-free. Ex-
isting results on realizing sybil-resistant DHTs by leveraging the social graph
between users (e.g., [81]) hint at the potential feasibility of this idea.
6.3.2 Pseudonym validation and use
In order for a user to be able to use a pseudonym, he must prove that:
1. He is the holder of the pseudonym.
2. The pseudonym is valid.
For 1, it is sufficient to use the pseudonym as an identity certificate, i.e., using the
corresponding private key for signing messages. For 2, the user needs to construct
a proof based on a valid GPTx and a transaction in which the Bitcoin address cor-
responding to the pseudonym has received funds. For ensuring the unlinkability
of pseudonyms to user identities, validity proofs shouldn’t disclose any additional
information about a pseudonym holder other than the fact that his pseudonym is
valid. A specific approach for building such proofs is introduced in the following.
6.3.2.1 Validation path
In Bitcoin, an input is always linked to one specific output of a preceding transac-
tion. In this way, transactions are linked. By defining a mapping between the inputs
and outputs within the same transaction, a path in the transaction graph can be de-
fined. In BitNym, such a mapping if defined via the ordering of inputs and outputs,
i.e., via the input and output indices. The i’th output is mapped to the i’th input
of the same transaction. The resulting path is referred to as the validation path. An
example validation path is depicted in Figure 6.4. The pseudonym encoded in the
marked pseudonym output is validated using a path containing two mix transac-
tions (mix tx 1 and 2) and a GPTx created by Alice. However, the pseudonym is
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not necessarily held by Alice6. As long the marked pseudonym output hasn’t been
spent in a subsequent transaction, the pseudonym encoded in it remains valid.
Figure 6.4 GPTx created by Alice and validation path involving that transaction.
The validated pseudonym is not necessarily held by Alice.
6.3.2.2 Constructing a proof
Pseudonyms holders must be able to present a validation path from their current
pseudonym to a valid genesis pseudonym. More specifically, a proof message must
be constructed that includes:
• A transaction with an output containing the pseudonym.
• A GPTx.
• A list of transactions that form a valid validation path between the output
containing the pseudonym and the provided GPTx.
Depending on the scenario, the size of proof messages can be greatly reduced by
including only the address of the output (i.e., a transaction hash in combination
with an output index) that contains the pseudonym to be validated. A recipient
with efficient reading access to the block chain (e.g., a full Bitcoin node) can then
obtain the necessary transactions and form the validation path himself.
6.3.2.3 Verifying a proof
The recipient of a proof message needs to verify the following criteria:
1. The provided transactions form a valid validation path.
2. The transaction containing the pseudonym is included in the block chain.
6The purpose of mix transactions is to maintain the unlinkability of pseudonyms across changes
and in this way prevent an unambiguous linking of pseudonyms to user identities (which could be
inferred from GPTxes). Pseudonym mixing is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3.
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3. The output containing the pseudonym is unspent, i.e., has not been used in a
follow-up transaction.
4. The provided GPTx is valid.
Criteria 2 and 3 require reading access to the block chain. For clients with con-
strained resources, that cannot form full nodes in the Bitcoin network, such access
can be provided by querying full nodes (the de facto standard operating mode of
end-user Bitcoin clients). Note that the verification of criteria 1 and 2 is sufficient for
ensuring that all transactions in the proof message are included in the block chain.
Transaction inputs include cryptographic hashes of preceding transactions, so that
no fake validation path starting from a transaction on the block chain can be con-
structed (under the assumption of a secure hash function). The verification of the
GPTx (criterion 4) depends on the used IAC mechanism. When using proof-of-burn,
for example, the recipient needs to verify that the amount of bitcoin allocated to the
marker output of the GPTx meets a previously established burn requirement.
6.3.3 Pseudonym change
As genesis pseudonyms might be identifiable (e.g., due to the funds used for cre-
ating them), unlinkable pseudonym changes are necessary for ensuring that pseu-
donyms hide the identities of their holders. Additionally, pseudonym changes help
with the prevention of correlation attacks where pseudonyms are broken following
longer periods of observation.
6.3.3.1 Simple change and Bitcoin mixing
As discussed previously, each valid pseudonym is encoded in an output of a trans-
action on the block chain. Changing a pseudonym involves creating a new trans-
action that spends that output. However, consecutive transactions on the Bitcoin
block chain are, by design, completely linkable to each other. Thus, for ensuring
the unlinkability between old and new pseudonyms, pseudonym change transac-
tions must be created in a coordinated fashion so that an external observer cannot
determine if two pseudonyms linked on the block chain are also held by the same
user.
This challenge is tightly related to the anonymization, or mixing, of Bitcoin funds,
which has already been tackled in a wide range of works [6, 8, 9, 77, 100]. While the
strategy used here is to build upon such works, existing approaches cannot be lever-
aged directly. First, the unlinkable payment of transaction fees is non-trivial when
considering the double role of transaction outputs as encoders of pseudonyms and
holders of funds. Second, it must be ensured that only users with valid pseudonyms
are able to contribute to mixes and that no entity is able to “steal” access rights, e.g.,
by manipulating the input and output ordering of formed transactions.
6.3.3.2 Pseudonym mixing protocol
In the following, a specific pseudonym mixing protocol is proposed that is based
on the Bitcoin mixing approach CoinShuffle [100]. In CoinShuffle, groups of users
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collaboratively form mix transactions to which every user contributes inputs and
outputs. The mapping between inputs and outputs is randomized so that both ex-
ternal adversaries and mix group members (for mix groups with 3 or more non-
colluding members) cannot conclusive determine who provided funds to which
output. In addition to being fully decentralized, CoinShuffle has the benefit of being
fully compatible with Bitcoin, requiring only standard output scripts. In compari-
son to commitment-based approaches like Xim [8], CoinShuffle mixes are faster and
cheaper, as only one transaction per mix needs to be written to the block chain. By
not relying on computation-intensive cryptographic primitives (unlike, for example,
Zerocash [6]), the CoinShuffle approach is, furthermore, better suited in scenarios
with resource-constrained user devices.
The presented pseudonym mixing protocol is divided into four phases that are dis-
cussed in the following:
1. Discovery of mixing partners. For creating a meaningful mix transaction, at least
one additional pseudonym holder is required that also wishes to change his
pseudonym. Different approaches are possible for discovering such mixing
partners. A generic one involves the establishment of a block chain-based
broadcast channel, using OP_RETURN outputs to mark transactions belong-
ing to the channel and include arbitrary announcement data. Pseudonym
holders monitor the broadcast channel and either respond to an existing an-
nouncement or place a new one themselves. A similar approach to mixing
partner discovery is used in [8].
Alternatively, in some scenarios, suitable mixing partners can be found via
side channels. In peer-to-peer systems, for example, pseudonym holders are
typically already aware of a number of other participants. In a smart traffic
context, nearby vehicles can be discovered using short-range radio beacons.
Additionally, in some scenarios, side channels that might weaken the unlink-
ability of pseudonym mixing must be taken into account. In smart traffic,
for example, mixing partners should be spatially close to each other to avoid
position-based linking (cf. Section 2.3.4).
2. Verification of mixing partners. All members of a mix group must prove the
validity of their respective pseudonyms to each other as described in Sec-
tion 6.3.2. As an additional benefit, this reduces the impact of uncooperative
mix group members that block subsequent protocol steps (a form of denial-
of-service attack), as malicious pseudonym holders face the danger of being
blacklisted (blacklisting is discussed in Section 6.3.4).
3. Creation of a mix transaction. This step is largely based on the CoinShuffle pro-
tocol [100]. The participants within a mix group exchange inputs and outputs
(containing freshly generated Bitcoin addresses), out of which one transaction
is cooperatively formed. Every participant verifies if his own inputs and out-
puts are correctly included in the resulting transaction and, if so, provides the
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necessary signature for his inputs. The exchange of inputs, outputs and signa-
tures is performed anonymously using techniques reminiscent to decryption
mix nets (cf. Section 2.4.6). Consequently, given a group size larger than 2 and
assuming that group members do not collude, no link between inputs and
outputs can be established.
As an important modification to CoinShuffle, a different mechanism is used for
distributing the value of inputs and paying transaction fees. Every participant
is allowed to contribute only one output to the resulting transaction. The value
of outputs is not chosen freely by mix group members, ensuring that they
remain with a similar amount of bitcoins after the mix, but divided equally
between all outputs. In this way, the value-based linking between inputs and
outputs is prevented. The value v used for all outputs is equal to the total value
available after the payment of the transaction fee f divided by the number of
participants m. With vi denoting the value associated to the input with index
i, we arrive at the following formula:
v =
(∑mi=0 vi)− f
m
The resulting mix transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin network. Once it has
been included in the block chain, the old pseudonyms become invalid and the
new ones (encoded in the outputs of the mix transaction) valid.
4. Construction of new proofs. Once all pseudonyms are exchanged, each partic-
ipant needs to construct a proof for his new pseudonym. The proofs for all
old pseudonyms participating in the mix have already been exchanged dur-
ing the verification of mixing partners. According to the validation path logic
introduced in Section 6.3.2, every new proof consists of one of these old proofs
in combination with the currently formed transaction. Which proof should be
used is determined by the index of the output containing a user’s new pseu-
donym - if it has the index i, the proof starting with the output referenced in
the i’th input of the transaction is used. It is a common case that users use a
different genesis pseudonym for validation after each mix.
Figure 6.5 depicts an example of such a path change. The holder of the marked
pseudonym in the mix transaction mix tx 2 participates in mix tx 4. He con-
tributes input 2 and output 1 to that transaction. Thus, his new pseudonym
has an entirely different validation path with a different GPTx.
6.3.3.3 Parametrization of mixing protocol
Two configurable parameters influence the achievable anonymity set growth per
mix, the possible number of mixes for a given pseudonym value and the speed of
pseudonym changes. These are the desired mix group size and the acceptable differ-
ence to the pseudonym values of other mix group members. Larger mix groups lead
to higher anonymity gains per mix. However, larger minimum mix group sizes
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Figure 6.5 Validation path change after mix.
also lead to longer waiting times until a group has been formed. A low acceptable
difference leads to a lower number of possible mixing partners and, therefore, also
increases waiting times. Note that there is no reason to refuse mixing with a pseudo-
nym whose value is higher than one’s own, as this would result in a value gain. In
Section 6.6, the impact of different mix group sizes and acceptable difference values
on anonymity, costs and communication overhead is investigated in detail.
Concerning the speed of pseudonym changes, instant changes would be ideal. How-
ever, coordination with other users is necessary and mix transactions must be writ-
ten to the block chain. These conditions lead to unavoidable waiting times. An
approach for enabling fast pseudonym changes is to allow each user to simultane-
ously hold two or more pseudonyms. If, for example, GPTxes spawn two instead of
one pseudonym, one pseudonym can be actively used while the pseudonym mix-
ing protocol is conducted opportunistically using the other. Once a change is ap-
propriate (e.g., for scenario-specific reasons like passing a mix zone), the roles of the
pseudonyms can be swapped.
6.3.4 Blacklisting
In many scenarios, it is necessary for users to be punishable upon malicious behav-
ior. Even in the context of BitNym itself, it is beneficial if participants that deliber-
ately disrupt the pseudonym mixing protocol can be blacklisted for a certain time.
Blacklisting is easily supported by BitNym. Pseudonyms can be publicly marked
as malicious, e.g., using a block chain-based broadcast channel as in [8]. Blacklisted
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pseudonyms will fail the pseudonym validation step. Additionally, once a pseudo-
nym is blacklisted, other participants will refuse to cooperate with it in the scope
of pseudonym mixes. Thus, the pseudonym holder is permanently blacklisted, re-
spectively needs to create a new genesis pseudonym (which, dependent on the used
IAC mechanism, implies high costs or is even impossible).
Open challenges with blacklisting include ensuring that the blacklisting mechanism
cannot be used for maliciously censoring users. A voting-based approach is a pos-
sible solution for making correct blacklisting decisions without a TTP. For example,
pseudonyms might need to be reported a certain number of times before being con-
sidered malicious. By layering upon BitNym, it can be assumed that participating
pseudonymous users are non-sybil and not actively colluding with malicious intent.
Thus, fair voting and consensus procedures become possible. If a darknet is main-
tained for social graph-based IAC (cf. Section 6.3.1.2), it can be applied for speeding
up the collection of votes and making it harder for malicious users to remain unpun-
ished. Specifically, victims can recruit voters from their social circle by distributing
proofs of a malicious user’s misbehavior.
It must also be ensured that punishment cannot be evaded by carefully timing pseu-
donym changes. Lock times per pseudonym might need to be enforced, during
which no changes are possible.
6.4 Sybil-resistance analysis
This section analyses whether BitNym effectively prevents sybil attacks. It is proven
that for a given set of genesis pseudonyms G and any given time, the set of valid
pseudonyms P is such that |P| ≤ |G|. If |P| ≤ |G|, the sybil-resistance of BitNym
depends on the sybil-resistance of the used IAC mechanism (e.g., proof-of-burn).
Only one assumption is required: that, at any given time, the Bitcoin block chain
contains only valid Bitcoin transactions. More specifically, it must be guaranteed
that transaction outputs can be spent only once and that transaction inputs can ref-
erence only one output. This assumption reflects the reality of the Bitcoin network.
Blocks containing invalid transactions are ignored by correctly functioning clients.
Attempting the actual proof that |P| ≤ |G|, we now assume that a sybil attack is
possible and |P| > |G|.
In order for a pseudonym p to be valid, i.e., in order for it to hold that p ∈ P, p
must be encoded in an unspent transaction output on the Bitcoin block chain. Ad-
ditionally, a validation path path(p) (based on the Bitcoin transaction graph) must
be presented that leads to a genesis pseudonym g, or:
∀p ∈ P ∃g ∈ G : g ∈ path(p)
If |P| > |G|, at least two currently valid pseudonyms must exist that share the same
genesis pseudonym for validation, or:
∃p1, p2 ∈ P, p1 6= p2 : |path(p1) ∩ path(p2) ∩ G| ≥ 1
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Let g ∈ G be the genesis pseudonym for which it holds that g ∈ path(p1) and
g ∈ path(p2). Validation paths are formed deterministically by linking, within
transactions, each input to the output with the same index in the transaction, and,
between transactions, each output to the input that spends it (cf. Section 6.3.2.1).
Therefore, only one possible path through g exists and only one output in this path
can be unspent at any given time. So, if path(p1) ⊂ path(p2), the output in which
p1 is encoded must have been spent (recall that p1 6= p2). Therefore, p1 is not a valid
pseudonym (p1 /∈ P), which contradicts its original definition. Analogous reasoning
applies for the case that path(p2) ⊂ path(p1). It follows that |P| > |G| is wrong and,
therefore, |P| ≤ |G|.
Assuming a sybil-proof IAC mechanism and a correctly functioning Bitcoin net-
work, BitNym is therefore sybil-resistant.
6.5 Privacy analysis
A privacy analysis of BitNym is conducted in the following, leaning on the approach
outlined in Chapter 3. The assumed system model and adversary capabilities are
first clarified. Several analysis steps are then applied. Based on the privacy threats
addressed through them, the steps are separated into two groups:
1. Detection and disclosure.
2. Linking and identification.
6.5.1 System and adversary model
A large population of honest users is assumed, for which following assumptions
apply:
• The majority of human users is honest and not colluding with malicious intent
(i.e., with the adversary). This assumption reflects the main trust assumption
behind cooperative services (cf. Section 2.4.1).
• Each user possesses a complete, authentic and up-to-date view over the Bit-
coin block chain. It is abstracted away from the fact that users might (due
to resource constraints) use a simple payments verification (SPV) approach for
interfacing with the block chain instead of maintaining a full Bitcoin node.
• Users can broadcast new transactions to the Bitcoin network. New transac-
tions are, as long as a modest customary fee is provided, always quickly in-
cluded in newly mined blocks (and, in this way, published on the block chain).
• Users are able to communicate pseudonymously with each other, using, e.g.,
PTP (cf. Section 2.6.2). The adversary cannot deanonymize such communica-
tion or compromise its confidentiality, integrity or authenticity.
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• Each user has created at least one genesis pseudonym and engages in periodic
pseudonym changes. Concerning the value used for creating genesis pseudo-
nyms and the implication of value loss on privacy properties, a further discus-
sion is conducted in Section 6.5.3.3.
• A sybil-proof IAC mechanism is used. Consequently, all currently active pseu-
donyms are assumed to be sybil-free. In effect, the number of currently active
pseudonyms that the adversary is able to control is limited by the number of
users with which he colludes.
The assumptions from Section 6.2.3 apply. This includes the assumption that adver-
saries can’t tamper with the state of the Bitcoin block chain in a malicious way, i.e.,
that the security of Bitcoin is guaranteed. The Bitcoin network is assumed to operate
correctly at all times.
Unlike in other parts of this thesis, the goal of the adversary in this chapter is not
the collection of identifiable location samples, as no location samples are generated
at all by the considered system. Location samples might, however, be shared under
pseudonyms realized through BitNym. Therefore, the main goal of the adversary
here is to break pseudonyms, i.e., discover the identity of their holders. Following
capabilities are assumed for the adversary in the following:
• He has full reading access to the Bitcoin block chain (which is public).
• He can control a small number of currently active pseudonyms.
• He can break all genesis pseudonyms, i.e., identify all published GPTxes7.
6.5.2 Detection and disclosure
Starting with the actual analysis, the following questions are considered in the scope
of this section:
1. What knowledge does the adversary gain from passive observation during nor-
mal operation?
2. What actions are possible for the adversary within the system model?
3. Do the actions possible for the adversary enable an increasing of his knowledge
and if yes - in what way?
6.5.2.1 Knowledge from passive observation
The adversary is aware of all transactions on the Bitcoin block chain. Therefore, he
knows both all currently active pseudonyms and the transaction graph (or pseu-
donym changing graph) that led up to them. As defined in the adversary model,
7Depending on the used IAC mechanism, this assumption may only hold for adversaries with sig-
nificant additional knowledge. Bitcoin addresses are pseudonymous and Bitcoin transactions there-
fore difficult to link to user identities.
6.5. Privacy analysis 137
he is additionally aware of the identities behind all GPTxes on the block chain. He
might also be aware of the identities behind other pseudonyms, i.e., due to addi-
tional context knowledge. In Section 6.6.2, a simulation study is presented that aims
at generating realistic changing graphs that can be used for the subsequent analysis.
Assuming that the small number of identities that the adversary can control act like
regular users, they will engage in pseudonym mixing with others. For mixes in
which some of the participating pseudonyms collude with the adversary, he has
an information gain compared to observing only the transaction graph. Namely,
by being able to identify some of the outputs of such transactions, he lowers the
amount of uncertainty caused by the mix. However, as the adversary is able to
control only very few active pseudonyms, the overall information gain (taking into
account all mix transactions) is expected to be insignificant and is therefore ignored
in the following.
6.5.2.2 Possible actions
The adversary can interact with the block chain, e.g., write arbitrary valid transac-
tions to it. However, only valid pseudonym transactions and GPTxes are considered
by regular users. The posting of other types of transactions on the block chain has
no impact exceeding that of regular operation and is ignored in the following.
The adversary can communicate with pseudonymous users, attempting to identify
them using a side channel. However, this exceeds the context considered in this
chapter and is not considered further.
The adversary can attempt to attack the functionality of the mechanism used for
discovering mixing partners. However, this won’t be considered further, as this
discovery mechanism is scenario-specific and not fully specified in the scope of this
chapter. In a similar context, the adversary can attempt a targeted attack on a specific
pseudonym. He can attempt to enter the mix groups of this pseudonym, therefore
lowering the entropy of its mixing. This attack vector too depends on the employed
discovery mechanism for mixing partners. If mixing partners are chosen randomly
and no sybil attack is possible, an infiltration of mix groups will be difficult. An ap-
proach like [38] can additionally be used for preventing attacks on the randomness
of mixing partner selection.
Lastly, the adversary can attempt a denial-of-service attack on the pseudonym mix-
ing protocol, preventing users from effectively changing their pseudonyms. How-
ever, deliberate disturbances can be detected by participating users, leading to a
blacklisting recommendation for the involved pseudonyms. Additionally, the im-
pact of such an attack will likely be severely restricted by the number of active
pseudonyms available to the adversary.
6.5.2.3 Increasing knowledge
As was identified in the previous section, none of the actions that exceed regular
operation and are possible within the considered system model and scope, are ex-
pected to have any significant impact and, hence, lead to notable benefits for the
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adversary. Consequently, no possibilities for increasing the adversary’s knowledge
through additional actions must be considered further.
6.5.3 Linking and identication
Based on the previous analysis, the adversary is aware of the complete pseudo-
nym changing graph and knows the identities behind all GPTxes8. The question
approached in this section is now: what can he learn from that data? And, more
specifically: how well suited is that data for achieving the goal of identifying indi-
vidual pseudonyms? Based on the approach outlined in Section 3.3, the following
possibilities should be considered in this context:
1. Direct identification.
2. Linkability.
3. Identification attacks based on linked data.
Approach 1 is only possible for GPTxes and if no pseudonym mixing is applied dur-
ing pseudonym changes (which would allow the non-ambiguous linking of pseu-
donyms and GPTxes). Bitcoin transactions in general and pseudonym transactions
in specific do not contain any form of identifiable data. Approach 3 is not consid-
ered, as it is targeted at scenarios in which richer data (e.g., location samples) is
included in considered data items, or in cases where additional context knowledge
is assumed.
In the following, the focus is on discussing linkability. More precisely, the feasibility
of linking pseudonyms to GPTxes (which, within the assumed adversary model, im-
plies their identification) is considered. Suitable metrics for this threat are worked
out. Additionally, the impact of transaction fees and pseudonym funding is dis-
cussed.
The metrics introduced here were used in a series of simulation studies (described
in Section 6.6.2) that provide empirical insights about the linking threat.
6.5.3.1 Anonymity metrics
A metric is required for quantifying the degree to which pseudonyms in BitNym
are unlinkable to GPTxes created by their holders. Such a metric can be constructed
based on the notion of anonymity as defined by Pfitzmann et al. [94], i.e., the indis-
tinguishability within a set of subjects - the anonymity set. The size of the anonymity
set of a user is a common metric for the non-identifiability of his pseudonym. In the
following, it is referred to simply as anonymity.
In the context of BitNym, different approaches for defining anonymity are possible
that depend on the assumed goals of the adversary. When considering backward
8For analysis, and without loss of generality, genesis pseudonyms act as placeholders for any
pseudonym that is already identifiable by the adversary (e.g., via additional knowledge).
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Figure 6.6 Backward anonymity increase for creator of genesis pseudonym GP 1.
anonymity, the adversary aims at determining which genesis pseudonym was previ-
ously held by the holder of a pseudonym. A somewhat opposite approach, forward
anonymity, assumes an adversary that, given a specific inactive pseudonym (e.g.,
a genesis pseudonym), wishes to determine the pseudonyms which that pseudo-
nym’s holder held afterwards. Based on the adversary goal of identifying pseudo-
nym holders, the focus here is on backward anonymity. Most of the subsequent
analysis applies for forward anonymity as well.
6.5.3.2 Backward anonymity
The backward anonymity set of a pseudonym is the set of genesis pseudonyms that
could have been created by that pseudonym’s holder. Consequently, the backward
anonymity of a pseudonym is the size of that set. As was discussed previously, the
adversary is assumed to know the identities behind all genesis pseudonyms. There-
fore, by measuring backward anonymity, the identifiability of pseudonyms is quan-
tified.
Genesis pseudonyms have a backward anonymity of 1. It is usually increased fol-
lowing pseudonym mixes, as the backward anonymity set after a mix is the union
of all anonymity sets of the participating pseudonyms. Given a pseudonym mix
transaction with the set of participating pseudonyms M and the anonymity sets Ap
for all p ∈ M, the anonymity increase ∆ap for a p ∈ M can be written as:
∆ap =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃q∈M Aq \ Ap
∣∣∣∣∣∣
The increase of backward anonymity across pseudonym mixes is also depicted in
Figure 6.6. At first, the creator of the genesis pseudonym GP 1 has no anonymity.
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Through the mix transaction mix tx 1 his anonymity set increases to 3, because the
pseudonyms P 1.1, P 2.1 and P 3.1 cannot be unambiguously linked to any of GP 1
to 3. After mix tx 4, the anonymity set of the creator of GP 1 increases to 8, as P 1.2
can be held by the creator of any one of the 8 GPTxes.
6.5.3.3 Transaction fees and pseudonym value
In the predominant majority of cases, the creation of block chain transactions re-
quires the provision of transaction fees. If fees are not payed from pseudonym in-
puts as proposed in Section 6.3.3, they need to be provided from other sources via
additional transaction inputs. If these additional inputs are not anonymized, the
breaking of pseudonyms becomes possible. For example, if a user contributes fees
to two linked mix transactions, it becomes clear which pseudonym belonged to the
user between mixes.
Figure 6.7 Anonymity loss through external payment of transaction fees.
An analogous scenario is depicted in Figure 6.7. Here, the genesis pseudonym GP 1
is identifiable as belonging to Alice, as it is funded by one of her outputs. By sending
funds to the mix transaction mix tx 4, she additionally makes the pseudonym P 1.1
identifiable. Based on the transaction graph, and assuming that Alice has created
only one genesis pseudonym, no other hypothesis about the identity behind P 1.1 is
possible.
BitNym avoids the external funding of mix transactions by using the value stored
in pseudonym outputs. More complex alternatives to this approach are possible.
Pseudonym holders can contribute to pools that are then used for paying fees. Or a
parallel coin mixing mechanism can be implemented that ensures that fee payment
funds are anonymous. In addition to increasing complexity, the adoption of such
approaches will likely result in a higher average fee requirement (mix transactions
will require additional inputs, increasing their size and, therefore, required fees). At
the same time, its relative benefit is questionable.
BitNym also supports the recharging of pseudonyms. Here, a non-mixing change
is conducted, with additional inputs increasing the pseudonym’s value. For anal-
ysis purposes, this is similar to creating a new genesis pseudonym - the pseudo-
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nym created in such a transaction might become linkable to the holder of the pro-
vided funds. If the provided funds are linkable to the pseudonym holder, however,
recharging doesn’t only make the recharged pseudonym identifiable, but also re-
moves its holder from the anonymity sets of all currently valid pseudonyms (assum-
ing a one-to-one relationship between valid pseudonyms and users). The anonymity
level of former mixing partners of the recharging user might, in this way, be lowered
by 1.
6.6 Evaluation
BitNym was evaluated by implementing a proof-of-concept prototype and measur-
ing its communication and computation overhead. Additionally, a simulation study
was performed for evaluating the effect of pseudonym mixing in scenarios with
multiple thousand participants.
6.6.1 Prototype
For gaining insights about the overhead and applicability of BitNym in practical
scenarios, a proof-of-concept prototype was implemented that is compatible with
the Bitcoin network. The prototype is capable of creating GPTxes using proof-of-
burn as an IAC mechanism, and performing the pseudonym mixing protocol with
mixing partners given as input. The discovery of mixing partners is not part of the
prototype, and neither is blacklisting.
6.6.1.1 Implementation
For communicating with the Bitcoin network and accessing the Bitcoin block chain,
the prototype uses the BitcoinJ library9 (version 0.12). The SPV mode of BitcoinJ
is used, i.e., the prototype doesn’t maintain a complete block chain but contacts
full nodes for required information. Thus, the prototype is suited for resource-
constrained devices. Cryptographic primitives required for the mixing protocol are
realized using the cryptographic library Bouncy Castle10 (version 1.51).
As one of the steps of validating a pseudonym, it must be verified that the transac-
tion output holding the pseudonym is unspent. The verification can be performed
efficiently by checking that the output is part of Bitcoin’s unspent transaction output
(UTXO) set that is maintained by all full nodes. An extension to the Bitcoin protocol
has been proposed for allowing SPV clients to query full nodes for entries in this
set11. While already supported by some nodes at the time of writing (most notably,
nodes based on the Bitcoin XT implementation of Bitcoin12), the proposed extension
has the main drawback that responses to UTXO queries are not authenticated in any
way. Full nodes must be trusted for providing a correct view on the UTXO set and
can, if malicious, present a spent output as unspent. In order for SPV queries for en-
tries in the UTXO set to be secure without trusting the queried full node, changes to
9https://bitcoinj.github.io/
10https://www.bouncycastle.org/
11https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0064.mediawiki
12https://bitcoinxt.software/
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Bitcoin are necessary. A promising approach is for mined blocks to include commit-
ments to the current UTXO set, using a hash tree [80, 98]. SPV clients can determine
(with a reasonable degree of certainty) whether a block header received from a full
node corresponds to a block actually included in the block chain. Therefore, if block
headers contain a commitment to the UTXO set, querying nodes can verify received
UTXO entries against this commitment.
UTXO checks were deactivated in the presented prototype. Instead, an additional
block is requested from a full node to approximate the latency of making a UTXO
query. Not verifying that the transaction output holding the pseudonym of a com-
munication partner is unspent has following implications:
• A malicious user can present one of his older pseudonyms that is no longer
valid (i.e., its corresponding transaction output has been spent). This ability
enables a form of sybil attack in which a malicious user can use all pseudo-
nyms that he ever held simultaneously. However, the practical impact of such
an attack is likely limited, as transmitted validation paths will often conflict
with a false claim about the state of older outputs.
• It is not possible to completely validate the pseudonyms of potential mixing
partners. However, if one of the mix group members is malicious and tries
to contribute to the mix transaction from a spent pseudonym output, this will
be easily detected by miners and the published mix transaction will not be
published on the block chain. A malicious user can, therefore, only block indi-
vidual mixes from completing, delaying pseudonym changes.
A possible workaround to the issue of securely finding out whether a given pseu-
donym output has been spent without needing to trust (or maintain) a full node,
is to render pseudonym outputs temporarily unspendable. In practice, this can be
achieved by including Bitcoin’s OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcode into pseu-
donym outputs, locking them so that they cannot be spent before the supplied
time. Another approach is to monitor all active pseudonym addresses, effectively
maintaining a subset of the UTXO set containing only pseudonym outputs. This
approach hast the benefit of making the transmission of (potentially long) valida-
tion paths in proof messages unnecessary. Neither of these approaches was imple-
mented in the presented prototype.
6.6.1.2 Performance
In the following, evaluation results gathered with the prototype are presented. The
main goal is to give a first impression about the expectable performance. The time
requirement of pseudonym changes was not evaluated, as it is dominated by the
time until the final mix transaction is included in the block chain (around 9 min-
utes on average [47]). Other contributing factors are the time until mixing partners
are found (the discovery of mixing partners was not part of the prototype) and the
CoinShuffle mixing protocol (evaluated in [100]).
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The focus here is on the evaluation of pseudonym validity checks. These need to
be performed not only by pseudonym holders, but also by all entities wishing to
validate BitNym pseudonyms. On a regular notebook computer (2.5 GHz CPUs,
the tested functionality was single-threaded), verifying a proof consistently took
between 130 ms and 550 ms (with a median of 198 ms) for different proof messages.
Proof sizes had no discernible effect on validation duration. The majority of time
is spent on requesting block data from a Bitcoin full node (for verifying that the
pseudonym transaction was included in the block chain) and verifying, with the
help of a full node, if the pseudonym output is unspent (which was approximated
by requesting an additional block, cf. Section 6.6.1.1).
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Figure 6.8 Size of proof messages.
The sizes of proof messages generated by the prototype are depicted in Figure 6.8.
The sizes of proof messages grow linearly with the number of (mix) transactions in-
cluded in the proof, starting from 4075 bytes for a proof containing only a GPTx and
increasing by 380 bytes for a mix transaction with a mix group size of 2. Larger mix
group sizes lead to a larger increase in proof message size per included transaction,
e.g., the increase is around 570 bytes for a mix transaction with 3 participants. The
standard serialization routines of Java were used in the prototype, so that improve-
ments to the proof message sizes are likely possible. Still, even with this implemen-
tation, proofs containing more than hundred mix transactions are possible at a proof
message size of below 50 kilobytes.
6.6.2 Large-scale pseudonym mixing
For answering questions about the scalability of BitNym and the levels of anonymity
achievable when using it, a series of simulation studies was conducted.
6.6.2.1 Simulation environment
A lightweight time-discrete simulator was developed for evaluating different prop-
erties of pseudonym mixing on a macroscopic scale. The simulator can be used for
measuring, amongst other things, the influence of mixing on the degree of anonymity
and the size of proof messages (affecting communication overhead).
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No actual interfacing with the block chain is simulated. Time is divided in slots.
A time slot corresponds to one block interval, i.e., the time interval between two
subsequent blocks on the block chain. During each slot (simulated) users perform
one of following actions:
• create new GPTxes (during the beginning of the simulation)
• announce that they are looking for mixing partners
• answer existing announcements, initiating a pseudonym mix
• recharge pseudonyms with depleted value for allowing further mixing
Simulation parameters can be divided into scenario-specific and BitNym-specific.
Scenario-specific parameters include:
• The pseudonym start value for all users. A value of 200 000 satoshi13 was used
in all presented simulations (0.002 bitcoin; worth around 0.8 euro at the time
of writing).
• The number of users. Unless noted otherwise, populations of 10 000 users were
simulated.
• The average pseudonym change rate for all users, i.e., at which average inter-
vals users announce a desire to form a mix transaction. An average of 288 time
slots was used in all presented simulations. This corresponds to 48 hours (time
slots correspond to Bitcoin block intervals, which average to 10 minutes).
• The change rate deviation. This is the standard deviation of change intervals
from the average change rate. A value of 72 was used by default, representing
a high variation. The impact of different values was evaluated as well.
BitNym-specific parameters include:
• The desired mix group size.
• Whether mix group sizes should be limited to the mix group size or if larger
groups should be allowed.
• The acceptable difference to the pseudonym values of mix group participants.
For example, with an acceptable difference of 50 000 satoshi, a pseudonym
with a value of 100 000 satoshi will mix only with pseudonyms with a value
between 50 000 and 150 000.
13108 satoshi amount to 1 bitcoin.
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At the beginning of each simulation, as a warm-up phase, each user creates a GPTx.
Creation times are uniformly distributed within a period corresponding to the aver-
age expected lifetime of a pseudonym. The lifetime of a pseudonym is determined by
the configured pseudonym start value and the value subtracted from pseudonyms
for the payment of transaction fees.
As the posting of transactions on the Bitcoin block chain requires the payment of
fees, in every mix transaction, an average of 5000 satoshi is subtracted from the
pseudonym values of all participants. The value of 5000 satoshi is chosen as a con-
servative estimate of the fees required in reality. By the fallback fee calculation logic
of the original Bitcoin client software, for example, 20 000 satoshi are payed per
kilobyte of transaction size14. Based on the prototype results, each participant adds
around 190 B to the resulting mix transaction. A per participant fee of 5000 satoshi
therefore includes a 24% margin of safety, ensuring a quick inclusion on the block
chain. After the pseudonym’s value has dropped to below 5000, it is considered dead
in the simulated context. For a configured pseudonym start value of 200 000 satoshi,
the average pseudonym lifetime is, thus, 40 changes.
Once a pseudonym dies, it is recharged by its holder. A regular transaction (i.e., not
a mix transaction) is created that increases the pseudonym’s value by the pseudo-
nym start value. The exact point in time of the recharge is determined using the
same logic as the decision about when a new mix transaction should be initiated,
i.e., randomly based on the configured change rate and change rate deviation.
Pseudonym change and mixing is not implemented in detail. Only the outward
effect of the mixing protocol outlined in Section 6.3.3 is reproduced. Mix groups
are formed centrally by the simulator in every time step, based on the published
announcements. The simulator is honest and honors all announced requirements,
i.e., concerning the desired mix group size and the acceptable difference to mixing
partners. If multiple possibilities for forming mix groups exist, groups are formed
randomly. Once a mix group is formed, the corresponding mix transaction is pub-
lished instantly, i.e., in the same time slot.
Two basic types of results are output by the simulator. First, such where the devel-
opment of a measured value is shown relative to the elapsed simulated time. Here,
the initial warm-up phase is clearly visible. The second type of results expresses
the relationship of a value to the number of mix transactions performed by users.
Measurements for this second type of result are made just after completing a mix.
In order to reduce the impact of the initial creation phase on this result type, only
pseudonyms created 3 average lifetimes after the start of the simulation are consid-
ered.
After the first 3 lifetimes, the simulation continues for another 10 lifetimes so that a
total of 13 lifetimes is simulated. Based on a pseudonym start value of 200 000 and
a change rate of 288 time slots, this corresponds to 149 760 time slots or 1040 days.
14https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v0.12.0/doc/release-notes.md
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All results presented in the following represent averages of 4 simulation runs per
parameter configuration.
The simulation parameters used for generating results figures in the remainder of
this chapter are summarized in Table C.2 (Appendix C).
6.6.2.2 Selection of BitNym-specic parameters
An initial selection of BitNym-specific parameters was performed as a base for sub-
sequent investigations. Recall that, based on the simulation setup, following BitNym-
specific parameters are configurable:
• minimum mix group size
• whether mix group sizes should be limited
• acceptable difference to the pseudonym values of mix group participants
Towards the goal of maximizing backward anonymity, an acceptable difference of
200 000 satoshi was initially chosen. This value corresponds to the configured pseu-
donym start value and, therefore, implies that no value-based constraints will be
put on potential mixing partners. Constraints on potential mixing partners would
reduce the pool from which mixing partners are chosen and are therefore expected
to increase the likelihood that mixes leave the anonymity sets of participants un-
changed.
The parameters related to group size have direct implications for the sizes of pseu-
donym proofs (a likely source of overhead in practice). With a mix group size of g,
the backward anonymity of users is increased by up to factor g after each mix. At the
same time, the proof sizes of mix participants increase by an average of 190g byte
(based on the results from Section 6.6.1.2). For an ideal scenario with an infinitely
large user population, the anonymity level a() per 190 byte block x is expected to
be:
a(x) = g
x
g = e
x ln g
g
Finding a value for g that maximizes anonymity per byte boils down to finding a
g that maximizes ln gg . Using standard function analysis, we arrive at g = e. How-
ever, e is not a natural number and, therefore, not a suitable value for BitNym’s mix
group size parameter. Substituting with the two closest natural numbers 2 and 3,
we find that ln 22 <
ln 3
3 and, therefore, conclude that a mix group size of 3 maximizes
anonymity per byte in an ideal scenario.
However, a realistic scenario differs from the ideal case in that the number of users,
and therefore the maximum reachable anonymity set, is limited. A simulation study
was performed using varying configurations related to group size. The backward
anonymity of each node was determined in each time step, and averaged. This
average anonymity level was then divided by the average proof size length of all
pseudonyms valid in that time step. The translation of validation path length (in
number and group size of mix transactions) to proof message sizes (in byte) was
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based on the results gathered with the prototype15. Figure 6.9 depicts results from
this study for group sizes gs of exactly 2, 3 and 5 as well as a configuration with
an unlimited maximum group size and a minimum group size of 2. It can be seen
that mix groups of size 2 outperform larger mix groups. Also, avoiding a limit on
group sizes (which implies larger average group sizes) causes lower anonymity per
byte values than configurations with group sizes fixed to 2, 3 or 5. Therefore, for all
subsequent simulations discussed in this chapter, mix groups of exactly size 2 were
used. A further benefit of this parametrization is that mix groups can be formed
faster, as only one mixing partner must be found.
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Figure 6.9 Backward anonymity per byte of pseudonym proof, for different config-
urations of mix group size gs.
Figure 6.9 also hints at the existence of periodic drops in the measured anonymity
levels. Drops in anonymity are due to the fact that, once a dead pseudonym be-
comes recharged, its holder is removed from all anonymity sets in the simulation.
His own anonymity set is reset to include only himself. With both of this measures,
the assumption is modeled that recharges are fully linkable to user identities. As the
depicted anonymity levels are averaged across the whole user population, signifi-
cant drops in the displayed values suggest the existence of synchronization effects.
The existence of synchronization effects is also suggested by Figure 6.10. The figure
depicts the number of currently alive (i.e., with a value of more than 5000 satoshi)
pseudonyms during each time slot of the simulation. The majority of pseudonyms
die and become recharged during a comparably short time frame. This observation
suggests that their pseudonym values synchronize and are nearly identical near the
end of their lifetime. The effect that a significant portion of nodes die in close succes-
sion to each other is less strongly expressed in a configuration without a maximum
limit on mix group size (gs ≥ 2), suggesting that such a configuration leads to less
synchronization effects and, thus, more stable anonymity levels.
154075 bytes for GPTxes and 190 bytes for each change and participant (cf. Section 6.6.1.2).
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Figure 6.10 Number of alive pseudonyms, for different configurations of mix
group size gs.
However, any potential benefits in terms of stability or the rate of anonymity in-
crease must be seen in perspective to the simultaneously induced overhead. For
additional illustration of the latter, Figure 6.11 depicts the average proof sizes mea-
sured during the course of the simulation study described at the beginning of this
section. After 1000 simulated days (144 000 time slots), the measured average proof
size for the configuration with unlimited mix group sizes is nearly an order of mag-
nitude larger than for the configuration with a mix group size of exactly 2.
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Figure 6.11 Average proof size, for different configurations of mix group size gs.
6.6.2.3 Further investigations
In the following, the impact of further parameters on backward anonymity is inves-
tigated, namely change rate deviation, acceptable difference and number of users.
The following figures depict the backward anonymity of the average user in relation
to the number of mix transactions in which he participated since his last recharge.
At change 40, which is marked as a vertical line in the diagrams, pseudonyms, on
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average, run out of funds. The values after and closely before 40 are thus less rep-
resentative as only few pseudonyms make it past the 40th change. This effect is
explicitly depicted in Figure 6.12. It depicts the percentage of pseudonyms that are
still alive after a given number of mix transactions since their last recharge. The
figure depicts values for two different configurations of acceptable difference ad to
mixing partners. The first plotted configuration (ad = 200 000) corresponds to the
parametrization recommended in Section 6.6.2.2. It can be seen that the majority of
pseudonyms run out of funds before their 40th mix transaction and that less than
5% survive longer than 70 mixes. With the second configuration (ad = 100 000),
achieved lifetimes deviate less strongly from the expected value of 40. No lifetimes
of above 50 mix transactions were achieved. Results obtained with lower values for
the acceptable difference were indistinguishably similar (for the plotted metric) to
the ones obtained for an acceptable difference of 100 000 satoshi, and are therefore
not shown.
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Figure 6.12 Cumulative distribution of pseudonym lifetime after a recharge (i.e., of
time until a new recharge is required), for different configurations of
acceptable difference ad (in satoshi).
Figure 6.13 depicts the impact of change rate deviation crd (the standard deviation
of change intervals in simulation time slots) on the development of anonymity sets.
Recall that the parametrization used in the rest of this chapter uses a value of 72 for
this parameter (crd = 72). The aforementioned synchronisation effects, due to con-
verging pseudonym values leading to closely clustered recharging times and, there-
fore, periodic drops in measured anonymity, are clearly visible. Both drops and rises
in anonymity can be witnessed. Based on the obtained results, it is furthermore dif-
ficult to rank the configurations with high change rate deviations. While anonymity
rises faster after a recharge when high change rate deviations (e.g., crd = 144) are
used, anonymity also starts dropping earlier. This shift can be explained through
the fact that more nodes near the end of their expected lifetime are able to mix with
freshly recharged nodes. While, in this way, newly recharged users receive an early
bump in anonymity, more pseudonyms die before the 40th change as they have al-
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Figure 6.13 Impact of change rate deviation crd (in time slots) on backward
anonymity.
ready lost much value shortly after being recharged. What can clearly be seen in
Figure 6.13, however, is that low levels of change rate deviation, e.g., 9 and below,
are detrimental to anonymity development and maximum achievable anonymity.
This relationship is understandable, as a low change rate variation leads to a limit-
ing of mix groups to members of small communities with synchronized pseudonym
change intervals. It should be noted that change rate deviation is, to a large extent,
a parameter of the application scenario of BitNym, and might be influenceable only
in a limited fashion by a practical implementation (e.g., by introducing artificial ran-
dom delays before initiating the discovery of mixing partners).
The impact of the acceptable difference ad on the pseudonym values of mixing
partners (in satoshi) is shown in Figure 6.14. As expected, a higher acceptable
difference, i.e., a higher readiness to lose bitcoins during a mix, leads to a faster
anonymity growth. Staring from an acceptable difference of 50 000 satoshi, the max-
imum reached anonymity level is reduced below the theoretical maximum and de-
creases further with lower values for the acceptable difference. Again, the reason is
that the pool of users out of which mixing partners are taken is enlarged, including
more users that are close to the end of their expected lifetime and can, therefore,
contribute larger anonymity sets to a mix. Interestingly, however, the configuration
with de facto no limit on the acceptable difference (ad = 200 000) leads to an early
drop in average anonymity compared to the parametrizations with acceptable dif-
ferences of 100 000 or less, i.e., starting already around the 30th mix. Two aspects
must be considered here. First, measurements for plots that express the relationship
of a value to the number of completed mixes are taken only immediately after each
successful mix. The observation that anonymity levels don’t seem to significantly
decline for lower acceptable difference values is, therefore, an illusion due to the fact
that the anonymity levels of dead pseudonyms are not shown (the anonymity levels
of dead pseudonyms are, due to the previously noted synchronization of pseudo-
nym values, likely falling rapidly with each time slot). The second aspect that must
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be considered is that while anonymity drops earlier for the parametrization with
a de facto unlimited acceptable difference (ad = 200 000), it also rises faster in the
beginning. More users with multiple pseudonym mixes behind them are able to
mix with freshly recharged pseudonyms, significantly increasing the anonymity of
the freshly recharged pseudonyms and, in turn, gaining the ability to perform more
pseudonym mixes than average. This effect is also reflected in the previously dis-
cussed results on pseudonym lifetime distribution depicted in Figure 6.12.
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Figure 6.14 Impact of acceptable difference ad (in satoshi) on backward anonymity.
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Figure 6.15 Impact of acceptable difference ad (in satoshi) on pseudonym value.
On an individual level, the acceptable difference to the pseudonym values of mix-
ing partners encodes the readiness to lose more than the 5000 satoshi of transaction
fees for participating in a mix. Independently of the acceptable difference, however,
only the transaction fees are in reality lost to the BitNym user population, so that
the average loss per mix and mix participant is still only 5000 satoshi. Figure 6.15
indicates the validity of this claim. It depicts the average pseudonym values of users
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after different numbers of completed mixes. Results for simulated acceptable differ-
ence values of below 100 000 satoshi are not shown, as they were indistinguishably
close to the values for 100 000 satoshi. For the parametrization with a de facto un-
limited acceptable difference (ad = 200 000), pseudonym values drop sharply for the
first few mixes. This drop is likely due to mixing with “older” pseudonyms, i.e.,
such with already low pseudonym values. As was previously discussed, however,
such pseudonyms usually have large anonymity sets that they can share with mix-
ing partners. As a pendant to the sharp drop in the beginning, the few pseudonyms
surviving past the 30th mix (for ad = 200 000) receive a rise in pseudonym value
through mixing with freshly recharged pseudonyms.
Finally, simulations with varying numbers of users were conducted. Figure 6.16 de-
picts the development of anonymity set sizes (on a logarithmic scale) across mixes
for different numbers of users nu. Note that the maximum achievable level of
anonymity is equal to the number of users in the scenario. Due to the approxi-
mately exponential growth of backwards anonymity with every mix, the respective
maximum anonymity levels are reached quickly even for larger user populations.
Figure 6.17 depicts a more global view on anonymity levels, with anonymity (on a
logarithmic scale) plotted against simulated time. Again, results for different num-
bers of users are shown. It can be seen that the periodic drops in anonymity ob-
served earlier are limited in strength and reduce the average anonymity of the user
population by a factor of less than 10.
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Figure 6.16 Backward anonymity development for different numbers of users nu.
It is also interesting to see whether user population size affects the size of pseudo-
nym proofs. Towards answering this question, Figure 6.18 plots average proof sizes
against simulated time for different numbers of users. As expected, no difference
between the compared parametrizations can be observed, as proof sizes are affected
by the number of mix transactions per time interval which is independent of the size
of the user population. Additionally, it can be seen that for the simulated scenario,
proof sizes after 1000 simulated days are, on average, still below 200 kB.
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Figure 6.17 Backward anonymity development for different numbers of users nu.
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Figure 6.18 Average proof size, for different numbers of users nu. The measured
values are indistinguishably close.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter tackles the challenge of enabling unlinkable and TTP-independent pseu-
donymity while remaining resilient to large-scale sybil attacks. An approach was
outlined that is suitable for offering privacy-preserving and abuse-resistant authen-
tication for cooperative services in smart traffic and beyond. Sybil-resistance is
achieved by leveraging cryptocurrency block chains as decentralized bulletin boards.
Furthermore, this chapter presented BitNym, a specific realization of the proposed
approach based on the Bitcoin network. Via a prototype of BitNym, the practical
feasibility of the approach was demonstrated. Using simulations of larger user pop-
ulations, it was demonstrated that large anonymity sets can be reached quickly.
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7. Summary and perspectives
Modern vehicles become increasingly intelligent and interconnected. This enables
new qualities of cooperation, as cooperation becomes decoupled from the atten-
tion of human users. In the domain of smart traffic, for example, smart vehicles can
autonomously cooperate to optimize traffic flow, request and provide services and
exchange sensor data. In addition to promising significant quality of life improve-
ments, such cooperative services have the potential for meeting long-standing societal
challenges, like reducing environmental impacts and meeting ever increasing mo-
bility demands.
However, the increasing amount of data shared by users also enables new dimen-
sions of privacy intrusions. Systems become inherently susceptible to leaks of privacy-
relevant data and exploits by determined adversaries if privacy issues are not con-
sidered early during system design.
The class of privacy-relevant data most characteristic to smart traffic is that of time-
stamped location data, i.e., data about the location at which some user has been at
a given point in time. Location data is required for the provision of a wide variety
of smart traffic services, from traffic monitoring and optimization to the delivery
of messages based on geographic criteria. At the same time, timestamped location
data is highly sensitive from a privacy standpoint. It can reveal habits, interests,
social contacts and even health status and political engagement. Consequently, the
location privacy of users should be preserved.
The utility of smart traffic services is often proportional to the amount and qual-
ity of shared data. Enabling users to participate anonymously or pseudonymously
might be insufficient for preserving privacy in this context. As repeatedly shown
in the literature, given a sufficiently high sampling rate and precision, the identities
behind anonymously shared locations can be inferred using correlation and easily
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obtainable context knowledge. As an additional challenge, identifiable data is often
needed for detecting and punishing abuse, i.e., attacks on the correct functioning of
services.
Many existing works and practically deployed systems rely on the existence of
trusted entities, e.g., trusted service providers. In addition to being attractive tar-
gets for adversaries, trusted entities are often in a position for large-scale privacy
breaches. By collecting large amounts of data, for example, correlation attacks be-
come possible through which sensitive information can be inferred from sets of oth-
erwise uninteresting data. In the scope of this thesis, decentralization was investi-
gated as a means to eliminate the need for single trusted entities. Decentralized
system design avoids centrally controlled data sinks as well as the difficulty of es-
tablishing trust anchors in systems of global scale. Additionally, the realization of
data locality becomes possible, i.e., it can be realized that precise location data is dis-
closed only to entities that are also provably nearby.
7.1 Results
The presented thesis focuses on three functional building blocks that are both rel-
evant to upcoming smart traffic services and highly challenging in respect of bal-
ancing privacy protection and utility: cooperative planning, geographic addressing and
the decentralized provision of pseudonymous identifiers. As an important distinction
to many related works and practically deployed systems, adversaries are assumed
that can compromise centrally controlled system components for obtaining privacy-
relevant data. This assumption reflects the threat arising from security breaches,
governmental subpoenas and dishonest service operators. It is assumed, however,
that the majority of users will not be compromised and, while possibly selfish or
curious in isolation, never actively collude with malicious intent.
The specific contributions are the following:
• A privacy-preserving cooperative route planning system was introduced. Despite
enabling the anonymous publication of plans, the possibilities for abuse (in
the form of malicious users that distribute false plans) are limited. Plans are
published anonymously as a series of promises concerning segments of the
planned route. Abuse resistance is realized by requiring the use of blindly
signed promise coins for making each promise. Following an initial registration,
during which users receive a first batch of promise coins, new promise coins
are issued only upon promise fulfillment. In this way, honest users retain their
right to participate in the system while malicious users get banned quickly.
Promise coins are issued using blind signatures and, therefore, not identifiable
or linkable. Consequently, and as confirmed by analysis, promises are anony-
mous and not easily linked to trips. Through performance measurements of
the involved cryptographic operations and latency measurements of the em-
ployed anonymous communication channel, it was furthermore shown that
the proposed privacy-preserving cooperative route planning system is practi-
cally feasible.
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• Mechanisms for enabling privacy-preserving long-distance geocast were investi-
gated that do not rely on centrally controlled service providers or dedicated
infrastructure support. Geocast is a communication abstraction that enables
the addressing of communication partners based on geographic criteria, e.g.,
the addressing of all vehicles in a given region. A comprehensive privacy
analysis of the overlay-based geocast service OverDrive was performed. In
OverDrive, user locations are not shared with a single service provider but
with a small dynamic set of other users. Based on the results of the analysis,
a location obfuscation concept was proposed that enables the precision of lo-
cation data to be decreased depending on the distance at which it is shared.
Through the integration of location spoofing detection using GSM broadcast
traffic, the correctness of this obfuscation can be ensured even in the face of ad-
versaries that fake their own position. The novel extensions to OverDrive were
evaluated through simulation. The results demonstrate that, through the pro-
posed enhancements, the large-scale surveillance and the targeted tracking of
OverDrive users becomes infeasible even for adversaries controlling hundreds
of overlay nodes. From a performance standpoint, OverDrive was shown to
represent a viable alternative to more traditional, centralized approaches.
• It was investigated how sybil-resistant pseudonymization and pseudonym change
can be realized without relying on the existence of trusted third parties. The is-
suing of pseudonyms is an established approach for protecting the privacy of
users while limiting access and preventing sybil attacks. Unlinkable pseudo-
nym changes are required to prevent the identification of pseudonym holders
through continuous observation and correlation. A novel approach towards
pseudonymization and pseudonym change was proposed that is indepen-
dent of individual trusted entities without putting an unrealistic burden on
users. Robustness and sybil-resistance is achieved by leveraging cryptocur-
rency block chains as decentralized append-only bulletin boards. In addition
to the general approach, BitNym, a specific design which leverages the security
of the unmodified Bitcoin network, was presented. Via a prototype of BitNym,
the practical feasibility of the approach was demonstrated. Using simulations
of large user populations, it was demonstrated that anonymity sets encom-
passing nearly the complete user population are achievable.
A privacy analysis and evaluation of all investigated building blocks was conducted
based on a two-step approach. First, the privacy-related threats detection and disclo-
sure were considered. The type and quality of data an adversary is able to collect
was investigated, which includes identifying possible active attacks that can help
an adversary to increase his knowledge. Second, possibilities for the linking and
identification of data items available according to the first step were investigated,
focusing on the goal of obtaining identifiable location samples.
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7.2 Perspectives for future work
A major challenge towards privacy-preserving smart traffic services, that was not
tackled in the scope of this thesis, is that of location privacy within cellular com-
munication networks. While first works that enable the anonymous usage of such
networks exist [107], a more serious investigation is necessary. Developed solutions
must be sufficiently well designed and understood so that they can be included in
upcoming cellular networking standards.
The route planning aspects of the cooperative route planning system proposed in
Chapter 4 exceed the scope of this thesis and remain unexamined. Open questions
remain concerning both the practical realization of such a system and its poten-
tial impact on traffic flow and environmental pollution. Conducting investigations
based on realistic traffic simulations might be a promising approach for addressing
both of these aspects.
Several open questions follow from the novel pseudonymization and pseudonym
change approach proposed in Chapter 6. This includes that of decentralized initial
access control - how to ensure that each human user is able to register to the system
only once. Leveraging the properties of social connections, as also described in this
thesis, is a promising direction for further investigation in this respect. Furthermore,
the BitNym prototype should be developed further, possibly in combination with
the PTP library described in Chapter 2. With moderate effort, an easy to use piece
of software can likely be created that can find widespread practical deployment.
The applicability of the developed building blocks to other scenarios is also a promis-
ing avenue for exploration. The promise coin approach proposed for cooperative
route planning might be applicable to other contexts in which plans need to be pub-
lished in an (ideally) anonymous fashion while the overall system must remain re-
silient to abuse. Lessons learned from investigating long-distance geocast overlays
can be applied to areas in which nodes must be addressed based on other privacy-
relevant properties. As long the reasoning of data locality can be applied, i.e., that
entities sharing a similar set of properties are more trustworthy in respect to learning
one’s own properties, an application of the proposed techniques is conceivable. The
BitNym system is, of course, already very generally applicable. An evaluation of
the approach in a specific application context is nonetheless an interesting research
opportunity.
At the end, most technologies for improving the privacy of smart traffic users are
only as useful as the size of their user population. As often stated in a colloquial
manner, anonymity loves company. The size of a system’s user population directly
determines achievable anonymity sets, the size of the “crowd” in which users can
disappear. Achieving a wider adoption of systems that honor and protect the pri-
vacy of their users is a vital and significant challenge.
A. Connectivity and privacy in
deployed cellular networks
In 2014, a study was performed investigating the connectivity and privacy prop-
erties of the major cellular networks available in Germany. More specifically, the
study aimed at answering following questions:
1. Whether the establishment of peer-to-peer connections to other cellular net-
work users is possible.
2. Whether IP address changes can be initiated by users (for ensuring the unlink-
ability of pseudonym changes).
3. Whether IP addresses used in cellular networks are identifiable by external
adversaries.
The setup and results of the study are presented in the following. A summary of the
results is given in Section 2.6.1.
This appendix is based on [58] and the appendix of [43].
A.1 Evaluating deployed cellular networks
Several previous works exist that evaluate connectivity properties in commercially
deployed cellular networks. In a study conducted in 2007 [76], the authors investi-
gate to what extent and in what form network address translation (NAT) is deployed
in six exemplary cellular networks from different continents. With NAT, address
information is transparently changed by middleboxes along the data path. In this
way, for example, multiple hosts in a private network can share one public IP ad-
dress. NAT middleboxes maintain state in the form of bindings in order to be able to
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correctly translate addresses for incoming packets. Bindings are typically set only
for outbound connections. Thus, unsolicited connections to devices behind NAT
are typically not possible and NAT traversal techniques need to be applied in order
for a peer-to-peer connection to a device behind NAT to be established. The find-
ings in [76] indicate that NAT characteristics vary greatly between networks, with
half of the tested networks implementing no NAT at all and two of the six carriers
implementing NAT configurations that make NAT traversal and the establishment
of peer-to-peer connections impossible. Similar results have been found in a 2011
study by Wang et al. [114]. Using a crowdsourcing approach, the authors evaluate,
amongst other things, the properties of NAT middleboxes and firewalls in 107 cellu-
lar networks around the world. According to their results, from 72 cellular networks
employing NAT, NAT traversal is feasible in 53.
While these studies provide valuable insights into the connectivity properties of
commercially deployed cellular networks, several open questions remain. First, the
mechanisms of assigning IP addresses as well as the possibility for initiating IP ad-
dress changes have not been evaluated. Second, the cited studies do not capture
potential developments from the last few years. Third, they do not provide country-
specific information, e.g., concerning cellular networks available in Germany.
Thus, between August and September 2014, an own study was conducted using
prepaid SIM cards from the four cellular networks available in Germany. In the
following, the individual networks are referred to as N1 to N4. The main goal of
the study was the investigation of the networks’ properties concerning the estab-
lishment of peer-to-peer connections and the requesting of new IP addresses for
ensuring the unlinkability of pseudonyms following pseudonym changes.
The employed methodology is based on a setup with two cellular network-enabled
clients and a publicly reachable test server. An evaluation framework was devel-
oped for automatically running large numbers of tests within this setup. The server
acts as an introduction and coordination point and, in some tests, is used as a STUN
server, for assisting in NAT traversal and for determining the external IP addresses
of clients. In the following, the tests and test results concerning the establishment
of peer-to-peer connections and the implemented policies regarding the assignment
and changing of client IP addresses are discussed.
A.2 Establishing peer-to-peer connections
Due to an increasing use of IP middleboxes (e.g., firewalls and NAT) in provider
networks, the availability of Internet connectivity does not automatically imply that
the creation of peer-to-peer connections is possible as well. Cellular network op-
erators, for example, rely heavily on NAT to both improve the utilization of their
public IP address pools and shield connected users from unsolicited communica-
tion attempts.
Using the test setup outlined in Section A.1, the following properties were evaluated
for the networks N1 to N4:
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N1 N2 N3 N4
N1 direct
connectionX
connection
reversalX
connection
reversalX
connection
reversalX
N2 port guessing × port guessing × port guessing ∼
N3 port guessing × port guessing ∼
N4 UDP hole
punchingX
Table A.1 Feasibility peer-to-peer connection establishment.
1. Whether NATs were deployed at all.
2. The employed type of endpoint filtering, i.e., based on which criteria incoming
packets are associated to an open binding and, thus, forwarded through the
NAT.
3. The employed NAT mapping, i.e., based on what principle external (public)
ports are chosen for new bindings.
Based on these properties, suitable approaches for establishing peer-to-peer connec-
tions were determined and tested in practice, e.g. state of the art NAT traversal
techniques. The best suited techniques for each combination of networks, as well as
estimations of their practical feasibility, are depicted in Table A.1.
According to the gathered results, N1 offered network access without NAT. Further-
more, it was possible to consistently establish direct connections between clients in
N1. The establishment of connections between clients in N1 and clients behind NAT
was possible as well using the connection reversal [105] method.
The remaining three carriers employed NAT using address- and port-dependent end-
point filtering. Clients behind this type of NAT can establish peer-to-peer connec-
tions if the external port allocated by the NAT can be predicted for both of them. The
feasibility of such a prediction is dependent on the deployed type of NAT mapping.
According to the gathered findings, N4 employs an endpoint-independent type of
NAT mapping (also known as cone). Here, every outbound packet with the same
source address and source port is translated to the same external source address
and source port, independently of the destination address or port (and vice versa
for incoming packets). For two clients located behind this type of NAT, UDP hole
punching [105] can be used, as was confirmed by tests in practice.
The remaining two networks N2 and N3 employ NAT with random port mapping.
Here, every new binding receives a completely random external source port. This
mapping type is the most unfavorable for realizing NAT traversal and establishing
peer-to-peer connections, as it allows no efficient predictions to be made. Instead,
port guessing needs to be used, where peers make attempts using different ports un-
til a connection is established. This approach is highly time-intensive and limited
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by the data rate available to clients as well as network parameters like the number
of NAT bindings a client is allowed to establish. For the parameters measured in
N2, N3 and N4, establishing a peer-to-peer connection using port guessing can take
from 27 minutes on average (N4 to N2 or N3) to 72 days on average (N2 to N3).
It is, thus, concluded that this approach is infeasible for most peer-to-peer applica-
tion scenarios. Consequently, clients of N2 and N3 cannot effectively participate in
most peer-to-peer systems if direct peer-to-peer connections over IP need to be used
(alternative approaches for establishing peer-to-peer connections are discussed in
Section 2.6.2).
In addition to employing NAT, the networks N2, N3 and N4 did not allow direct
connections between network-internal addresses. Thus, if two clients reside in the
same network, they still need to perform NAT traversal in order to establish a peer-
to-peer connection.
A.3 IP address changes and linkability
In addition to determining the feasibility of establishing peer-to-peer connections in
cellular networks, we investigated the implemented policies regarding IP address
assignment and the possibility for users to initiate IP address changes. Using the
test setup described in Sec. A.1, it was discovered that new IP addresses from the
operators’ individual subnets were assigned upon every reconnection to the cellular
network. This effect was witnessed in all considered networks. Thus, users can
easily initiate IP address changes, ensuring unlinkability on pseudonym changes,
by disconnecting and reconnecting to the network. However, as an important detail,
both the new and the old address belong to subnets owned by the network operator.
Thus, an adversary might be able to link addresses to cellular networks, which can
reduce the unlinkability offered by pseudonym changes.
Further measurements were conducted in which the location of the measuring sta-
tion was varied between two locations located 90km away from each other. The
change in locations had no detectable influence on the IP addresses assigned to
clients.
B. Interactive visualization of
OverDrive
An interactive demonstrator of the OverDrive protocol was developed that visual-
izes OverDrive’s neighborhood structures and routing approach. Through a novel
extension to the overlay simulation framework OverSim [3], node movement in geo-
graphic space can be visualized as well as the underlying road network. Screenshots
of this visualization can be seen in Figure B.1.
An earlier version of the work described here was previously presented in [39].
B.1 Functionality
The visualization extension supports two views - the default visualization view, pre-
senting the movement of all simulated nodes on the underlying street map, as well
as an application view tracking the movement of one particular vehicle.
In addition to giving a global overview of all nodes and their movement (cf. Fig-
ure B.1a), the visualization view also enables the inspection of OverDrive protocol
internals. Individual nodes can be selected, displaying their overlay neighbors and
the concentric rings used in OverDrive’s neighbor selection logic (cf. Figure B.1b).
The neighbors of the selected node (which is highlighted in purple) are colored in
light blue. Additional green markers are used to represent the knowledge of the se-
lected node about its neighbors’ locations. The green markers represent obfuscated
locations. By clicking on the map while a node is selected, the sending of a GUM
can be initiated. The GUM originates from the selected node and is forwarded to
the destination point according to OverDrive’s forwarding logic. The path that the
GUM takes is shown in the visualization (cf. Figure B.1b). Flooding messages are
initialized and visualized in an analog manner, by switching the message sending
mode in the visualization interface.
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Once the application view is selected (multiple views can be open simultaneously
on different devices or browsers), one of the simulated vehicles is randomly chosen
and the view shifts to present that vehicle’s perspective, tracking its movement (cf.
Figure B.1c). The view is similar to that of popular navigation applications, with a
map centered on the current position of the tracked vehicle. The initiation of GUMs
to arbitrary points on the map is also enabled. These messages get routed according
to OverDrive’s routing logic. Once a GUM reaches its final recipient, the location of
this recipient is shown on the application view. Clearly, this functionality is only a
placeholder for more sophisticated real-life applications like the ones discussed in
Section 5.1.1.
B.2 Extensions to OverSim
For realizing the interactive visualization of OverDrive, several extensions were
made to OverSim. A new dynamic scheduler was implemented that enables the ex-
plicit setting and on-the-fly changing of the simulation speed. In the visualization
of OverDrive, this functionality is used for aligning the simulation time with real
time and speeding up the simulation when this is more convenient for inspecting
the inner workings of OverDrive. In addition to the new scheduler, a lightweight
web server1 was integrated into OverSim that enables the visualization of OverDrive
nodes and data structures as well as the tunneling back, via a web interface, of com-
mands into the running simulation in OverSim. The actual web-based views are
based on the Google Maps JavaScript API2 and map material from the OpenStreetMap
project. From the views, the running simulation can be influenced directly, e.g., by
initiating the sending of GUMs or by changing the simulation speed.
These additions to OverSim can easily be reused for visualizing other protocols and
scenarios in which node movement and the geographic location of nodes is of im-
portance. In addition to overlays for smart traffic scenarios, this includes, for exam-
ple, works in the area of user-centric networking [2].
1http://code.google.com/p/mongoose/
2https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/javascript/
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(a) default visualization view
(b) neighborhood structure and GUM delivery
(c) application view
Figure B.1 Screenshots of interactive visualization.
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Parameter Value
General parameters
# regular nodes 10 000
simulation duration 4200 s
warm-up period 600 s
initial node creation interval 0.5 s
accelerated node creation interval 0.05 s
# nodes after which accelerated creation starts 200
Parametrization of regular OverDrive
ndes 4
nmax 20
rb 2 km
# rings 8
ring satisfaction check interval 60 s
Parametrization of obfuscation-enabled OverDrive
ndes 8
nmax 32
f d 1
rb 2 km
# rings 8
ring satisfaction check interval 30 s
Parametrization of location spoofing detection
verification attempt timeout (cell) 15 s
verification attempt timeout (LA) 30 s
maximum verification delay (cell) 150 s
maximum verification delay (LA) 300 s
verification interval (cell) 600 s
verification interval (LA) 900 s
cell radius 2 km
LA radius 5 km
blacklist retention period 300 s
Parametrization of attacker nodes for Figures 5.6 and 5.7
# attacker nodes {1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100}
ndes unlimited
nmax unlimited
fake own location yes
Parametrization of attacker nodes for Figure 5.8
# attacker nodes {1, 2, 5, 10}
ndes unlimited
nmax unlimited
fake own location yes
Parametrization of victim nodes for Figure 5.8
# victim nodes (target) 100
victim node creation interval 120 s
Table C.1 Simulation parameters used in Chapter 5.
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Parameter Value
Default parameters
# users 10 000
simulation duration 13 lifetimes / 1040 days
pseudonym start value 200 000 satoshi
mining fee per mix transaction and participant 5000 satoshi
average change rate 288 time slots
change rate deviation 72
mix group size 2
allowed difference to mixing partners 200 000 satoshi
base proof size 4075 B
proof size increase per mix participant 190 B
Parameter variations for Figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11
mix group size { 2, 3, 5, ≥2 }
Parameter variations for Figure 6.13
change rate deviation { 144, 72, 36, 9, 2 }
Parameter variations for Figures 6.12, 6.14 and 6.15
allowed difference to mixing partners { 200 000, 100 000, 50 000, 25 000,12 500, 6250} satoshi
Parameter variations for Figures 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18
# users { 400, 2000, 10 000, 50 000, 100 000 }
Table C.2 Simulation parameters used in Chapter 6.
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